

Studies on Asia

1964

Studies on Asia, 1964 is Volume V in the series

STUDIES ON ASIA, 1964

ROBERT K. SAKAI

Editor

Arthur J. Robins
University of Missouri

Ping-Chia Kuo
Southern Illinois University

Frank H. Tucker
Colorado College

Yung-Hwan Jo
Adams State College

Chong-Do Hah
Lawrence University

Fred R. Von Der Mehden
University of Wisconsin

Scott D. Johnston
Hamline University

Minoo Adenwalla
Lawrence University

Romeyn Taylor
University of Minnesota

Richard B. Landis
Montana State College

J. L. Fischer
Tulane University

Winston L. King
Grinnell College

university of nebraska press

Lincoln • 1964

Copyright © 1964 by the University of Nebraska Press

Library of Congress catalog card number 60 15432

All rights reserved

Manufactured in the United States of America

*No part of this book in excess of 500 words may be reproduced in any form
without permission in writing from the publisher*

Contents

Introduction, by <i>Robert K Sakai</i>	vii
The Foreign Consultant's Role in Newly Developing Countries, by <i>Arthur J Robins</i>	1
Mao Tse-Tung and China's "Poor Peasants," 1927-1957, by <i>Ping-chia Kuo</i>	13
Sino-Soviet Relations as Conditioned by Competition of Factions and Pressure Groups in the U S S R, by <i>Frank Tucker</i>	27
An Interpretation of Professor Kamikawa's View of Japanese Diplomacy, by <i>Yung-Hwan Jo</i>	51
Bitter Diplomacy Postwar Japan-Korea Relations, by <i>Chong-Do Hah</i>	63
Some Aspects of Political Ideology in Malaysia, by <i>Fred R von der Mehden</i>	95
Communist Party Politics in Israel, by <i>Scott D Johnston</i>	105
British Responses to Indian Nationalism—The Irwin Declaration on Dominion Status, 1929, by <i>Mino Adenwalla</i>	121
Founding of the Ming Dynasty as an Event in Chinese Social History, by <i>Romeyn Taylor</i>	143
The Origins of Whampoa Graduates Who Served in the Northern Expedition, by <i>Richard B Landis</i>	149
Family Roles as Conceived by Japanese Children, by <i>J L Fischer</i>	165
Split Selves and Fractured Karma, by <i>Winston L King</i>	175

Introduction

Intellectuals of a few decades ago were impressed by the possibility that the social behavior of human beings could be rationally ordered and explained in scientific terms. Such optimism has been tempered for contemporary scholars with greater awareness of the complexity of human beings who respond or react to factors which are both objective and subjective, rational and irrational. Habits, traditions, past experiences, prejudices, fears, pride, hatred, and ambitions are some of the elements which serve to confound the rational and "scientific" behavior of men. Difficult though the study of man and his social organization may be, however, the need for such research has increased to a point of critical urgency.

The gap of our understanding of national and international attitudes in Asia is particularly wide. Yet it is in Asia that the United States has expended great effort and made many sacrifices to win friends and influence peoples and nations. To be of maximum effectiveness such efforts must be based, not on good will alone, but on understanding derived from conscientious study, observation, and reflection. One aspect of this problem is discussed by Professor Arthur J. Robins, associate director of the School of Social Work, University of Missouri. He describes with clinical objectivity some of the difficulties and pitfalls of "The Foreign Consultant's Role in Newly Developing Countries." Professor Robins speaks not only from his academic background, but also from his year (1955-1956) in India as Fulbright lecturer, Delhi School of Social Work, University of Delhi, and another year (1961-1962) in East Pakistan as Senior Social Welfare Training Advisor, United Nations Technical Assistance Mission.

Communism, as developed by Marx and Lenin, is a notable product of the intellectual optimism of earlier generations. Communist leaders have assumed that the development of societies to a large extent is predictable and controllable. They intend to expedite the progression of societies from one stage into the next, ultimately leading to the establishment of the communist society. On such assumptions Mao Tse-tung formulated his policies for Chinese communism. Professor Ping-chia

Kuo, professor of history at Southern Illinois University, shows how Mao's policies for the "poor peasants" of China evolved over an extensive period of time. The relative smoothness by which the "socialist transformation" was effected in China Kuo attributes to this peasant program. Kuo's study makes interesting collateral reading with the recent volume by Chalmers Johnson, *Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power* (Stanford University Press 1962). Professor Kuo is also author of *China New Age and New Outlook* (New York Alfred A Knopf, 1956).

On the other hand, none of the sages of modern communism, including Mao, foresaw the present deep rift between the two giant communist countries. An up-to-date review of this Sino-Soviet split is provided by Professor Frank H. Tucker of Colorado College. Tucker focuses his attention on the various domestic factions and pressure groups which have influenced Russia's gyrations from "hard" to "soft" foreign policy.

Geopolitical studies are efforts to reduce the dynamics of international politics into concrete and rational terms. Scholars of geopolitics seek to explain how geography, the physical resources and international spacial relationships, determine national policies toward other nations. An analysis of the ideas of Japan's leading geopolitical theoretician, Professor Hikomatsu Kamikawa, present director of the Japan Institute of International Affairs, is given by Yung-Hwan Jo, assistant professor of political science at Adams State College, Colorado. Professor Jo completed his Ph.D. dissertation recently on "Japanese Geopolitics and the Greater East Asia Co Prosperity Sphere."

Professor Chong-Do Hah, however, disputes that international relations can be explained by rational national responses to given geophysical factors. Especially in the case of Japanese-South Korean relations it would be rational, even in simple terms of power politics, for the two states to stand together against communism and to take advantage of their complementary economic positions. But the actual situation, as described by Hah, is that bitter memories and national prejudices pose difficult barriers to rationalization and normalization of their relationship. Professor Hah received his graduate training at the University of Virginia's Woodrow Wilson School of Foreign Affairs and at

Indiana University He is presently teaching Soviet and Chinese political systems in the Department of Government, Lawrence University

Two studies by Professor Fred R. von der Mehden and Professor Scott D. Johnston contrast the behavior of political parties located in countries at opposite parts of the Asian land mass. The analysis by von der Mehden of the major political parties of Malaysia show varying attitudes toward the importance of ideology, economic programs, and communalism, but the dominant Alliance party composed of Malay, Chinese, and Indian sections has maintained itself in power by its non-doctrinaire, non-communal, and pragmatic program. In Israel the communist party has followed a zig-zag course directed from Moscow and seemingly totally divorced from the practical realities of the domestic situation. The latter interpretation taken in conjunction with the survey of the Sino-Soviet split made by Tucker suggests how centrally directed international communism creates its own internal contradiction. Von der Mehden is chairman of the East Asian Studies Program at the University of Wisconsin, while Johnston is professor of political science at Hamline University.

Minoo Adenwalla, associate professor of government and history at Lawrence University, discusses in detail the formulation of the Irwin Declaration on Indian Dominion Status, 1929. The varying attitudes of Labor, Liberal and Conservative leaders in Great Britain toward reforms in India are delineated against the background of increasingly impatient Indian nationalism.

An aspect of Chinese nationalism comes under the scrutiny of Richard B. Landis, assistant professor of history at Montana State College. The Whampoa Military Academy, which was created by the Kuomintang, provided China with the nucleus of a national army. Landis seeks an insight into the composition of the national revolutionary army by statistically analyzing the places of origin of the Whampoa cadets. Did they come from rural or urban areas, large or small cities? Did they come particularly from certain provinces? The approach adopted by Landis suggests that other political studies of modern China might profitably be correlated with the study of social and economic geography.

For his analysis of "Family Roles as Conceived by Japanese Children," J L Fischer, professor of anthropology at Tulane University, conducted a simple questionnaire survey among one hundred fifty grade school children in the city of Fukuoka during 1961-1962. The social science device utilized by Professor Fischer is of particular interest. Although the sampling was too limited to warrant firm generalizations, the evidence gathered in this survey indicated that, contrary to popular belief, the relationships between children and parents and grandparents and between brothers and sisters have not undergone fundamental alteration in Japan since World War II. In other words, the personalities of family members as seen by the school children of Fukuoka still reflect traditional social values and attitudes.

Another contemporary view of a traditional institution is described by Winston L. King, professor of philosophy at Grinnell College. King reviews and explains the fresh interpretation given to Theravada Buddhism by Mr. T. Magness of Bangkok. The traditional view of man as an illusory being composed of elements temporarily bound together, and which split off and take their separate courses upon death, is essentially a gloomy doctrine. The interpretation given by Magness, however, gives emphasis to the positive force of spiritual deeds which unifies and integrates the elements of being, provides continuity and increases one's awareness of Reality until perfection and Nirvana finally is attained.

Social scientists of the twentieth century owe much to Max Weber, and the term "charisma," popularized by him, has gained widespread currency. However, Professor Romeyn Taylor, who specializes in Chinese history at the University of Minnesota, believes that the term has been overused and misapplied by some scholars. In his examination of the early Ming period Taylor discounts the factor of charismatic influences both in the person of the founder of the dynasty and in the ruling scholar class. Legitimacy and the control of power, it is suggested, are better explained by institutional studies.

Each of the above studies was initially presented at the twelfth annual meeting of the Midwestern Conference on Asian Affairs held at the University of Nebraska, October 18-19, 1963. This

is the fifth volume of an annual series. This series will continue to disseminate primarily the scholarly reports given at the meetings of the Midwestern Conference on Asian Affairs, but non-conference research studies also will be considered for possible inclusion in future issues.

Robert K. Sakai

The Foreign Consultant's Role in Newly Developing Countries

ARTHUR J ROBINS, PH.D.

University of Missouri

International aid programs involve more than the transfer of money, material, and manpower, they also involve the transfer of ideas, usually by the formal process of consultation. It is the purpose of this paper to consider the application of principles of consultation to the role of the consultant in foreign aid programs, and to indicate some of the special considerations dictated by the nature of such programs *

Broadly speaking, "consultation is a process by which expert knowledge and skills are transmitted in a relationship between consultant and consultee for the purposes of problem-solving"¹ The client (hereafter in this paper the "consultee" will be referred to as the "client") is generally a person who is seeking technical help in the area of his professional responsibilities in order more effectively to discharge those responsibilities. Charlotte Towle has noted certain characteristics of traditional forms of consultation: the seeking by one person of the help of another, the basic grounding of the client in the field in which he is seeking help

* The author is Professor of Social Work and Associate Director, School of Social Work, University of Missouri. From July, 1956, to July, 1957, he was a Fulbright Lecturer at the Delhi School of Social Work, University of Delhi, India, from July, 1961, to July, 1962, he was Senior Social Welfare Training Advisor, United Nations Technical Assistance Mission to the Government of East Pakistan. The author bears sole responsibility for the content. No official agency of either the Fulbright program or the United Nations necessarily shares the views expressed.

from the expert, the freedom of a client to accept or reject consultation, and the payment by the client for consultation² She has also pointed out that consultation within the context of an agency becomes more complex because the authoritative figures in the agency may have requested consultation on behalf of the client, because the consultant may be anxious when faced with the uncertain goals and content of consultation, and because a coercive element may be introduced when the consultant is the agent of the organization that is financially supporting the client's program

These difficulties, in addition to others, are likely to be present in consultation in international programs The consultant who goes abroad must recognize these departures from traditional consultation and be prepared psychologically to cope with them if he is to avoid the frustration not infrequently suffered by those who have had experience in international consultation

This writer will deal with these differences and their implications within the framework of seven questions which, Lippitt³ suggests, a consultant must ask himself during the course of a consulting relationship The first question concerns definition of the problem, its origin, and the forces that are maintaining it This, of course, implies some theoretical frame of reference which will guide the consultant's analysis of the problem Consultants in international programs must, however, be sufficiently flexible so that they do not structure all their observations in terms of their theoretical orientation or their previous experience in application of theory to problem situations in their home culture The international consultant must have sufficient inner security that he may view his conceptual frame of reference as tentative and be willing continually to test its transferability Although there are undoubtedly some universal truths that are not culture bound, the consultant must be ready to admit that he is not already in full possession of all of these Further, the consultant may not be able to identify which components of his theoretical frame of reference are culture-bound and which are cross-cultural A knowledge of the culture of the client becomes, therefore, an important aspect of international consultation, for the purpose not only of facilitating the consultant's personal adjustments but also of achieving the objectives of consultation

Lippitt's second question is "What are my motives for becoming involved in this helping relationship? What are the bases of my desire to promote change?"⁴ It is, of course, not a new concept to those in the "helping professions" that a professional helper must accept responsibility for a high level of self-awareness about his own values and needs as they influence the helping relationship. In view of the frequently encountered vagueness of the client's definition of his problem and the additional dimension of cultural differences, it is likely that the international consultant's motives and values may affect his perception of the problem and his role in relation to it. The relatively unstructured nature of the problem situation lends increased importance to the consultant's degree of self-awareness and to the limits he sets on his license to intervene in the client system. The motives of the consultant are difficult to unravel, and he may not be conscious of all the forces which motivate him. Motivation may be achievement for the sake of career advancement, motivation may simply be the personal satisfaction which comes from doing well a professional task. These motives are not mutually exclusive nor should differential value be placed on them. Whatever the consultant's motivation, he needs to maintain objectivity, keeping his motives from affecting his evaluations of what is to be done, of how it is to be done, and of what he has done. Objectivity can be facilitated if the consultant is given assurance that job rewards are not necessarily tied to the concrete accomplishments of his mission. This would help to enhance the validity of the consultant's evaluation both of actual and potential accomplishments of the project. The development of vested interest on the part of the consultant in perpetuation of his project is not an uncommon one, particularly for career consultants in the international field.

The fact that international consultation involves a country's specific request for assistance and the fact that the consultant's appointment is subject to the prospective client's approval after a thorough review of his credentials may give false assurance that the question of what justifies intervention will not arise. Such justification frequently does become a real issue. The consultant may find, after arrival in the requesting country, that motivation and capacity are not present in quality and quantity sufficient

for the client to make effective use of consultation. The initially assumed justification, namely, the request for an expert, may not be sustained. The consultant then is faced with the issue of deciding what, if anything, does justify his entering into the client system. Should he retire from the scene as gracefully as possible? Should he remain for the duration of the contract and enjoy a tourist role? Should he search for avenues of service other than through the consultation project? Should he seek to establish a common ground with his client and redefine the consultation project? The choice will largely depend on the response to the remaining of Lippitt's questions.

The third question for the consultant is "What seems to be the present, or potential, motivations of the client toward change and against change?"⁵ Dissatisfaction with the present situation may be the primary dynamic for change in the case of individuals, in fact, the client's discomfort may be as good a measure of his motivation in the consultation situation as it is in the casework situation. Lippitt points out, however, that an organization's request for consultation may be motivated by what he calls "images of potentiality," as compared with an individual's request, which may be motivated by awareness of present difficulties. The former motivation is especially common in international consultation, involving as it usually does newly developing countries which are trying in the shortest possible time to realize long-ignored potentials.

The international consultant, then, must be oriented toward helping the client to achieve his potential instead of being "problem-oriented." The foreign client not only may not have defined his problem but also he may not even feel that he has a problem. One might well wonder what motivated the request for consultation. Cynically, we might conjecture that the consultation request was prepared perhaps by the preceding consultant and was acceded to by the client, who may have no investment at stake and who may welcome any distinguished visitor so long as no substantial financial responsibility is incurred by the client. On the other hand, frequently there is the vague feeling that a consultant would be useful, but no significant problems have been identified. International consultants often hear the protest "If

"I knew what my problems were, then I would not need you" The traditionally oriented consultant who insists on the presence of a problem, might, on hearing this complaint, decide that the client was not ready for consultation and withdraw from the consultative relationship. Lamenting as it may be to the consultant to receive that reaction at the conclusion of a long journey from his home to the client's country, there is some truth to the client's lament. The consultant should not, however, be concerned by the excessive dependence which he may see reflected in the client's protest that he needed to be told what his problems were. The consultant may have to be directive, even aggressive in his approach, although the degree to which he has been accepted will determine how much initiative he may take. The danger is, of course, that the consultant's interpretation of the problems that exist may be accepted only intellectually by the client, and that the latter will not have any emotional investment in the solution of problems which another person has identified for him.

Foreign consultants may find also that their clients do not have the minimum level of competence necessary in order to take advantage of consultation. In this case, they may have to act as teachers of their clients. The temptation to take over operational roles, actually to administer programs, may also be great. Although it may appear that such intervention is welcomed by the floundering client, this writer doubts the wisdom of this modern expression of the idea of the "white man's burden." Driven by the need to produce results, to achieve concrete objectives, the consultant may take over administrative functions, thereby fostering dependency and stifling the development and initiative of his client. Some international consultants have, in fact, chosen such a resolution of the dilemma. This writer would be the first to admit that one can overemphasize the importance of process at the expense of achieving certain specific goals, however, he cannot refrain from viewing the consultant's assumption of an operational role as a usurpation of indigenous responsibility, no matter how willing the abdicating client has been to transfer his burden to the consultant.

Lippitt emphasizes the importance to motivational analysis of

a study of the interdependence between the subparts in the client system "Learning about the supporting and conflicting relationships between subgroups is a crucial task, and success in getting these facts will determine to a great degree whether the consultant is able to develop the necessary and appropriate relationship to the total group and to its various subparts"⁶ The international consultant who is dealing with an administrative hierarchy and with diverse collateral organizations must be especially discreet lest he appear to be identified with the interests of one subgroup. He must consider the fact that the consultation project may have been formulated by an upper echelon group in the client system without the participation, perhaps even without the knowledge, of the lower echelon groups who will be directly involved in the consultation process. The highly placed person may freely admit, without jeopardizing his own emotional security, the professional deficiencies of a subordinate. A serious problem may result when those with whom the consultant must work directly do not feel the need for the service and, further, may actually resist a service which they perceive to be a reflection on their adequacy. Even clients who have asked for consultation, and who therefore are less likely than the involuntary client to be threatened by the connotation of personal incompetence implicit in consultation, may evidence ambivalence. If for no other reason, the client may have anxiety about what the consultant, who perforce has an intimate look into his thought processes, thinks of him.

Since the subordinate in the client system does not usually have the option of rejecting consultation that has been arranged for him, his resistance may be deviously expressed. It may be manifested in unconstructive inertia, or in active undermining of the consultant. On the other hand, he may build up the consultant to flattering proportions. The consultant may become concerned that extravagant evaluations of his reputation may lead to unrealistic expectations of him by the client, and he may discourage the latter from engaging in such self-deceit. My feeling is that frequently the client's magnification of the consultant's proficiency is largely a device to make more palatable the consultant's presence. The consultant might better accept graciously

the greatness that has been thrust upon him, otherwise, he might be robbing his client of a defense mechanism. Under such circumstances, the consultant must guard against developing an exaggerated sense of his own importance. It is, of course, also possible that the plan for the consultation may have originated at a lower echelon of the client system and the desire and awareness of the consultation of members of the upper echelon may be minimal, if not entirely absent. In any event, the different degrees of investment of various subparts in the client system in the success of the consultation project may set limits to what can be accomplished.

Another problem encountered by reason of the need to relate to a client system is that various levels in the hierarchy represented by the system may try to make use of the consultant in obtaining information denied to them as a result of their position in the hierarchy. This again works both ways, that is, the lower levels in the client system may want to know what is going on at the top, and the top may want to know what is going on at the bottom. Both groups may depend on the consultant to bring them intelligence reports. It is up to the consultant in this case to maintain focus on his mission. It may even become necessary for him, depending on how subtle have been the demands on him by the various parts of the client system, to point out to an individual that it is not his function to find out for that person what is going on in other parts of the system. At the same time, such items of intelligence may very well be directly related to the success of the consultation project. This poses a delicate problem. How non-aligned should the consultant be when alignment with certain members of the client system may make for greater progress of the project than alignment with others? The consultant must always emphasize that his advice on any point is dictated by the best interests of the project to which he has been assigned and is not dictated by the personal interests of any individual clients. This may be difficult to do inasmuch as the members of the client system who will seek the consultant's special support, or who will seek to use the consultant as a "spy," may have little difficulty in rationalizing that use of the consultant is desirable in the interests of the program.

The fourth question posed by Lippitt is "What are my resources, as a consultant, for giving the kind of help that seems to be needed now, or that may develop?"⁷ Lippitt, pointing out that consultation involves two types of skills—the analytical skill for the purpose of making diagnoses and the skills for implementation of any action suggested by the diagnosis—recommends having a consultant team. Apparently he believes this would give more continuity to consultation, assuming that the team members would terminate their services at different times and further assuming that members of the team would have among them various skills which might be required for the project. Consulting teams offer another advantage in that they serve to challenge the capacities of the various members. Frequently, in consulting in foreign countries, one may be relatively isolated professionally. The wearing of the mantle of the expert without challenge, together with receiving the deference usually tendered the expert, may make him feel omniscient. The presence of a consultant colleague may avoid this undesirable outcome. It is important that the members of any consultant team share a common orientation to the objective of their project, have clearly defined roles, and accept these roles. Danger lies in the possibility of having a consulting team, the members of which have not had the opportunity of working together before and do not have a common frame of reference. Under these circumstances, individual consultants may vie for favor with the client group, aligning support for their divergent opinions among the clients and disorganizing them by the implicit or explicit demonstration of disagreement among the experts.

The optimum time for a period of consultation is, so far as this writer is concerned, still an unsettled question. The statement that "work expands so as to fill the time available for its completion"⁸ is not entirely frivolous. Time limits are helpful in exerting pressure upon both the consultant and the client to mobilize resources and achieve the goals of the program. The period of time necessary for optimum utilization of a consultant depends on several factors.

1 "Mechanical" difficulties, such as finding housing, acquiring furnishings and such amenities as may be locally important

2 Cultural difficulties, having to do with the degree of "culture-shock," language barriers, etc. The impact on both the consultant and his family must be considered because family related problems will affect the consultant's performance

3 Consultation problems, such as client motivation, capacity, and stability. Also important is the nature of the project, that is, whether it requires only analysis and diagnosis of a problem, or also involves implementation of advice

Lippitt's fifth question is "What preliminary steps of action are needed to explore and establish a consulting relationship?"⁹ The possibility of a pilot project or trial period for the purpose of exploring a possible consulting relationship is particularly important in international consultation. Such a trial period provides an opportunity to establish relationships to all of the different subgroups in a client system, to clarify readiness for change, and to determine the nature of the consultant's role. Getting into contact with the "whole client" is one of the most challenging problems for the international consultant, who frequently has more than one counterpart. It is not unusual for international consultants to have several different individuals with whom they consult at any time during the course of a project. The length of time required for consultation may be a function of whether such pre-consultation has taken place. The consultant's sponsoring organizations should make this preliminary exploration in considerable detail. It might be said that the consultant should do this "spade work" himself, however, practical considerations dictate that this be done before the arrival of the consultant, particularly when his period of availability may be limited.

Lippitt's sixth question is "How do I, as consultant, guide and adapt to the different phases of the process of changing?"¹⁰ Lippitt, *et al* identified seven phases of consultation: (1) the development of a need for change, (2) the establishment of a consulting relationship, (3) clarification of a client problem, (4) the examination of alternative solutions and goals, (5) the transformation of intentions into actual change efforts, (6) the generalization and stabilization of a new level of functioning or group structure, (7) achieving a terminal relationship with the

consultant and a continuity of change ability.¹¹ These phases can be analyzed with reference to the nature of the consultation skills which will facilitate achievement of the objectives of each phase. The first three phases may call largely for skills in the process of consultation, the latter, for skills in training. Lippitt points out that the attitude of the consultant most appropriate to the former role may be a non-directive one, in contrast to the directiveness appropriate to the training role. This writer has already indicated that international consultation may require considerable directiveness throughout the relationship. It should be recognized that a large amount of overlap may be present among the various phases, hence, the consultant must be versatile enough to play the role appropriate at any given time. He must be able to help the client to formulate goals as well as to teach him the skills necessary to achieve the goals. If the consultant has been successful in the initial phases and has stimulated the client to delineate his problems and to want to do something about them, then it will indeed be disheartening if he does not have the skill to help them through the remaining phases or if he does not have the time to do so.

Lippitt's last question is "How do I help promote a continuity of creative changeability?"¹² Consultation is successful to the degree to which not only the initial problem has been resolved but also to the degree to which the client's competence to cope independently with future difficulties has been enhanced. The criteria for success must include both components. If the client has not reached some level of achievement with respect to immediate goals, then he will not have the feeling of self-confidence on which further achievement can be based, and which will enable him to take the inevitable future failures in stride. International consultation may involve redefinition of immediate goals so that they are feasible. The levels of aspiration are likely to be impractically high because newly developing countries typically feel under pressure to compress their development within short time spans. On the one hand, it is the international consultant's function to help the client to quicken the pace of progress by taking advantage of lessons offered by the evolution of similar programs elsewhere, on the other hand, the consultant may have

to slow the client if conditions crucial to sound progress are not present

Continuity of consultation depends not only on the consultant but also on the client. Not infrequently in international consultation, the rate of turnover of client personnel may exceed that of consultant personnel. Assurances of stability of client personnel should be a precondition to establishment of a consultation project, however, the practices followed by many newly developing countries may result in frequent transfer of civil servants, particularly at the administrative levels in the client system. Such transfer may take one's client into a field entirely different from that of the consultation project.

Eventually, of course, it is the consultant's goal to do himself out of a job. He must avoid developing any investment in continuing the project beyond the point where it has outlived its need. The deference which an international consultant may receive, the client's tendency to exaggerate the consultant's expertness, the consultant's control over grants-in-aid, fellowships for foreign study, etc., make it easy for the consultant to fall into a paternalistic pattern of behavior. He must avoid any action which tends to tie the client to his "apron strings." Beckhard has suggested that consultants should withdraw for periods of time so as to permit the client some independence of action.¹⁸ A planned break in the consultation project would offer the client the opportunity of testing out any learning gained in the consultation relationship. Also, an occasional interlude at home may provide an antidote to the overweening pride to which international consultants are vulnerable and restore the requisite humility.

The problems of international consultation probably differ more in degree than in kind from those of traditional consultation, but the consultant who is conscious neither of the basic principles nor of their application in international settings may be ineffective and frustrated. This is not to place the onus for the success or failure of consultation projects entirely on the shoulders of the consultant. A set of questions, analogous to those Lippitt poses to the consultant, could also be developed for each prospective client to ask himself. It is the writer's impression that

many organizations which sponsor international consultative programs have not, unfortunately, been sufficiently aware of the fact that consultants must have competence not only in their substantive fields but also in the consultant-client relationships. The affective aspects of international consultation loom as large as the intellectual aspects. Knowledge and skill related to the process of consultation per se is as important as both knowledge of the substantive aspects of the field in which the consultant is operating and skill in the application of that knowledge to a foreign situation.

NOTES

1 The Workshop on the Consultation Process, "Closing Summary" (Chicago School of Social Service Administration, University of Chicago, 1951) p. 1 (mimeographed)

2 Charlotte Towle, "Consultation: Frame of Reference for Group Discussion and Application in Specific Situations" (Chicago School of Social Service Administration, University of Chicago, 1949), p. 1 (mimeographed)

3 Ronald Lippitt, "Dimensions of the Consultant's Job," *The Journal of Social Issues*, XV (1959), 5-12

4 *Ibid.*, p. 7

5 *Ibid.*, p. 8

6 *Ibid.*, p. 9

7 *Ibid.*

8 C. Northcote Parkinson, *Parkinson's Law and Other Studies in Administration* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1962), p. 2

9 *Ibid.*, p. 9

10 *Ibid.*, p. 10

11 *Ibid.*, citing Ronald Lippitt, Jeanne Watson, and Bruce Westley, *The Dynamics of Planned Change* (New York: Harcourt, Brace Co., 1958)

12 *Ibid.*, p. 11

13 Richard Beckhard, "Helping a Group With Planned Change: A Case Study," *The Journal of Social Issues*, XV (1959), 19

Mao Tse-tung and China's "Poor Peasants," 1927-1957

PING-CHIA KUO

Southern Illinois University

It is generally assumed that after the Communists were driven underground by the Kuomintang in the summer of 1927, the outgrowth was the agrarian revolution in the Kiangsi-Hunan-Fukien area. However, the genesis of the agrarian revolution went back at least to 1925, when Mao Tse-tung, serving at that time as Director of the Peasant Movement Training Center in Canton, directed peasant organization work in his native province, Hunan.¹ The experience which Mao gained in this period laid the foundation of the agrarian revolution which spread through Central China after 1927 and ultimately led to the completion of "socialist transformation" thirty years later.

Few documents in modern Chinese history are more significant than the "Report on an Investigation of the Peasant Movement in Hunan," which Mao wrote in February, 1927.² In this report, Mao spoke with clarity and conviction about the necessity for the Chinese Communist Party to work with the Poor Peasants as a class in order to win the revolution. According to Mao, China's peasant masses were undergoing a process of internal split. The Rich Peasants, who together with the landlords represented 10 per cent of the population but owned 50 per cent of the land, were feudalistic and opposed to revolution. The Middle Peasants, who represented 20 per cent of the population and owned 15 per cent of the land, were self-sufficient and non-exploiting, but capable of being made friends of the revolution. The logical followers of the Chinese Communist Party as

the party of the proletariat, however, were the vast class of the Poor Peasants, who represented 70 per cent of the population and owned only 10-15 per cent of the land. Whether they were peasants with too little land to be self-sustaining (whom Mao called the "Secondary Poor") or hired hands with no land at all (whom Mao called the "Naked Poor"), they formed the greatest propelling force for revolution. So Mao advocated a militant program to rely on the Poor Peasants, ally with the Middle Peasants, and liquidate the Rich Peasants and the Landlords.³

In the spread of the Chinese soviets in the Kiangsi-Hunan-Fukien area from 1927 to 1934 (that is, from the Ching-kan-shan experiment to the Long March), the crucial instrument which the Party used to organize the Poor Peasants was the Peasant Association. According to eyewitness accounts, the function of the Party was to organize and direct the P'in-Nung-T'uan (Poor Peasant Corps), which in turn supervised the Ku-Nung-T'uan (Hired Hands Corps) and the K'u-Li-Kung-Hui (Coolies Union). Activist elements from these bodies were selected to be the chairmen and members of the Peasant Associations at the *hsiang* level.⁴ Whenever the Peasant Associations met, the soviets sent officers to direct their proceedings. Likewise, whenever the soviets met, the chairmen of the Peasant Associations were invited to attend. But the Peasant Associations always supported—never supplanted—the decrees of the soviets.⁵

In several vital areas, the Party was able to enlist the enthusiastic support of the Poor Peasants. First, of course, the Poor Peasants supported the Party in the liquidation of the village bosses and the gentry, the confiscation and redistribution of their land, and the establishment of a revolutionary government. Second, the Poor Peasants willingly met the requisitions of grain. Third, they organized themselves, as directed by the Party, into labor-exchange brigades and labor teams, for the sake of increasing production. Fourth, they answered the draft for the Red Army, and developed guerrilla warfare which engulfed the Kuomintang forces in six major campaigns (1930-1933). The success of these measures made it possible to win over most of the Middle Peasants to the cause of the revolution.⁶ During these years, the fact that the peasant masses feared falling again under the control of the Kuomintang government and landlordism con-

tributed much to their continued support of the Communist Party and its program.⁷

The Communists were driven out of Kiangsi not because of the failure of this program but because of Kuomintang blockade. However, after they moved to northern Shensi in 1934-1935, the situation changed. Here, in the northwest, the Poor Peasants represented only 25 per cent of the rural population. Many factors which bound the Party and the peasant masses together were absent.⁸ The Yen-an government, therefore, abandoned the land reform program and turned to the reduction of rent and interest.⁹ The objective was to win the support of all classes of peasants rather than to work with the Poor Peasants alone against the rest of the rural population. Thus during the years from 1934 to 1937, the working relationship between the Party and the Poor Peasants was at its weakest. Communist policy in this period leaned heavily on exploiting the issues of resistance against Japan, which ultimately led to the Sian kidnapping of General Chiang Kai-shek, the formation of the "united front," and the outbreak of total war against Japan.¹⁰

No immediate change occurred after the commencement of the war. Beginning with 1939, however, the "united front" began to break, and the Kuomintang once again instituted a blockade to throttle the economy of the Communist region in the northwest. Under the circumstances, the need for higher production within the area again brought the Party and the peasants into a closer relationship. Drawing his lesson from certain types of group farming practiced in Kiangsi days,¹¹ Mao Tse-tung now ordered the formation of Pien-Kung-T'ui (Labor-exchange brigade) and Cha-Kung-T'ui (labor-pool brigade). Under the former, the peasants exchanged labor with one another so that every fragment of farm land was carefully cultivated without fail. The labor days spent by one peasant on the farm of another were cancelled against the labor days spent "the other way around." Any differential after the mutual cancellation was compensated in wages paid by the recipient of the uncanceled labor. Under Cha-Kung-T'ui, the Poor Peasants with insignificant amounts of land were hired by other peasants to devote their surplus labor to the cultivation of their farms.¹²

The outcome of these measures was a noticeable increase in

production In his lecture "On Cooperatives," Mao said that two peasants now produced what it took three to produce under the individual system¹³ At the same time, with heightened enthusiasm aroused among the peasant masses, the Party met with widespread support in embarking upon other forms of mass organization, notably the consumers' cooperatives, the transportation cooperatives (especially for the transport of salt), the credit cooperatives, and the handicrafts cooperatives¹⁴ So in the latter years of the war (1943-1945), the Communist Party discovered that "cooperativization" not only helped increase production but could open up powerful means for manipulating the support of the peasant masses¹⁵

The decade following the end of the war witnessed the extension of Communist control from North China to the entire country and the successful achievement of "socialist transformation" The tasks involved were stupendous Yet the concepts and techniques of working with the peasant masses, as developed in the Kiangsi and Yenan periods, were adhered to with remarkable continuity The following sections of this study will be devoted to a close-up view of these developments

First, let us examine the extension of land reform from North China to the rest of the country It will be recalled that the war against Japan was followed by the great civil war which ended in the defeat of the Kuomintang government in 1949 There was therefore a continuous process of "liberation" from north to south In all of Northwest China, and in the Old Liberated Areas¹⁶ of North China and Northeast China, the land reform movement was completed by the winter of 1947-1948 In the New Liberated Areas of Northeast China, it was completed by the winter of 1948-1949, and in the New Liberated Areas of North China, a year later As to land reform in the rest of the country, the work began with the adoption of the Land Reform Law of June 30, 1950,¹⁷ and was completed by the close of 1952

The guidelines for the last phase of this gigantic operation were contained in two basic documents The first document was "Decision concerning the Classification of Percentages of Rural Classes" adopted on August 4, 1950¹⁸ Five classes were enumerated Landlords, Rich Peasants, Middle Peasants, Poor Peas-

ants, and Farm Laborers This was in effect a restatement of the Kiangsi document "How to Analyze Rural Classes" The second document was "Organic Law of the Peasant Associations"¹⁰ Again it was a reaffirmation of the Kiangsi program The majority of the members of the Peasant Associations were Poor Peasants, while Middle Peasants were encouraged to join and Rich Peasants were excluded²⁰

A standard procedure was followed by every village undergoing land reform In the first stage, Party cadres were sent from the provincial capital They began their work by visiting the Poor Peasants Soon they would "sink roots and form links," that is, organize party cells among the Poor Peasants Then followed public meetings where the Poor Peasants were encouraged to air their grievances In the second stage, the Party would lead the Peasant Associations to define the class status of every individual, and on that basis proceed to redistribute land This task consisted of five steps: exchange of opinion, discussion and adjudication, examination, adoption of decision, and ratification Upon ratification, a public celebration would be held to mark the emancipation of the peasants In the third and final stage, the Party cadres would doublecheck the ownership status and class status of the peasants This was to eliminate abuses or "secret deals" that might be made by some Poor Peasants with the Rich Peasants Upon satisfactory ratification, deeds would be issued to the new owners At this point, a special effort would be made to strengthen the Poor-Peasant leadership in the Peasant Associations²¹

The most notable effect of the land reform movement was liquidating the landlords and easing the lot of the Poor Peasants The popular slogan at the time was "fan sheng" ("turn over oneself," meaning a change of fortunes) However, it also enabled the Communist government to exercise direct and complete control over the masses, since no intervening class now stood between the government and the governed

No sooner had the land reform movement been completed than the government proceeded to urge "Let's Organize." This was the drastic step to move from land reform to socialization Elaborating the concept of "cooperativization" which Mao dis-

covered in Yen-an, this new phase of Communist policy in effect asked the peasants to give up what they had just gained, and to embark upon "socialist transformation" which actually nullified land reform²²

The Communist authorities carried out "socialist transformation" progressively, establishing in succession (1) mutual aid team, short-term type, (2) mutual-aid team, long-term type, (3) low-grade producers' cooperative, and (4) high grade producers' cooperative. In the first three stages, which were carried out in 1952-1955, the government relied on the Poor Peasants but continued to seek the cooperation of the Middle Peasants. In the fourth and last stage, accomplished in 1955-1957, however, the Middle Peasants were reduced to the same level as the Poor Peasants, thereby achieving the full effects of socialization²³

Under the short-term type of mutual aid team, the pooling of labor during the cropping season carried tremendous appeal to all classes (the Middle Peasants as well as the Poor Peasants) owing to the overall increase in production. Then, the government moved on to the long-term type of mutual-aid team, under which draft animals and farm equipment were likewise pooled and the team continued on a permanent basis instead of disbanding after the harvest. In this stage, new incentives were created for the Poor Peasants because they derived immense benefits from the use of the animals and equipment of the Middle Peasants, and because the permanence of the team assured them that these valuable assets would not be taken away from them.

This was the method by which the Communist government developed new potentials of mass support during the first two stages of socialization. Up to this point, each peasant selected the crop he wished to plant on his land. In other words, ownership of the land was effectively exercised by the individual peasant.

With the formation of the low-grade producers' cooperatives, which embraced from twenty to fifty households, the pooling of land took place. Here, private ownership was maintained only in principle, since the choice of crop was made by the Party cadres for the entire membership of the cooperative. When the crop was harvested, a certain portion was first set aside for the government. The next portion was earmarked for seeds for the following

season. The balance was then divided among the members on the basis of their respective investments, in accordance with this ratio: land, to count for 30 per cent, labor, 60 per cent, and animals and equipment, 10 per cent.

The pooling of land under the low grade producers' cooperative was a step of tremendous significance to the Poor Peasants and the government alike. Once land was placed under the cooperative, the Poor Peasants would always have land to cultivate, while the government became better able to manage the totality of the means of production. Thus the identification of the government and the Poor Peasants was further strengthened. That the government was fully aware of this fact was borne out by an abundance of evidence. For instance, in Huai-yin district (in Kiangsu), over 95 per cent of the support for the establishment of these cooperatives came from the Poor Peasants, while 50 per cent of the Middle Peasants were either hesitant or negative.²⁴ In Hunan, the government took energetic steps to build up Poor-Peasant predominance in the cooperatives, insuring a two thirds majority of the membership.²⁵ In certain cooperatives in the Changsha area, Party cadres gave special support to the "righteous views" of the Poor Peasants and publicized their model accomplishments until the Middle Peasants fell in line.²⁶ In other cooperatives, loans and credits were given extensively to the Poor Peasants to make it possible for them to "perform their work in peace." Similar experiences can be cited in many other parts of the country.²⁷

Throughout the three stages discussed so far, the government's success was attributable to a number of factors. First, the sense of becoming a successful independent farmer was too weak among the Poor Peasants to develop into any effective resistance against government orders. Second, the Poor Peasant was in constant danger of being overtaken by the Middle Peasant, and consequently welcomed the strong hand of a third party (that is, the government) to restrain such competition. Third, the Poor Peasant believed that his lot would not be worse if he worked as a member of a cooperative.²⁸ Fourth, the Poor Peasant knew from the experience of the Yen-an days that when "Let's Organize" was put into effect, the new form of production brought a larger

yield for the village as a whole. These elements of Poor-Peasant psychology were characteristic of the changes in China in these years, changes which were radically different from those under Stalin in Russia.

The fact that the institutional changes in these years of socialization were unfailingly accompanied by increased production which brought tangible benefits to the peasant masses, is especially worthy of note. It avoided the unfortunate experiences of Stalinist Russia when tremendous pressure was exerted for institutional changes only thereby bringing on a class war at once brutal and destructive. In the Chinese situation, the authorities used "mutual benefit" to induce "voluntary joining." By the phrase "voluntary joining," Peking really meant that when the socialization process was coupled with increased production, the extent and tempo of the institutional changes were less harsh, more flexible, and consequently more acceptable.

The low-grade producers' cooperative, however, fell short of the ultimate objective of the Communist government. While land was pooled, its ownership was not frozen. The fact that land counted 30 per cent in the division of income operated to the advantage of the Middle Peasants. In time they could form a new class of thriving peasants, to whom certain Poor Peasants would once again lose their meager holdings.

Moreover, during these same years, the First Five-Year Plan went into effect. To accumulate domestic capital for industrial construction, the government needed full access to the nation's agricultural output—to feed city workers, to furnish raw materials to the industries, and to send exports abroad in exchange for industrial equipment. The "capitalistic" operations of the Middle Peasants had to cease in order to remove any threat to the government's program. For a while—from the autumn of 1953 to the spring of 1955—the government resorted to planned buying and distribution of foodgrains by the state. This gigantic undertaking was enforced with reasonable success. However, the Communist authorities realized that so long as private ownership existed, the government would in the end be the loser. The state monopoly could serve as a *modus vivendi*, it could not bring the

permanent solution²⁹ Accordingly, by the summer of 1955, the government decided to embark on the fourth and final stage of socialization, namely, the establishment of the high-grade producers' cooperatives³⁰ In the following paragraphs, the term "collective" will be used interchangeably with the term "high-grade producers' cooperative", and the term "collectivization" denotes the fourth and final stage of "cooperativization"

For some time prior to this, experiments with collective farms had been going on in Manchuria³¹ The satisfactory outcome of these experiments, which included large-scale land rearrangement, unified planting of the same crop, improved farming techniques, change from single crop to double crop, change from low-production crop to high-production crop, and better utilization of manpower, convinced the authorities in Peking that collectivization on a nationwide scale would be entirely feasible³²

The new program was made public in Mao Tse-tung's historic speech on "The Question of Agricultural Cooperation" on July 31, 1955³³ By November, 1955, the movement was in full swing In the high-grade producers' cooperatives thus set up, each had a membership of some 300 households as a rule³⁴ This advanced-type cooperative differed from its predecessors in that no peasant received any compensation for the use of his land Other means of production such as draft animals and farm equipment taken into the cooperative likewise ceased to count as bases for differential remuneration³⁵ In this way, all vestiges of private ownership were replaced by collective ownership Rent, profit, and interest were outlawed, leaving wages as the only form of income From now on, the Middle Peasants ceased to exist as a class that operated to the detriment of both the Poor Peasants and the government

Those Poor Peasants who had neither land nor animals nor equipment to contribute to the collective at the time of its establishment acquired membership with the assistance of the State Bank, which granted loans to finance their payment into the "Fund in Shares" The Poor Peasants contracted to repay these loans out of their wages over a period of five years This was further proof of the government's policy to equalize the class

status of all peasants³⁶ This leveling process was perhaps the most revolutionary measure in the entire course of the socialization of Chinese agriculture

A word is necessary here to underscore the careful procedure followed by the Communist authorities to insure the success of collectivization It is true that Rich Peasants in China did not possess the economic strength of the kulaks in Russia Still Peking took steps well in advance to undermine whatever strength they did possess In the Old Liberated Areas, the percentage of the Rich Peasants had been reduced to 1 per cent, and in the New Liberated Areas to 3 per cent, at the time of collectivization The admission of members also followed a neat procedure All the Poor Peasants (that is, currently landless) and the New Middle Peasants (landless prior to 1949) were taken into the collectives without exception But the Old Middle Peasants (that is, self-sustaining and with the status of Middle Peasants prior to 1949) were kept under observation and were not admitted until after they had successfully undergone "political reform" As to the former Rich Peasants, landlords, and counter-revolutionaries, they were kept out until the collective had become a going concern, with 75 per cent of the region's total population enrolled as members³⁷ This is what Anastas Mikoyan meant when he said "The Chinese comrades, guided by Russian experience, are avoiding our mistakes and are overcoming difficulties more easily The Chinese Communist Party has manifested great wisdom, courage, and organizing ability"³⁸

The amazing aspect of the entire collectivization drive was its speedy success Mao Tse-tung himself was surprised In 1953, the government estimated that 20 per cent of the peasant households would be incorporated into the high-grade producers' cooperatives by 1957 Yet once the drive was launched in the summer and autumn of 1955, more than 60 per cent of the nation's peasant households joined such collectives during the winter of 1955-1956 By the following winter, the figure had reached 90 per cent, leaving only certain remote regions beyond collectivization Thus by early 1957 the battle for the socialization of agriculture had been won by Peking

From 1957 onward, Communist agricultural policy moved

into a new epoch. As "socialist transformation" gave way to "socialist construction," the problem was no longer one of institutional revolution by utilizing the Poor Peasant class to achieve "cooperativization." The problem of the new epoch was to mobilize the total agricultural population, now without class distinction, in quest of new formulas for economic growth, such as the "Great Leap Forward" and the Commune movement. Yet it must be stressed that neither of these drives would have been possible but for the foundations laid prior to 1957. The inception, evolution, and perfection of a revolution, based specifically upon the support of the Poor Peasant sector, represented a historical development of supreme importance. It was this long drawn-out process, stretching over thirty years and bearing the imprint of Mao Tse-tung's leadership at every stage, that destroyed the old order and gave strength to the new.

Mao Tse-tung's contributions to the theory and practice of Communism, of course, do not stop with "cooperativization." Currently, new and interesting developments are taking place in the Communes. The prospect of self-sufficiency in the rural townships (*hsiang*) and of subsidiary industrialization in the very midst of agriculture is no less significant than the program reviewed in this study. But the issue is no longer the utilization of the Poor Peasants, and consequently comes under a separate heading and calls for a separate study.

NOTES

1 There were a million members in Peasant Associations of various descriptions at the commencement of the Northern Expedition in June, 1926, according to Mao's report in 1927. See footnote 2.

2 See 湖南農民運動政府報告 見毛澤東選集卷一 PP 220-222

3 The Poor Peasant class as defined by Mao Tse-tung was roughly identical to the destitute mass called "P₁ Tse" by the gentry. The Chinese Communist Party's official definition of peasant classes, which was contained in the document "How to Analyze Rural Classes" published in Juichin in 1933, was in essence an elaboration of Mao's classification in the 1927 Report.

See 怎樣分析農村階級 (中共, 1933)

4 In Hengshan district (Hunan), the officers of the hsiang Peasant Associations comprised Naked Poor, 50 per cent, Secondary Poor, 40 per cent, Poverty stricken intellectuals, 10 per cent See Mao's 1927 Report

5 One of the best eyewitness accounts of this period is

成聖昌 青區土地問題 見國聞週報 Vol 10, Nos 22, 26, 28 (June 5, July 3, July 17, 1933) See also 秦琪生 青區土地分配的成績與程序, 見國聞週報 Vol 12, Nos 7, 16 (Feb 25, Apr 29, 1935)

6 Victor H Yakhontoff, *The Chinese Soviets* (New York, 1934)

7 It is interesting to note that after the Communists were dislodged from Kiangsi in 1934, the Kuomintang restored landlordism in the former soviet areas

8 This was an area where an independent Communist leader, Kao Kan, had been organizing the peasants Judging from his lack of success, Ma concluded that to introduce the Kiangsi type agrarian revolution would bring more popular disaffection than popular support

9 Only the land of the absentee landlords was confiscated during this period

10 For conditions in the Shensi Kansu Ninghsia Border Region during this period, see eyewitness accounts by Huang Yen pei, Edgar Snow, Gunther Stein, and Harrison Forman

11 Rudimentary forms of labor exchange and mutual aid were practiced in the Kiangsi soviets, when teams comprising six or seven households used their labor, tools, and animals to full capacity in cultivating, planning, weeding, and harvesting Nothing was left idle, everything was done on time Larger yields were obtained in the autumn The smaller unit of such a team was known as "tso", the larger unit was known as "shih" See

墾荒問題與財政問題 見毛華東選集卷四 pp 36-44

12 On peasant movements under Communist leadership during the years of the war against Japan, see 鄭位三編 抗日戰爭中的農民運動

13 See 論合作社 見毛華東選集卷四 p 207

14 See 組織起來 見毛華東選集卷四 p 217

15 In Mao's lecture "On Cooperatives," it was actually envisaged that the process of socializing agriculture should start with mutual aid teams and producers' cooperatives and culminate in collectives

16 The adjectives "Old" and "New" in this usage denote "pre 1947" and "post-1947" respectively

17 土地改革重要文獻彙集 (北京, 1951)

18 *Ibid*

19 *Ibid*

20 See Article 2, Section 4 of Organic Law of the Peasant Associations"

21 土地改革法 (1951)

22 Article 54 of the Common Program said: "In all areas where land reform has been thoroughly carried out the government should organize the peasants and all labor force applicable to agriculture, in order to develop agricultural production and other auxiliary enterprises, the government should also lead the peasants to move gradually and according to the principle of voluntary entry and mutual advantage to form all kinds of mutual aid and cooperation for production. In November, 1951 a 'Directive concerning Work in Rural Villages after Land Reform' urged the peasant masses to move from individual to collective production and set up producers' cooperatives."

23 For a sympathetic account see Solomon Adler, *The Chinese Economy* (New York, 1957) pp 104-127. A more skeptical view is contained in

李天民 如此山農民 (1958)

24 合作社的全面開展 (1955, 11月14日農業生產合作社, Oct. 1955)

25 關於之: 水山嶺山印武地... 見胡胡五山... July 26, 1955

26 *Ibid* The government's role in helping to build up Poor Peasant pre-eminence in the cooperatives can be seen from the following editorial in the magazine *Mutual aid and Cooperativization* (Changsha, July 26, 1955): "In the process of cooperativization, we must pay attention to (i) Present-day Poor Peasants who are still hard pressed in their livelihood, (ii) Low Middle Peasants among the New Middle Peasants, (iii) Low Middle Peasants among the Old Middle Peasants. We should first of all take these groups by batches into the cooperatives, as they would more readily accept socialist transformation. Any cooperative must establish and maintain the superiority of the Poor Peasants. In composition they should represent $\frac{2}{3}$ of the membership, while the Middle Peasants might form $\frac{1}{3}$."

27 See, for example, 誰說雞毛不能上天 (1955, 11月14日農業生產合作社, 11月14日) 見河南日報 Nov. 2 1955) See also 中共中央辦公廳編 中國農村的社會

主義高潮 (1956), pp 35-47

28 李天民 中共與農民 pp 106 ff

29 See *Economic Survey of Asia and the Far East for 1957* (United Nations, 1958), pp 97-98

30 In contemporary literature, the high grade producers' cooperative was often referred to as the 'Large Cooperative,' in contrast to the low-grade producers' cooperative which was commonly called the 'Small Cooperative.'

31 The process of cooperativization was first tried out and proved to be feasible in Kirin, in Manchuria, during the years 1947-1950. It went through these stages: (i) Mutual aid team system, (ii) Labor day unit system, (iii) Production quota system, and (iv) Fund in Shares system.

(i) 互助生產制 (ii) 勞動日工制 (iii) 生產分紅制 (iv) 土地入股制
This pioneer cooperative took its cue from the "Let's Organize" experience of Yenan days. Later it became the model for the drive for socialization for all of China in 1953-1957. See 劉王璋等著 金時龍農村生產合作社 (重慶, 1952).

32 See 大社的優越性 (中共新華書店發售 Sept. 21, 1955)

33 農業合作化問題 (中共, 1955)

34 This was the general rule in the plains. The average size of a high grade producers' cooperative in hilly regions was 200 households, and in mountainous areas, 100 households. It may be recalled that average size of a low grade producers' cooperative in the plains was 20 to 50 households. Hence, as explained in footnote 25, the high grade producers' cooperative was referred to as the "Large Cooperatives" while the low grade producers' cooperative was referred to as the "Small Cooperative."

35 Animals and equipment taken into the collectives were paid for by instalments in three to five years, after which their ownership belonged to the collectives.

36 高級農業生產合作社工作章程 (中共, 1956)

37 全上

38 *Current Digest of Soviet Press*, VIII (October 31, 1956) 6 ff

Sino-Soviet Relations as Conditioned by Competition of Factions and Pressure Groups in the U.S.S.R.

FRANK H. TUCKER

Colorado College

In surveying here the course of Sino-Soviet relations from 1960 to 1963, it is particularly interesting to see how these events may relate to activities of the factions and pressure groups in the Soviet Union. This relationship is, naturally, a two-way street: the groups or cliques affect the Sino-Soviet diplomacy, and the events, in turn, affect the groups themselves.

As a beginning, let us see just what factions and pressure groups are discernible. We can make them out only dimly or indirectly, as a rule, because the Soviet Union does not have the overt partisanship or the open lobbying and publicity campaigns used by pressure groups and rivals in a Western democracy.

First, in the Soviet Party and government, there has been historically a spectrum of "left, center, and right" leaders within the Bolshevik or Communist Party. Robert V. Daniels, in his *Conscience of the Revolution: Communist Opposition in Soviet Russia*,¹ makes this very clear, particularly with his appended charts of cleavages in the Party from 1917 to 1930. Besides the left-right dimension, he discerns a "hard-soft" dimension among the factions. Thus, in the 1928 to 1930 period, he places Stalin on the "right" end of his chart, and in the "hard" corner, with Bukharin and Rykov on the right, too, but less "hard."

At present, the word "right" or "conservative" may give varying impressions, and so I would prefer to substitute the word "doctrinaire," applying it to the neo-Stalinists, among others. Similarly, for the de-Stalinizers, we might use the term "flexible," rather than "left" or "liberal." At varying times, we have seen in the doctrinaire group such men as Molotov, Kaganovich, and Kozlov, while, among those showing more flexibility, have been Malenkov and Mikoyan.* Between the two groupings, pre-empting the center like the superb politician he is, appears Premier Khrushchev, aided by such other "centrists" as Suslov.

The Twenty-first Party Congress of January and February, 1959, gave indications of how other leaders fitted into this spectrum. Many of them spoke to the Congress about the "anti-Party group" of Molotov, Kaganovich and Malenkov. Spiridonov, the Leningrad Party Secretary, Presidium members Nikolai Ignatov and Nikolai Podgorny, Pavel Yudin (Ambassador to China), and Aleksandr Shelepin, head of the KGB, all denounced them strongly. Shelepin likened them to "Trotskyites and Rightists." Suslov, who had supported and later renounced the anti-Party group, Mikoyan, Aristov, and Kosygin made critical but less violent comments, as did Kirichenko, Kozlov, Furtseva, Brezhnev, and Marshal Malinovsky.

Nineteen other speakers expressed no views on the anti-Party group.² Of the ten men in the Presidium of the Central Committee after Stalin's death there remained in the office as of May, 1963, only Khrushchev, Mikoyan, and Suslov. The other members in 1963 were Kuusinen and Shvernik (old hands in the top echelons of the Party), Brezhnev, and Kozlov, both elected in 1957, Kosygin (who, like Mikoyan and Kozlov, is a First

* Donald Zagoria, in *The Sino Soviet Conflict* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962), shows on pp. 156, 278, 378 and 405 how, in the 1950's, the latter persons stressed the dangers of nuclear war, the power of mutual deterrence, and the desirability of more consumer goods production. In this, the former group opposed them. The Chinese, of all the Communist Parties, showed the least enthusiasm for Khrushchev's purge of the "anti-Party group," though the Chinese had disliked Malenkov's emphasis on consumer goods because of its bad effect on availability of aid to China. See also "Mikoyan—Communist Trouble Shooter", *Communist Affairs*, December, 1962, pp. 19-22.

Deputy Premier), Kirilenko, Podgorny, Polyansky, and Voronov³

Now aside from being generally doctrinaire or flexible, what pressure groups or cliques have these two schools of political leaders used for their support? Let us take as one potential pressure group the industrial managers and coordinators, the men who actually operate the Russian apparatus of production. Their motives are certainly not altogether homogeneous, for example, the heavy industry specialists surely agreed with the doctrinaire group in its continuing stress on development of heavy industry, and the armaments plant personnel would have a natural professional interest in a continuing high level of production in their area. However, the other segments of the economy are enhanced by an emphasis on consumer goods production, an emphasis that presupposes a relatively peaceable national posture, with a moderated level of armament programs.

Then, too, the typical factory manager or economic planner desires a healthy rate of capital reinvestment, plant expansion, and replacement of obsolescent equipment. With this aim is compatible neither runaway militarism nor excessive catering to the public appetite for consumer goods. We can conclude, really, that the industry people are heterogeneous, but not generally inclined to back up a doctrinaire or ultra-militarist faction. That they are an influential body is best proven by Khrushchev's action in 1957 to abolish many powerful, national-level industrial ministries, for which he substituted less cohesive, less prestigious, regionally organized economic structures.

It is important to remember that the Soviet economy has a less ample base than our own, so that greater allocations of resources to major programs can only mean painful cutbacks elsewhere. A prime example is the Soviet missile and space program: its importance to the Soviet military planners hardly requires explanation, and it is important to the entire regime as a source of public pride and international prestige. At the same time, its budgetary bite is more painful than that of a similar program in the United States. Similarly, the Soviet foreign aid programs, though far smaller than the American ones, make unwelcome demands on the national economy. In this sense alone, the cut-back and virtual termination of the loans and aid programs for

China was, without a doubt, very welcome to the Soviet economic and financial planners *

Some authorities believe that the Sino-Soviet conflict was caused primarily by the Soviet government's refusal to allot huge resources to develop Chinese industry—a refusal which occurred because the people of Russia could not and would not tolerate a gigantic aid-to-China program † “Public opinion,” then, big and vague as it may be, is one more pressure of importance in the dynamics even of an authoritarian state Remember that when Harry Hopkins, talking with Stalin, smiled at the dictator's statement that they must consider the effect of a proposed measure on Russian public opinion, Stalin admonished him, “Don't laugh, we have our public opinion, too” Hard to measure as a force, but worth noting here, is that special group, the writers and other intellectuals Often repressed under the doctrinaire influence, they still have managed to get their messages to the public at crucial times ‡

* There appears to have been no lending of funds for economic aid to China since 1954 The withdrawal of technical and military assistance personnel in 1960—there had been ten thousand or more of them—brought the Soviet commitment down to almost nothing

† *Time*, April 21, 1961, describes the Sino-Soviet trade agreement of that year as putting trade on a cash basis, with no Russian grain to spare for China Instead, the U.S.S.R. offered sugar, which was little help, since China was even then committed to take one million tons of sugar from Castro It is worth noting also that while Sino Soviet trade, even on a cash basis, shrank greatly in the past five years, Soviet shipments of oil continued This was truly an essential item for China Their dependence on Russia for it has given the Soviet government a certain influence over China, even when relations were very unfriendly Note also that many of the Soviet technicians withdrawn from China in 1960 had gone there to help develop the local oil producing capability New York *Herald Tribune*, August 6, 1962

‡ New York *Herald Tribune*, November 7, 1962 For example, *Pravda* printed Evtushenko's poem, “Stalin's Inheritors,” on October 21, 1962, just one day before the public airing of the Cuban crisis The poem's words, “Obviously, nowadays, it is for good reason that Stalin's inheritors have heart failure,” served then as a public rebuke to the doctrinaire group, in the person of Kozlov, who on April 11 had had a severe heart attack Its printing on October 21 portended a rejection of the aggressive approach to the Cuban crisis that was probably being urged by the doctrinaire group during those very days

Add to all the above-described competing pressures and demands the further strain of poor-crop years in Soviet agriculture, as with the 1963 grain harvest, and it is plain that apportionment of resources to the respective national programs occasions a lot of strain and infighting.

Trying to relieve this strain, in November, 1962, Premier Khrushchev undertook a sweeping reorganization of the system of economic control. He appointed Veniamin Dymshits, an engineer and investment expert who had also been made a Deputy Premier in July, 1962, as the highest economic coordinator, and brought the Party more dynamically into the economic planning system. There was also a reshuffling of membership in the Central Committee's Presidium, and in ministerial posts, bringing production specialists to the fore.⁴ Four new deputy premiers were named: Dmitri Polyansky, Ignati Novikov, Mikhail Lesechko, and Aleksandr Shelepin. Only Shelepin was not an economic specialist, he was a trusted Khrushchev political aide. These reorganizations seem to have implied an all-out effort to achieve more efficiency and productivity, through which the ever heavier demands of pressure groups and national programs might somehow be met.

Also, in November, 1962, British sources were on record as predicting that Russian opinion might go for some disarmament or arms control measures, if only because the economy could not carry all the costly competitive arms and space programs and still take care of the people. This estimate, which has now proven accurate, said: "There are strong indications of widespread skepticism in sections of the Soviet elite concerning Mr. Khrushchev's promises of better living standards. This attitude would deepen if it became known that a still greater share of resources was to be devoted to nuclear weapons."⁵

The total government expenditures for 1962 exceeded the budgetary estimates by about 2.3 billion rubles. Only once before, in peacetime, had USSR expenditures exceeded estimates—in 1958, and then only by 1.5 billion rubles.⁶ By April, 1963, the budget problems were perhaps even worse. Dmitri Ustinov was made the economic czar, as chairman of the new Supreme National Economic Council. It is interesting to note that he was

formerly the overseer of the Soviet arms industry, and it was against this industry that Premier Khrushchev turned in April with public accusations of inefficiency, lack of discipline, and use of security to cover up its shortcomings.⁷

The armed forces are a very strong pressure group which during three hundred years of Russian history have not only influenced governments, but repeatedly have substituted one ruler for another, when the incumbent gave too little consideration to their standing or their aspirations.

During the four years of collective leadership which followed Stalin's death, the military leaders were ranged against the doctrinaire neo-Stalinists. Marshal Zhukov was a member then of the Presidium of the Party's Central Committee, his role in the fall of Beria and in Khrushchev's victory over the "anti-Party group" in the crucial Central Committee vote of 1957 is well known. However, the military weight was probably thrown against the neo-Stalinists in order to secure freedom of maneuver and to prevent a recurrence of a Stalin type of regime—the wholesale purge of the military leadership under Stalin in the 1930's. In fact, Zhukov's removal as Defense Minister in 1957 was on the ground that he tried to subvert Party control in the army.

We cannot, therefore, consider that the military sympathies rest really with the flexible or left-wing factions. The programs which interest them the most—continued maintenance of large forces—are best supported by a set of views advocated by the doctrinaire neo-Stalinists, and by Mao's China, which may be summarized as follows: (1) the West, especially Germany and the United States, is malevolently aggressive and highly dangerous, (2) full-scale warfare may indeed occur, the alternative being surrender to Western aggression. These views implied that the law of January 15, 1960, which provided for a 1,200,000 man reduction in the Soviet forces by the fall of 1961, should not be carried out as scheduled, and, in fact, it was not.*

* Marshal Malinovsky told the twenty second Party Congress that a nuclear attack against Russia was being prepared and that any war with the West would develop into a nuclear war. Concerning the reduction of forces, he commented that 250,000 officers would be discharged in this reduction. He also remarked that only 35 per cent of a previous group of 70,000 officers

The reduction was temporarily halted in August, 1961, in connection with the Berlin crisis. It seems, however, to have remained a live and controversial issue, because in the summer of 1962, *Krasnaya Zvezda*, the official publication of the armed forces, published a violent attack against a protégé of Premier Khrushchev, Marshal Golikov, who was then Chief of the Political Directorate of the Armed Forces (He was replaced shortly thereafter). *Krasnaya Zvezda* reported that a conference of the top military leaders had accused Golikov of neglecting the welfare of the officers who were being discharged in connection with the reductions of forces, and it alleged that he had caused the forces to lose many essential specialists. The paper went on to say that a number of the most senior generals considered the political leadership responsible for many improper actions, including the promotion of political officers who should, instead, have been dismissed.⁸

Aside from the pressure group of the victims of force reductions in general, there is at the top of the military pyramid a formidable group of marshals, for whose retirement there is no effective provision in law, and who thus have become an overage, very conservative, yet prestigious lot, occupying all the top jobs in the Defense Ministry and Armed Forces. Furthermore, some fourteen marshals of the Soviet Union held full membership in the Party's Central Committee, and seventeen other very senior officers are candidate members, totaling about 10 per cent of the aggregate Central Committee.

In April, 1963, almost a year after the removal of Marshal Golikov, his successor in the Political Directorate, General of the Army Aleksie A. Epishev, wrote an article saying "the reasoning of some theoreticians about the necessity of refusing to create mass armies, about the replacement of man by technology,

who were discharged found jobs that did not involve a long step downward on the social and economic ladder. Most of the remainder wound up as laborers, the Marshal said (Frank J. Johnson, *No Substitute for Victory* [Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1962] p. 90). He could have added that the forces had already been reduced gradually in the 1955-1960 period by about 2,000,000 men, and they stood, according to Khrushchev, at \$623,000 in January, 1960.

has shown itself to be worthless The role of mass armies grows with the increasing role and significance of technology in modern wars "9

Earlier in 1963, Pavel A. Rotmistrov, marshal and World War II hero, wrote in another magazine of the armed forces that Premier Khrushchev had laid a foundation for Soviet military doctrine, but that "the detailed development and exposition of the nature of Soviet military doctrine we find in the reports and statements of the Minister of Defense, Marshal of the Soviet Union R. Y. Malinovsky and other military figures" 10

This really outspoken comment—because most people inferred that the "theoretician" was the Premier—was uttered at a critical stage of decision making only a week after Epishev said this, Marshal Nikolai I. Krylov was appointed Commander-in-Chief of Rocket Forces, and reports reached the West that this meant the U.S.S.R. had decided to shift further resources to the armed forces, but especially to missiles 11 Since the previous year, 1962, had seen a 40 per cent increase in the military budget, 12 it can be seen that the nation's resources were being sorely taxed

Opposition to the large-scale production of ICBM's, which began in 1957-1958, when the U.S.S.R. was already technically ready to schedule it, brought a number of contending interest groups into play. The dominant group among the military, the Ground Force people, probably opposed it, with the help of two other strong groups, the Air Defense Force, which emphasizes AA rockets, and the leaders of the Air Force. The latter group naturally had a relation to ICBM enthusiasts in budgetary haggling that resembled the American competition between advocates of large bomber production as against an all-out ICBM effort. 13

At any rate, by 1962 the Army's opposition to the "more bang for a buck" or "more rubble for a ruble" approach no longer prevented the programming of large-scale production of ICBM's. Also, 1962 brought the Soviet move to install IRBM's in Cuba. They had as many as two hundred of these altogether, while their grand total of available ICBM's was probably only about fifty 14 Furthermore, their strategic bombers were outnumbered tenfold by those of the United States 15 This great gap in striking power

would have been narrowed if the IRBM's could have been placed in Cuba and kept there

It is also conjectured that Khrushchev hoped by thus narrowing the gap to appease his military leaders, without incurring the painful expense of an all-out ICBM-building program. However that may be, the Cuban crisis was the high-water mark, for the early sixties, of dynamic moves or threats against the powers of the Western Alliance. Simultaneously, the threat of renewed doctrinaire, neo-Stalinist power within Russia was relieved somewhat, and the subsequent events led toward increasing trouble with China and peaceful accommodations with the West.

There were setbacks in this process, of course. The budget-related military agitation of January to April, 1963, previously described, was coupled with persistent reports that Khrushchev would give up to the doctrinaire Frol Kozlov either his premiership or his post as First Secretary of the Party. Also, his constructive correspondence with President Kennedy on a nuclear test ban in December, 1962, was superseded by a "difficult" attitude in April, 1963.¹⁶ Simultaneously, in the January to May, 1963, period, Khrushchev found it expedient to say that the Sino-Soviet arguments were only a quarrel between friends, and his government moved toward another conference with the Chinese, held finally in Moscow in July, 1963.

However, Frol Kozlov became ill, and, with other adjustments about which we can only guess, this phase passed. Where in April Khrushchev had called for worldwide Communist unity and for curbs against "war-minded imperialist madmen,"¹⁷ by July the atmosphere was different. The Sino-Russian conference began with strict secrecy, but it was soon evident that the Soviet leaders were unable or unwilling to reach agreement with the Chinese. Peking Radio on July 10 accused the Soviet government of trying to poison the relations of the two countries.¹⁸ On July 13, Anastas Mikoyan joined the Soviet delegation, which had been led by Mikhail Suslov,¹⁹ but it was not even possible to quiet down the discord in which the meeting ended.

Moving again to friendliness with the West and to talk of disarmament and peace, Khrushchev found himself able to speak out very hopefully on the test-ban treaty as early as July 2, and

by September, 1963, the test-ban treaty was a fully ratified reality²⁰

Now let us review briefly the earlier diplomacy of 1960-1963 which accompanied the internal maneuverings of the Russian pressure groups. The period began when the U-2 affair and the stormy conference of Eisenhower and Khrushchev at Paris showed that the "Spirit of Camp David" was dispelled. Three days after the U-2 shootdown, a surprise session of the Central Committee was held. During it, Kirichenko and Belyaev were dropped from Presidium, and Kirichenko from the Party Secretariat as well. Also dropped from the Secretariat were Aristov, Pospelov, Ignatov, and Furtseva, while Kozlov was the lone addition to that body.²¹

When Khrushchev reported to the Supreme Soviet, in this same week, and cited the U-2 flight, there was an interruption from a member, who interjected, "How does that agree with Eisenhower's unctuous speeches?" The interruption, an almost unheard-of thing, was probably planned by the doctrinaire faction.²² Next, from May 11 to 14, a major politico-military conference was held, at which Malinovsky discussed "the increase in the readiness to fight."²³

In June, 1961, came the Kennedy-Khrushchev encounter at Vienna, best described by the President's own word, "somber." The summer of that year brought the building of the Berlin Wall and the related crisis.²⁴ All the while, there was an unstable, sometimes critical, situation in Laos and Viet Nam, in which the Russians may at times have tried to extend a quieting influence. There was little that they could do, really, to control the Southeast Asian situations, but they admittedly could have made these troubles worse, by cooperating with Red China. From this cooperation, the U.S.S.R. moved farther and farther during this period. The Party conferences at Bucharest and Moscow in 1960 and at the Twenty-second Party Congress in 1961 were increasingly violent demonstrations of deep differences between the two Red giants, with Moscow rejecting the Chinese view that violent world revolution and world war against the "imperialists" is both inevitable and, indeed, desirable.

These conferences were more than mere oratorical competition, of course. Both the Chinese and the Russians used them as

a platform for trying to convince the other Red bloc members and the Communist Parties in both neutralist and Western bloc nations that they were right, and that their respective programs offered more for the future of communism. More important still, they were appealing to the latent opposition in the rival country. The Russians were thinking, for one thing, of the Chinese military leadership, which had everything to gain in terms of modern equipment and technical support by a *rapprochement* with the Russians. The Chinese could appeal to the doctrinaire Russians, on grounds of Marxist dogma, as well as to the Soviet marshals, whose quest for appropriations made them often allies of the doctrinaire group.

The Bucharest Conference of Communist Parties met in late June, 1960. From the fifth to the ninth of June, the General Council of the World Federation of Trade Unions was in session at Peking, and was used as a forum for a strong indictment of Khrushchev's view that world wars were to be avoided, this indictment being delivered by the Chinese Vice President of the WFTU. He also attacked Khrushchev's belief in the possibility of peaceful coexistence with the capitalist world, and in the possibility of disarmament as a corollary to peaceful existence.

This clear challenge to the Soviet Premier must have strengthened the Premier's resolve to have it out with the Chinese at Bucharest. There he told the Chinese representative that Mao was an ultra-dogmatist, with the same narrow viewpoint that Stalin had, and that the Chinese were ignorant of the potential of nuclear weapons in modern warfare. The Chinese replied with similar bitterness. However, Khrushchev's speech to the general meeting attacked Mao more vaguely, and the final communique of the meeting avoided a statement of the Sino-Russian discord.²⁵

Back in Russia, the Premier appears to have enlisted the aid of Kozlov, Suslov, and other influential Party members to acquaint the Soviet Party with the dispute, and to prepare both the Party leadership and public opinion for the further confrontation that was to come at the Moscow conference of all the Communist Parties in November, 1960. The principal Soviet delegates to this conference are an interesting line-up, especially

if compared with the alignments noted previously with regard to the attack on the "anti-Party group" in 1957, and in later factional maneuverings. They were Khrushchev, Kozlov, Mikoyan, Brezhnev, Suslov, Pospelov, and Furtseva.²⁶

In the November meeting, the Chinese complained of the withdrawal of Soviet technicians from China, which was carried out during the summer. It is significant that the Russian delegation gave as one reason for the withdrawal of the technicians the fact that they were being led astray by Chinese propaganda.²⁷ This seems to reflect a genuine concern by the Khrushchev leadership that there be no effective infiltration of Russian public opinion on the controversial issues involved—that the doctrinaire position should reach the public only when accompanied by suitable rebuttal. We shall see more of this concern later.

Most significant of all for the shaping up of Russian opinion, the Chinese at this Moscow conference were so uncompromising, so careless about inter-Party harmony except on their own terms, and so brutally inclined to accept or even welcome a nuclear war which might—as they themselves put it—kill 50 per cent of the populations involved, that they lost much of the support their theories had previously enjoyed in the Russian and the other Communist Parties. Khrushchev, on the other hand, was adaptable enough to agree, in the final Declaration of the conference, that the class struggle and anti-imperialist struggle could go on energetically under "peaceful coexistence."²⁸

At the Twenty-second Party Congress, in October, 1961, the U.S.S.R. delegation made a pretense of focusing its attack on Albania, while the Chinese, conversely, emphasized a defense of Albania. On later occasions, also, their press quoted Albanian criticisms of Khrushchev, instead of making an original, overtly Chinese attack on the Soviet Premier. In this way, the adversaries avoided attacking one another directly. However, the real importance of the noisy Albanian defiance of Khrushchev, abetted by China, was that it could serve as a rallying point for anti-Khrushchev actions in Russia and around the Communist world.²⁹

So it was that Vyacheslav Molotov, who after his fall from power with the "anti-Party group" in 1957 had been sent to Mongolia as the Soviet envoy, was apparently in too convenient a

spot for dealing with Mao's government. Consequently, he was moved to Vienna, where he served with the International Atomic Energy Agency. From there he wrote a letter to the Central Committee denouncing the new, flexible foreign policy. His following was strong enough to draw much attention at the time of the Twenty-second Party Congress in the form of another denunciatory campaign against the "anti-Party group."³⁰ In January, 1962, his cause was active enough that he proceeded from Vienna to Moscow to present his views on peaceful coexistence, etc. His stay in Moscow was punctuated by an attack on him in the January 17 issue of *Pravda*. On the same day, the *Svenska Dagbladet* of Stockholm reported that Molotov had left certain delicate memoirs on safe deposit in Switzerland as a form of "life insurance." These were reported to include three chapters on Sino-Soviet relations. For one thing, Molotov described anti-Chinese discrimination and abuses affecting 1,800,000 Chinese brought to work in Russia under a Sino-Soviet agreement. Many were allegedly forced to do manual labor, although qualified for skilled work, and the wages were far below the usual Russian scales.³¹

To look further at the simple nationalistic aspect of the Russian side of the dispute with China, there are many factors which helped to focus the attention of many Russians on China as a threat to their country. It is safe to assume that many of the military leaders were sufficiently impressed by these factors to be weaned away somewhat from the doctrinaire emphasis on the Western menace, and to support more flexible national policies, more pacific toward the West. Adlai Stevenson tells us that most of the Russian officials with whom he talked about China were worried about the burgeoning Chinese population, its aggressive government, and their long common border.

Contributing to the hostile feelings also was the traditional Russian security-consciousness and reluctance to share the most advanced technology. The refusal to give the Chinese atomic and missile know-how was the best demonstration of this, and the refusal served, furthermore, to embitter the Chinese against the Russians.

Border incidents were another matter involving, from the

Russian point of view, simple national defense. Their anxiety about the border was given substance by Peking's claim that the territories Russia had gained by the Treaty of Peking of 1860 should be returned, and by Chinese maps which persistently showed parts of the Sino Soviet border and much of the Sino-Mongolian border as "undemarcated," while Russian maps had, of course, continued to show these borders very precisely.³² Also, the official Chinese maps up to the Communist period always showed the Pamir region of Soviet Central Asia as Chinese. Although the Mao Regime withdrew those, everyone knows that the Chinese claim there is historically as valid as the claims on the Indian frontier.

There is an unconfirmed report that soon after the Bucharest Conference of June, 1960, the Chinese sent some forces across the Soviet frontier and erected some fortifications, and that Soviet troops proceeded to wipe them out.³³ Late in 1962, Peking finally got around to making a formal border delimitation treaty with Mongolia and a preliminary agreement with Pakistan on frontiers.³⁴ In a way, though, this underscored the continued absence of any such understanding with the U.S.S.R. or with India.

Substantial border flareups occurred in 1962, though only on September 5, 1963, did Peking bring them to light, with a broadcast charging that Russia, in April and May of 1962, coerced tens of thousands of Chinese citizens into entering the U.S.S.R. China also charged that the U.S.S.R. then tried to overthrow the local government in the Ili district of Sinkiang Province.* Those who crossed the Soviet frontier at this time were probably refugees, quite possibly belonging to the non-Chinese racial groups which are numerous in Northwestern China. At any rate, the Soviets considered them refugees and refused to return them to the Chinese authorities.

At about the same time, the Russians reported that they caught some Chinese citizens at Naushki, on the Soviet-Mon-

* New York *Herald Tribune*, September 7, 1963. The U.S.S.R., in the *Kazakhstan Pravda* of September 29, 1963, retorted with accounts of Chinese machine gunners in Ili massacring the would be refugees, who were of Kazakh stock. *Ibid.*, October 2, 1963.

golian border, allegedly smuggling into the U S S R literature "hostile to the Soviet Union" After some resistance and "hooliganism" by the Chinese, they were expelled from Russia ⁸⁵

The most sweeping charge has come this year in a Soviet government statement that the Peking government has tried "to appropriate individual sections of Soviet territory," and that the Chinese violated the border five thousand times in the year 1962 alone ⁸⁶

Next, let us see how the Sino-Soviet feud and the feuding factions within Russia are related to conditions within the lesser Communist Parties The Soviet Russian Party and government have, of course, a continuing great interest in leading the worldwide Communist movement This interest is reinforced by a desire for power and influence around the world which is both a matter of nationalism and of conspiratorial communism, of "world revolution" In taking up this point, we should not forget the split, from the early days of the Soviet regime, between the advocates of "socialism in one country" and "World revolution," the Stalin-Trotsky conflict, known to be a divisive influence in Russia during the first two post-revolutionary decades Now, in the 1960's, we can conclude at least that world leadership of communism is highly important to the Russian Party and government as a matter of prestige and as a worldwide "resource," that is, as a means of implementing all sorts of Soviet aims or activities Also, Party discipline and good order around the world is inevitably related to good order and discipline within the Russian Party itself

Peking has effectively challenged Moscow's primacy in many areas in recent years The Chinese can do this because of their "non-white" status, and because of their clear record as a past, and allegedly present, victim of European and American imperialism In their economic problems, too, they have much in common with the poor, industrially primitive areas of the world As Dr Walt Rostow would put it, the Russians have reached "technological maturity," while the Chinese are far from doing so This means that relatively crude Chinese expedients for industrialization, and the Chinese programs in general may seem applicable to visitors from less developed countries, while a Russian

demonstration of a fully automated, highly intricate and costly industrial plant may seem impressive but irrelevant to a nation which lacks the capital to set up such a plant and lacks the technology to support it

The Chinese, who are at least as conscious of prestige and world position as the Russians are, began in earnest to offer a worldwide challenge in early 1960, when they created the Committee for the Support of Afro-Asian Emancipation Movements, and the Chinese-African Friendship Society. While the latter worked on cultural and economic exchanges, Peking proceeded, in January, 1961, to establish the Chinese People's Committee for the Aid of African Countries against Aggression, a propaganda organ, and the Institute for African Affairs, for the training of African members of the Party. In the field of radio broadcasts to the less developed nations, China competes systematically with Russia, with considerable success as to both quantity of programs and content. At exhibitions and trade fairs, the Chinese have gone to much expense to show what they can offer the newly emergent nations.

Chinese trade and economic aid can hardly be huge in quantity, but it has been carefully placed to supplement the ideological infiltration. The terms of Chinese aid have at times been more attractive than the Soviet terms—with the offering of interest-free loans, for example. In trade agreements, it has not been difficult to rival Soviet terms—the U S S R is often a notoriously hard bargainer in its agreements.

The U S S R authorities seem to have tried hard to cultivate the newly emergent nations, through extensive acceptance of Afro-Asian students at Russian universities, to mention one program. As of 1963, there were two thousand Africans studying at Patrice Lumumba Friendship University in Moscow and one thousand more studying elsewhere in Russia, as compared with five thousand in the United States. These three thousand have been well and carefully treated by the authorities, but still there have been interracial incidents and complaints, as well as dissatisfaction with curricula.* Other disillusionments for the

* *New York Times*, August 9, 1963. China also, hosting over three thousand foreign students, has had comparable troubles. In August, 1962, thirty

Soviets came at the Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference at Moshi, Tanganyika, where their delegation found that the Chinese representatives were far better received, while President Nyerere of Tanganyika implied that the Russians were just a new type of white exploiters who wished to colonize Africa. As one Russian observer at the conference, Vladimir Kudryavtsev, put it "Some of the more chauvinistically inclined leaders would like to direct the solidarity movement, not against imperialism and colonialism and its agents, but against all white people."

The Chinese challenge was particularly vigorous, in the politico-military area, in 1962. Not only did the North Vietnamese, with Peking's military support, continue an effective fight in Laos and South Viet Nam, but the Chinese undertook an open invasion of India, in which they were successful. That is, they took over, without great opposition or setbacks, large strips of territory on India's northern borders.

The Soviet Union's role in the same year, 1962, must have seemed contrastingly passive or unsuccessful to many Afro-Asian and Latin American observers. The Soviets tried, at least through general statements, and perhaps through more pointed representations, to restrain the Chinese in Southeast Asia and in the Indian invasion. If they produced any effect, there was certainly no overt evidence or recognition of this.

Likewise, in the encounter with the United States about the missile installations in Cuba, in October and November of 1962, the Khrushchev leadership appeared in a hesitant or compromising role, in the eyes of highly aggressive Communists everywhere, and the Chinese leaders repeatedly and raucously denounced the Soviet Premier for this, calling his action "appeasement" or a new "Munich."³⁷ The large segment of world opinion, and of Russian public opinion, which took some comfort from the Soviet Premier's policies, would probably agree with Walter Lippmann, when he said of the Indian and Cuban affairs "But while the two crises on opposite sides of the world are not connected, they are in highly important ways related. In Cuba the

Cameroonian students left China or were expelled, after they complained of racial discrimination and lack of contact with the people. *Communist Affairs*, October, 1962, p. 15

Soviet Union has had to abandon an effort to extend its power in the Americas, in the Sino Indian conflict it is confronted with a distinct and dramatic loss of influence and power in the heart of Asia "38

It is interesting to note, in both the Indian and Cuban crises, a double shift in Soviet day-to day policy making which strongly indicates rival factions at work. There was the Soviet offer to provide MIG jet fighters to India or to assist in having them built in India. As of August, 1962, angry Chinese representations against this step had apparently produced no effect.³⁹ By November, however, a "high Soviet Military source" indicated that the Russians had canceled their agreement to sell a dozen MIG 21 jet fighters to India, and *Pravda* and *Izvestia* had dropped their neutrality in the Indian frontier issue and had begun to support the Chinese case against the McMahon Line of frontier demarcation.⁴⁰ However, on November 10, Prime Minister Nehru stated that the Soviets had unofficially indicated that sixteen MIG 21's would be delivered on schedule,⁴¹ and Russia offered other technical support, such as a \$15,000,000 contract for oil-drilling equipment,⁴² as well as shipment of spare parts for the transport planes and helicopters which the Soviets had furnished India early in 1962.⁴³

On December 1, 1962, in another reversal, the New Delhi Government was notified that the USSR would not deliver the sixteen MIG 21's, but would build a MIG manufacturing plant in India and deliver a token number of MIG's while the factory was being built.⁴⁴

Similarly, at the height of the Cuban crisis, the three principal stages in the position of the Soviet Premier featured abrupt changes from (1) an aggressive attitude to (2) a much less belligerent position, with apparently anxious concern for peace to (3) a perceptibly firmer posture, permitting, however, terms that both nations could accept.⁴⁵

Not only had there been disharmony among the policy makers in Moscow on the Indian and Cuban issues, but the two affairs led to further discord among the Communists. There had been some Latin Americans all the while among the pro Chinese minority which, at the Sino-Soviet confrontations in Moscow

own Party Congress which concluded on November 24, 1962⁵³ The Czech Party boss, Novotny, who is of Stalinist inclination, like Ulbricht of East Germany, nevertheless brought the editorial policy of his party paper, *Rude Pravo*, firmly into consonance with the Khrushchev side of the Sino-Soviet dispute at this same time⁵⁴ The Rumanian Party made just enough pro Peking moves to extract economic concessions from the U S S R⁵⁵

In Asia, the Chinese influence predominated in the Japanese Communist Party, and there was nothing surprising about the Chinese control of the North Korean and North Viet Nam satellites, but in the case of the Mongolian People's Republic an interesting conflict came into the open on January 8, 1963, when the First Secretary of that country's Party, Yumshagin Tsendenbal, addressed a special "ideological conference" in Ulan Bator He declared that Peking had busily built factions in almost every Communist Party, and had irresponsibly sown discord everywhere He accused the Chinese of using the ideology of nationalism as a weapon, while disguising this nationalism as ultra revolutionary The conference denounced the pro Chinese nationalist faction of D Tumor Ochir, former Mongolian Party Secretary and Politburo member The importance to the U S S R of the Sino-Soviet tug-of-war over Mongolia was underscored at this time by prominent mention of large-scale Soviet economic aid to the Mongols, and by the arrival of a special Soviet delegation to this conference, headed by Leonid Ilchev⁵⁶

So far, in discussing the Sino Soviet rivalry in various nations, we have considered mainly the effort to dominate the parties of Communist faithful in each country In addition to that, the Russian leaders must be concerned with their appeal to socialists of many types—in popular front movements, where those are expedient—and with the prospect of support under some conditions from many sorts of "peace advocates" around the world—a group, however amorphous, to which Moscow's "peace campaigns" often have been directed in the past two decades The appeal of peace as an issue could be strong, as we have seen, within the U S S R itself and everywhere

Now the result of Peking's belligerence has been to leave these promising fields to the Russians Moderate Socialists were alienated by China's aggressive moves, particularly those of such

Chinese neighbours as India, Japan, or Indonesia. For example, the Indian Socialist magazine *Tulsi*, which had for years described the Chinese Communist Government as "peace loving" and "progressive," came around after the 1962 invasion, to the issuance of an article strongly denouncing that government as a chauvinistic government of Chinese mandarins in Marxist disguise. *Tulsi* noted that Mao Tse-tung had declared in 1959, in a pamphlet called "Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party," that China must regain her territories seized by the imperialists, including Korea, Viet Nam, Burma, Bhutan, and Nepal.⁵⁷

With regard to peace as a worldwide issue, the World Women's Congress in Moscow, in the summer of 1965, arrived at a solid affirmative vote on a resolution for peace and against the arms race, with the Chinese and Albanian delegates as the lone but vocal dissenters. (They wanted to include a denunciation of the United States and NATO in the resolution.) A move by the pro-Chinese delegation of Japan to call for withdrawal of U.S. forces from all points in Asia and Latin America was countered by the Italian delegates, who said "We are here as women to work for peace and not to engage in cold war polemics."⁵⁸

In another aspect of the peace issue, the nuclear test ban treaty, under attack from the Chinese People's Republic, as well as from factions in the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A., was pointedly denounced by Premier Chou En-lai in a message to the 1963 World Conference against Nuclear Weapons, held in Hiroshima on the anniversary of the dropping of the atomic bomb on August 6. Chou said that the treaty would increase the danger of nuclear war, while his delegates accused the U.S.S.R. of selling out to the United States.⁵⁹ This Chinese criticism continued throughout the negotiation of the treaty and even after the ratification.

As this paper is being written, the Chinese are pressing to bring the Sino Soviet dispute before a "World Court of Communists" for settlement. The Indonesian Party leader, D. M. Aidit, has called for such a "jury trial," while the Parties of Portugal and Paraguay, more in line with Moscow's feelings, have implied that the world meeting would contemplate a denunciation of the Chinese Party.⁶⁰

To sum up this discussion, Sino Soviet relations in the sixties

have been influenced by the changing ways in which the Russians have met the following problems (1) How to allocate the limited Soviet resources among many programs and many demanding interests? Most influential among these have been the competing demands for large, *un-reduced* ground forces, and/or an all-out missile and space effort, the need of industry for capital investment, and the people's aspiration for a better standard of living (2) How to keep the authority and prestige of the Soviet State and the Soviet Party at the highest possible level? This problem brought many changes in Soviet politics and government policies, including decisions on economic aid and military backing for the "comradely nations"

The Khrushchev approach to these problems has been repeatedly challenged by the Chinese, who looked for support from neo-Stalinists in the Russian Party and other Communist Parties. The challenge to Khrushchev's group was sustained also by the Russian ground force leaders, as recently as the spring of 1963

NOTES

1 Robert V. Daniels, *Conscience of the Revolution Communist Opposition in Soviet Russia* (Boston: Harvard University Press, Russian Research Center Studies, 1960), Vol. XL, *passim*

2 Wolfgang Leonhard, *The Kremlin since Stalin*, trans. Eliz. Wiskemann and Marian Jackson (New York: Fred A. Praeger, 1962), pp. 318-320

3 *New York Times*, May 12, 1963

4 *New York Times*, November 24, 1962, and November 25, 1962.

5 *New York Times*, November 18, 1962

6 *Christian Science Monitor*, December 13, 1962

7 *New York Times*, May 5, 1963

8 *New York Herald Tribune*, July 15, 1963

9 *New York Times*, April 7, 1963

10 *Ibid*

11 *New York Herald Tribune*, April 15, 1963

12 *New York Herald Tribune*, May 17, 1963

13 *Ibid*

14 *Newsweek*, May 7, 1962, p. 50

15 *Ibid*

16 *New York Times*, April 28, 1963

17 *New York Herald Tribune*, April 23, 1963

18 *New York Herald Tribune*, July 10, 1963

- 19 *New York Times*, July 11, 1963
- 20 *Ibid*
- 21 Leonhard *op cit*, pp 359-360
- 22 *Ibid*, p 363
- 23 *Ibid*, p 365
- 24 *New York Times*, July 11, 1963
- 25 Edward Crankshaw, 'Khrushchev and China,' *Atlantic Monthly*, May, 1961, p 16
- 26 Klaus Mehnert, *Peking und Moskau* (Stuttgart Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt) p 523
- 27 Donald Zagoria, *The Sino Soviet Conflict* (Princeton Princeton University Press, 1962), pp 329-335
- 28 Crankshaw, *op cit*, p 17
- 29 *Newsweek*, March 26, 1962
- 30 G F Hudson, "Soviet Fears of the West," *Current History*, May, 1962, p 309
- 31 *Washington Post*, January 17, 1962
- 32 *New York Times*, February 27, 1961
- 33 Frank J Johnson, *No Substitute for Victory* (Chicago Henry Regnier Co, 1962), p 117
- 34 *Christian Science Monitor*, December 28, 1962
- 35 *New York Herald Tribune*, September 10, 1963
- 36 *Ibid*, September 23, 1963
- 37 *Washington Evening Star*, November 3, 1962, November 5, 1962
- 38 *New York Herald Tribune*, November 1, 1962
- 39 *Ibid*, August 8, 1962
- 40 *Ibid*, November 1, 1962
- 41 *New York Times*, December 2, 1962
- 42 *Time*, November 23, 1962
- 43 *New York Herald Tribune*, November 13, 1962
- 44 *New York Times*, December 2, 1962
- 45 *Time*, November 9, 1962
- 46 *New York Herald Tribune*, November 21, 1962
- 47 *Washington World*, July 8, 1963
- 48 *Time*, November 23, 1962
- 49 *Ibid*
- 50 *Ibid* and *New York Herald Tribune*, November 6, 1962
- 51 *Washington Post*, December 16, 1962
- 52 *New York Herald Tribune*, November 26, 1962
- 53 *New York Times*, November 25, 1962
- 54 *New York Herald Tribune*, November 26, 1962
- 55 *New York Times*, June 23, 1963
- 56 *Christian Science Monitor*, January 17, 1963
- 57 *National Observer*, February 11, 1963
- 58 *Time*, July 5, 1963

59 New York *Herald Tribune*, August 7, 1963

60 New York *Times*, October 6, 1963

An Interpretation of Professor Kamikawa's View of Japanese Diplomacy

YUNG-HWAN JO

Adams State College

Japan's past expansion in East Asia has been subject to various interpretations among scholars. The interpretations that are rather familiar to Western scholars can be classified into three groups: (1) plot thesis v. Conroy's non-plot antithesis, (2) from Mason's thesis of "rule from below" (i.e., the policy of the field army became the official policy of the Imperial government) to Maruyama's antithesis of "fascism from above" (i.e., the Tosei group, by seizing control of the army, imposed fascism on the Japanese people), and (3) the Marxists' interpretation.¹ The purpose of this paper is to introduce a "geopolitical" interpretation of Japanese diplomacy by way of evaluating Professor Hikomatsu Kamikawa's works on international affairs.

Graduated from the Tokyo Imperial University with a bachelor's degree in political science and a doctor's degree in law, Kamikawa served his alma mater as a professor for twenty years. In 1952 he was awarded the Japan Academy Prize for his three-volume work entitled "Current History of Diplomacy."

Today he is Director of the Japan Institute of International Affairs (Nihon Kokusai Mondai Kenkyu-sho), which is the Japanese counterpart of the British Royal Institute of International Affairs, and also Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Japan Association of International Relations (Nihon Kokusai Seijigakusai).² One of Japan's pioneer scholars and researchers of international problems, Kamikawa may well be considered as the dean of diplomatic historians in Japan.

Before dealing with Kamikawa's views on Japanese diplomacy, a brief sketch of his concept of world history in relation to the changing pattern of international politics seems necessary

I

Kamikawa's theory of international relations is stated in his *Outline of International Relations (Kokusai seiji-gaku gairon)*,³ Japan's first systematic and laborious work in the field of international relations. In the light of six thousand years of world history, international politics is viewed as having evolved according to a dialectic system. The state of nature (anarchy) in Greece was followed by Alexander's Macedonian Empire which was replaced by the Roman (world) Empire. The Roman Empire was succeeded by another state of nature, which in turn was replaced by a quasi-world empire in the form of the Holy Roman Empire and the Catholic world church. This quasi-world empire, which was a synthesis of the Roman Empire and the subsequent state of nature, was then followed by a modern quasi-state of nature lasting over five hundred years as the "age of rival chiefs." Today's world is in a transitional stage from this quasi-state of nature to another quasi- or genuine world empire.⁴

In his ambitious attempt to erect laws which would demonstrate recurrence and regularity in history, Kamikawa could not escape being both a researcher and an artist of some license.⁵

As for the coming world empire, Kamikawa concurs with Friedrich Meinecke's view that the present *Englisch-Amerikanische Dyarchie* and *Gesamtbürgerschaft* would last almost indefinitely and that today's world is a harbinger of the Anglo-Saxon's "universal world empire." And thus, he opposes the thesis of "Fims Europe" as variously advanced by Arnold Toynbee, Oswald Spengler and Joseph Kunz.⁶ As he concludes that the Anglo-Saxon's empire is predetermined, he holds that one can only strive to see that it becomes a democratically evolved world federation.

To Kamikawa, the most fundamental causes that bring changes in the system and process of international politics are in the following order: (1) the economic factor, (2) the political factor,

(3) the military factor, and (4) the intellectual factor Kamikawa derives his economic factor essentially from Louis Gumplowiz's *Précis de Sociologie* (p 370) ⁷ These arguments appear to parallel the "organismic theory of state" and "theory of Lebensraum," both of which have been the key concepts of contemporary geopoliticians In explaining the succession from economic expansion to political expansion and from political expansion to military preparation and war, Kamikawa cites approvingly from both Franz Oppenheimer's *The State* (pp 24-27) and Scott Nearing's *War* (pp 136-137) ⁸ The intellectual factor is briefly mentioned to the effect that the intellectual advancement of people has greatly contributed to the economic, political and military "cultures" of human society

II

According to Professor Kamikawa, the foreign policy of Japan or any other country can be divided into three elements (1) the geographic and historic foundations, (2) the political objectives to maintain the nation's existence, security and prosperity, and (3) the appropriate means to achieve these objectives ⁹ In complete agreement with Karl Haushofer, Kamikawa characterizes the geopolitical condition of Japan as the most fundamental determinant of Japanese foreign policy ¹⁰

In its embryonic stage of growth as a modern nation-state, Japan was relatively undisturbed by external pressures Since Japan was an insular country in the Pacific, only sea powers could exert political or military influence on the island But, until the latter half of the nineteenth century the only access route between Europe and Japan was a sea route passing the Cape of Good Hope via the Indian Ocean or an overland route across Siberia Because of its limited contact with Europe and its position off the major trade route, the influence exerted by the European sea powers has been relatively weak and thus Japan to its good fortune was able to escape territorial losses ¹¹ (This view is also shared by American political geographers ¹²)

On the other hand, Kamikawa argues that by virtue of her geographical proximity to the land mass of Asia, the insular

country is in fact one of the most important "Mittel-lage" (middle zones) sandwiched between land and sea powers. He illustrates this fact with the Mongols' efforts to invade Japan. Carrying this interpretation to the present time he sees that the island is adjacent to three spheres of influence, namely, Slavs, Anglo Saxons and Hans (Chinese). In such a position, it is inevitable that Japan become a "cockpit of nations." It is this uniqueness of Japanese geopolitics combining the advantage of insularity and the disadvantage of the "middle zone" that has determined the course of the last one hundred years of Japanese history "from glory to the grave"¹³

Meiji leaders sensed intuitively the difficulty of Japan as an international "middle zone," and thus they led a half-century struggle to secure a "free hand" in the "dog-eat-dog" world. As a result, Japan emerged following World War I as one of the five land powers and one of the three sea powers of the world. (There is clear evidence that the Meiji leaders were keenly cognizant of the implications of Japan's geographical location¹⁴) However, the resulting position of the growing nation was not without difficulties. It was faced on the continent of Asia by the two world giants—China and Russia—and to the southeast by the two wealthiest and strongest sea powers—Great Britain and the United States. Hence, it was of utmost importance for Japan to have an insight into the shifting balance of power among these giants.¹⁵

To understand this view, one must turn to Kamikawa's view of history. He interprets history as a constant struggle between the land powers and the sea powers, and in this struggle he sees the world as divided into three zones: (1) the continental Pivot (Heartland) Area, covering most of the U S S R, (2) the oceanic zone of the Outer or Insular Crescent, which is largely under the influence of the Anglo-Saxon sea powers, and (3) the middle zone consisting of the coastland zone of the Inner or Marginal Crescent covering the non-Russian part of Europe and the monsoon areas of Asia.¹⁶ Thus his view of history and world geography is seen to be merely a reiteration of Sir Halford Mackinder's celebrated Heartland theory.¹⁷

Although the British and Japanese homelands were termed

by Mackinder as the "Offshore Island,"¹⁸ Kamikawa treated them as identical with the United States in the Insular Crescent. In geopolitical terms Japan belonged to the Insular Crescent and thus was destined to come under the domination of Anglo-American sea power. Hence, the ultimate cause which led to Japan's total defeat was that her leaders, oblivious of this fundamental geopolitical fact, led the maritime Japan to clash with the maritime Britain and the United States.¹⁹ (From this it can be deduced that it was a geopolitical mistake for the land-power Germany to attack the land-power Russia.)

As stated before, geopolitically Japan is located in the sphere of Insular Crescent. Nevertheless, historically she has always belonged to the sphere of East Asia, although the historic basis of Japanese diplomacy too is, in the opinion of Kamikawa, fundamentally conditioned by the geopolitical basis. From ancient times Japanese diplomacy was directed toward the continent, and Korea was a viaduct between the continent and Japan. For this reason, the Korean peninsula was viewed as an area of life-and-death importance, just as Flanders was to Britain.²⁰ Since Korea, Manchuria and most of China were included in the Marginal Crescent, which could not escape the pressures either from the maritime powers or from the continental powers, Kamikawa is not surprised that Japan recently attempted to expand her influence to catch up with other areas of the world and picked these areas as her theater of action.

After successfully challenging China and Russia's influence in Korea, Japan annexed the latter. With Korea as an integral part of the Japanese empire, Manchuria appears in Kamikawa's vocabulary as a "middle zone" of the Far East. He views it as the Balkans or Belgium of the Far East.²¹ Despite the fact that Manchuria was almost a cockpit for China, Russia, Japan, England and the United States, beginning in 1931 the Japanese government anachronistically considered Manchuria as a special problem affecting only China and Japan, and the question should therefore be settled between the two. When the Soviet Union proposed to Japan a non-aggression pact immediately after the Manchurian Incident, the Japanese cabinet boldly refused. To Kamikawa, this was a great miscalculation on the part of Japan.²²

Spurred by the success of the army in the Manchurian Incident, in December, 1934, the Japanese navy informed London and Washington of Japan's decision to abrogate the Washington Naval Agreement. Subsequently, Japanese delegates withdrew from the Naval Disarmament Preliminary Conference in London. Accordingly these actions made Japan a sworn enemy of the maritime powers which saw their own naval supremacy was threatened²³

Japan's peculiar geographic location presented her military strategists with two conflicting policies, a continental policy directed toward the northwest (Hokushin-ron) and an oceanic one directed toward the Pacific (Nanshin-ron). On the one hand, the continent possessed important natural resources owned by a weak China, impotent Siam, and lands such as French Indo-China and British Malaya which were controlled by the mother countries having troubles at home. On the other hand, there were insular storehouses of great natural wealth in the Netherland East Indies, owned by a weak, remote state and in the Philippines, close to Japan but remote from her protector²⁴. Japan attempted expansion in both directions. The Russo-Japanese Neutrality Pact, which Matsuoka hurriedly signed, failed to reduce the American pressure against Japan as he wished, but did help Japan shift in favor of the oceanic policy. In Kamikawa's eyes, this change brought the Japan-Anglo-American relationship to the breaking point²⁵. When the Allied powers started to encircle Japan, she was exposed to a two-front war, the worst strategic situation in which a country can find itself in a war²⁶.

In viewing the recent history of Britain which also had the land-sea duality of diplomacy, Kamikawa is of the opinion that it affords a valuable lesson for Japan²⁷. Like Japan, Britain played a leading role in the nearby continent. But England fought a land-power as a leading member of the Insular Crescent, while Japan challenged the ruling powers of the Insular world at the same time she opposed China and Russia. Hence, Britain ranks today as a world power and Japan as a "military colony" of the United States. This inferior situation of Japan is to be attributed to a lack of geopolitical insight on the part of the Japanese policy-makers.

No great power except the United States has succeeded in maintaining the world's largest naval force and land force at the same time. The British Empire, which once had 27 per cent of the world's total area and 25 per cent of its total population, managed to become the world's greatest sea power only because she concentrated on the construction of the navy at the expense of her army. Nevertheless, the duality of Japanese military policy—maritime as well as continental—led her militarists to attempt the impossible task of making Japan both a great sea and land power. This task was beyond Japan's means in view of the narrowness of Japanese domain and the poverty of natural resources, both of which are also important elements conditioning the geopolitical character of Japan.²⁰

Sophisticated arguments for the 'have-not' nations run through most of Kamikawa's publications. It is his major hypothesis that so long as the distribution of world territory and natural resources does not parallel the national needs of powers, it is impossible to maintain the status quo. 'More equitable' redistribution of these material elements is, therefore, the price of peace.²¹

In prewar days, Kamikawa argues that the Axis powers which possessed among themselves no more than 1 per cent of the world land area and 10.6 per cent of the world population were challenging the big four—France, the United States, the U.S.S.R., and England—which occupied altogether about 60 per cent of world land area and 41 per cent of its total population.²² World War I and II were viewed as struggles between revisionist powers and status quo powers. But today, Kamikawa likes to point out that Japan, 40 per cent of which is arable, is extremely limited in resources essential to the functioning of industries. With 1/350th of the world land area Japan is supporting 1/30th of the world population.²³

III

In evaluating Kamikawa's views, one might bear in mind their relationship to certain other views. For example, in evaluating his geopolitical formula for redistribution of *Lebensraum* it

can well be compared with the Marxist counterpart for the redistribution of the means of production. In this respect, his geopolitical arguments of the "have-not" nations can be referred to as the nationalistic counterpart of Marxian international dialectic materialism.³² It is true that, as Marxists explain historical phenomena in terms of economics, geopoliticians consider them in terms of space. Nevertheless, it should be noted that Marxists and Leninists are theoretically opposed to the recognition of any influence on the life of states by their natural environment, and that geopolitical determinism has, therefore, no place in their theory.*

Kamikawa is right to argue that Japan, deficient in territory and natural resources and a newcomer in modern imperialism, was at a disadvantage in competition against the wealthy imperialist states. However, Japan's lack of colonies could be a cause, but not a justification of territorial imperialism. Kamikawa should realize that much of Japan's continuous expansion was not dictated by objective geography but caused by the policymaker's subjective interpretation of her natural environment. One's territorial domain should not be viewed as having a "snowballing" effect.

Kamikawa has extended his interpretation to current world politics. He sees an inevitable life-and-death struggle between the Communists and the Capitalists, not because the reason for existence between the two systems is viewed as incompatible regardless of any evolutionary changes, but rather because the struggle is viewed as an "either-or" proposition.³³ Today's bipolar politics is seen as the geopolitical contest between the continental empire and the maritime empire rather than a dialectical one between the Communist and the Capitalist ideologies.

* The Marx-Leninist theory could not accept geopolitical determinism without contradicting the economic interpretation of the development of states. Moreover, to geopoliticians the life of societies is conditioned by natural environment such as geographic location, not by the "mode of production" nor by the "monopolistic stage of capitalism." For Marx's economic interpretation of the growth of states, see his *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*, translated from the 2nd German edition by N. I. Stone (Chicago: Charles H. Kerr & Co., 1904), pp. 10-13.

In view of his geopolitical ideas, Kamikawa would like to see Japan recover, with American assistance, from the total defeat and from the present status of "sham independence." Japan, like the United Kingdom, is an off-shore island and therefore should be regarded as an equal of the United Kingdom and as the natural ally of the United States, the pillar of the Insular world.

The resulting ties among these three seapowers would enable them to face any of the large landpowers. This is particularly important in establishing a position for Japan as the balancer of power in Asia as England is in Europe. Thus, Kamikawa reiterated the view that was presented as early as 1942 by Nicholas Spykman when the latter suggested that the United States will have to adopt a protective policy toward Japan similar to that existing between the United States and Great Britain³⁴

Thus, today as in the past, Kamikawa's interpretation is contrary to popular sentiment in Japan. Yet his influence among intellectuals of Japan is great, although not in proportion to the exalted positions which he holds (Director of the Japan Institute of International Affairs and Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Japan Association of International Relations). * His geopolitical theory on the rise and fall of the Japanese empire is accepted by certain intellectuals, but of more importance is the attention given it by his many critics. Hence, in any case, the theory deserves the attention of Western scholars.

* In an Asiatic society like Japan, where authority frequently depends on age and experience, it is possible to have a man like Kamikawa in charge of the Board of Editors even when most of the editors may not subscribe to his views. This opinion was reinforced during an interview the author had in Washington, D.C., on August 23, 1963, with Professor Chuhiro Hosoya of Hitotsubashi University.

NOTES

- 1 For the first group, see Hilary Conroy, *The Japanese Seizure of Korea 1868-1910* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1960), and Chion Dong, *Japanese Annexation of Korea: A Study of Korean-Japanese Relations to 1910* (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, the University of Colorado, Boulder, 1955), a review article on these two different views is in *The Journal of Asian Studies*, August, 1963, pp. 169-172. For the second group, see Yale Maxon, *Control of Japanese Foreign Policy* (Berkeley: University of California, 1957), and Masao Maruyama, *Gendai seiji no shiso to hodo*, 2 vols (Tokyo: Mirusha 1956-1957). For the third group, see Bokuro Eguchi, *Teitoku shugi to minzoku* (Tokyo, 1948), and Shigeki Toyama, *Showa shi* (Tokyo, 1951).
- 2 *The Japan Biographical Encyclopedia & Who's Who* (2nd ed., Tokyo: The Rengo Press, 1960), p. 183.
- 3 (Tokyo: Keisho shobo, 1950). The author calls it "the textbook written by a pioneer"; it is a consolidation of the views Kamikawa has held for the past thirty years.
- 4 *Ibid.*, p. 531.
- 5 This is also true with Professor Toynbee. See K. W. Thompson, "Toynbee and the Theory of international Politics," *Political Science Quarterly*, September, 1956, pp. 365-386.
- 6 See Hikomatsu Kamikawa, "Gendai kokusai seiji no kiso koso," *Kokusai seiji*, Winter, 1957, pp. 2-6.
- 7 Cf. Kamikawa, *Kokusai seiji gaku gairon*, p. 514.
- 8 *Ibid.*, pp. 516-517, 519.
- 9 Hikomatsu Kamikawa, "Nihon gaiko heno Prolegomena," *Kokusai seiji*, Summer, 1957, p. 2 (for an English translation of this article, see "Prolegomena to Japanese Diplomacy," *The Japan Annual of International Affairs*, No. 1, 1961), "Gendai kokusai seijishi ni okeru nihon Kokusai seiji," Autumn, 1957, pp. 2, 19.
- 10 Haushofer had written eight books on Japanese geopolitics, the classic of which is *Die Geopolitik des Pazifischen ozeans* (Berlin: K. Vowinkel, 1924, 1938).
- 11 See his *Nihon gaiko no sai shuppatsu* (Tokyo: Kajima Kenkyu sho 1960), pp. 198, 206.
- 12 See G. E. Percy, R. H. Fifield and Associates, *World Political Geography* (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co. 1948), pp. 374, 384.
- 13 "Honshono Plan," *Kokusai seiji*, Summer 1957.
- 14 See Manjiro Inagaki, *Tohosaku ketsuron soan* (Tokyo: Tetsugaku shoin, 1892), Appendix pp. 1, 19, 56, 89, and 100.
- 15 *Nihon gaiko no sai shuppatsu*, pp. 239-241, 258, "Nihon gaiko heno Prolegomena," p. 4.
- 16 "Gendai kokusai seiji no kiso koso," *Kokusai seiji*, Winter, 1957, pp. 12-13.

17 See Halford Mackinder, 'The Geographical Pivot of History,' *Geographical Journal*, April, 1904, or its reprint in A Dorpalen, *The World of General Haushofer* (New York Farrar & Rinehart, Inc., 1942)

18 See H Mackinder, *Democratic Ideals and Reality* (New York Henry Holt & Co., 1942), p 150

19 "Nihon gaiko heno Prolegomena," p 6

20 *Ibid*, p 7

21 *Nihon gaiko no sai-shuppatsu*, p 232

22 *Ibid*, pp 250-251

23 *Ibid*, pp 232-233

24 *Ibid*, pp 257-258, see also Percy, Fifield, and Associates, p 384

25 *Nihon gaiko no sai-shuppatsu*, p 273

26 *Ibid*, p 242

27 "Prolegomena to Japanese Diplomacy," *The Japan Annual of International Affairs*, No 1 (1961), p 11

28 "Nihon gaiko heno Prolegomena," p 3

29 "Daichuki shugi no genri to taisei" (Tokyo Teikoku-shoin, 1943), p 46

30 *Ibid*, p 48, "Redistribution of Natural Resources as the Price of Peace," *Contemporary Japan*, June, 1937, p 18, 20

31 "Nihon gaiko heno Prolegomena," p 3

32 See Johannes Mattern, *Geopolitik, Doctrine of National Self-Sufficiency and Empire* (Baltimore Johns Hopkins University Press, 1942), pp 11-12

33 See "Gendai kokusai seiji no kiso koso," *Kokusai seiji*, Winter, 1957, p 10

34 *Nihon gaiko heno sai-shuppatsu*, p 96, "One Hundred Years Across the Pacific," *Contemporary Japan*, May, 1960, pp 403-404 Cf Nicholas J Spykman, *America's Strategy in World Politics* (New York Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1942), p 470

Bitter Diplomacy: Postwar Japan-Korea Relations*

CHONG-DO HAH

Lawrence University

Studies in international relations commonly assume the concept of national interest, defined in terms of the quest for power, as the key to conduct as well as analysis of foreign policy. The focus of international relations, according to Frederick H. Hartmann, "is on the processes by which states adjust their national interests to those of other states", therefore, "in formulating a foreign policy it is imperative to express what is to be sought in accurate and modest terms"¹ In other words, rationally calculated national interest is fundamental in foreign policy decisions.

This celebrated concept, though useful for general analytical purposes, falls short of adequately explaining such an emotion-laden diplomatic conflict as the one involving Japan and Korea in the postwar period. As with other ex-colonial countries' relations with their former "mother" countries, Japanese-Korean relations have been influenced as much by the forces of nationalism, anti-colonialism, social revolution and the cold war as by the rationally calculated concepts of national interests. It may even be argued that in such cases the motives usually associated with the concept of interest are greatly subordinated to another set of motives which—though they may seem less rational (if not irrational) from a certain point of view—carry far more powerful and immediate emotional impact.

* A part of the research for this paper was supported by grants from the Social Science Research Council of Lawrence University and the Ford Foundation. I am also indebted to my colleagues, Phillip Chapman and Mojmir Povolný for reading and making comments on the manuscript.

The point is not that the conflicts of interest are unimportant, but that the complex forces underlying the conflicts must not be underestimated, especially in attempting to understand more comprehensively the bitterness which often characterizes the relations between underdeveloped and industrialized states and between small powers and great powers. To put it in another way, an interpretation like this must necessarily begin, not with a cool-headed Machiavellian analysis of national interest, but with an endeavor to correlate social, psychological, and historical tensions to the substance and style of their diplomacy.

I

Few countries are so closely related geopolitically, ethnically, and culturally to each other as Japan and Korea, their intimate intercourse goes back through time immemorial. In the remote past, the Korean peninsula served as the main channel through which new elements of continental civilizations were introduced to the island empire, and in the recent past, Japan, though as a conqueror, was instrumental in familiarizing the peninsula with modern technological civilization. Today, Korea is divided, but the Republic of Korea (ROK) stands along with Japan in the camp of the free world, both countries are allied with the United States.² Korea, though independent, is still closely tied economically to Japan, almost 60 per cent of Korea's exports go to Japan.³

Under the present circumstances, involving the threat from the nearby Communist countries, it would seem not only logical but realistic that these two neighbors should be close allies. Yet their relations in the postwar period have been tragically harsh. In the words of William J. Jorden, "there is probably no more bitter diplomatic conflict in the world today than that which divides Japan and Korea."⁴ Standing between them are such issues as fishing rights, the ownership of Dokdo or Takeshima Island, financial claims and the treatment of Koreans in Japan, but above all, deep-seated prejudices on both sides, and their uncompromising nationalism. In spite of the numerous conferences between the two countries since 1951, Korea still refuses to allow the establishment on her soil of a Japanese diplomatic

mission.⁵ As a precondition for the normalization of diplomatic relations, Korea has insisted that Japan nullify the old treaty of annexation (1910) which she feels was forced upon her "under duress."⁶ On its part, Japan has never shown any remorse or even offered a mere gesture of apology for her colonial rule, which the Koreans consider to have been vicious. She has stubbornly refused to make amends or to admit the slightest regret for the colonial past. More than that, Japan insists that she developed Korea. "Rather than offering [the] apologies that the Koreans have demanded since the war," says Lawrence A. Olson, "the Japanese still seem to expect a show of gratitude for the exploitation of Korea and the calculated repression of whatever capacities for self-government the Koreans possessed."⁷

Japanese and Western observers used to attribute the estranged Japanese-Korean relations to Syngman Rhee, while entertaining the hope that his disappearance would bring about a better turn. Rhee's "greatest invective," charges Richard C. Allen, "was reserved for Japan," and, rather than attempting to resolve the differences with Japan, he "sought to compound them by a deliberate policy of encouraging anti-Japanese sentiment in the Korean populace."⁸ Such criticism is not without foundation. For example, when some foreign reporters spoke of the possibility of sending a few Japanese troops to the peninsula during the Korean war to help the UN forces, Rhee stated bluntly that in that case the Korean soldiers would withdraw from the frontline to battle with the Japanese. Probably he suspected Japan more than he hated her, he said once to Claude A. Buss that it was difficult for him to imagine "a Japanese *kimono* without a knif in the sleeve."⁹ Few Japanese were allowed even to set foot on Korean soil while he retained the reins of government.¹⁰

Such sentiments, though they might seem irrational in the light of the genuine national interests of the Korean people, were not monopolized by Rhee. Most Koreans harbored similar sentiments then. Rhee's hostility, hatred, and fear of Japan were and still are shared by many Koreans who lived under the "yoke of Japanese imperialism."¹¹ To a great extent, this accounts for the still unresolved diplomatic conflict between the two countries, in spite of Rhee's fall from power, the changes of

We would like to think Koreans are a meek and gentle nation. In the light of our experiences, however, unfortunately we cannot think they are gentle and obedient. Compared with them, really very obedient and lovely is the attitude shown by the Japanese. This makes us feel that the Japanese people are quite irreconcilable with the Koreans. Japan and Korea are neighboring countries. Yet there have occurred too many incidents in which both nations could not reach agreement. We regret it much. This is apparently due to a difference in nature of the two nations.¹³

These generalizations, though obviously loaded with prejudice, cannot be dismissed merely as isolated impression, for recent Japanese public opinion polls bear out these deep prejudices toward Koreans. A study conducted recently among the students in grade and high schools and universities in Osaka shows that their liking for Koreans was 0 per cent. They rated Koreans as the worst people among the twelve nationality groups with which most Japanese are familiar.¹⁴ A similar study by the Research Committee on Japanese National Characteristics indicates that the Japanese consider Koreans the ugliest, least likeable, and least capable people.¹⁵ Nearly all public opinion polls conducted in Japan from 1951 to 1955 confirm such findings. They also rank the ROK as the most disliked country along with the Soviet Union.¹⁶

Koreans also have their share of prejudices against the Japanese. They continue to call the Japanese *Waenom*—meaning the little barbarians—and to remind them of Korean cultural offerings before the seventeenth century. They have never forgiven the Japanese for their unprovoked aggression in Korea in the sixteenth century, which has often been described as the most ruinous attack on one country by another. Of the Japanese invasion of the peninsula, a Japanese historian has written

Korean civilization was virtually destroyed even the graves of her kings were molested and rifled. At the close of the war Korea was a land of ruins, so great had been the devastation. The Koreans have ever since fostered great enmity toward the Japanese. Even today, Korea is filled with monuments, traditions and literature describing the horrors of the Seven Years' war—one of the most cruel and

unprovoked wars that the world has ever witnessed. Thus does Korea keep alive the memory of Japanese atrocities, generation after generation.¹⁷

Also, the Koreans tend to attribute the economic and political underdevelopment of their country to Japan's recent colonialism in Korea. It is not surprising that Koreans are bitter at Japan's persistent refusal to amend her past ruthlessness by a sincere apology. The general feeling of Koreans toward Japan was best described by You-Chan Yang at the first Japan-Korea conference:

I cannot say to you that we Koreans are going to wipe the past out of our minds.

The years of Japanese occupation left us with problems which cannot be easily solved. Our economic processes were tied closely and inexorably into those of Japan and were made to serve as subsidiaries to Japanese development. As a result, our industrial development was unhealthy and was so devised that it should not be able to stand alone. Similarly, during all those years, our own people were barred from technical and managerial training and experience.

This is the sum of the feelings of our people. I should like to indicate that a fair and full settlement of Korea's just claims will constitute the only basis upon which we can turn from the past to contemplate together the building of a better future. We cannot avoid a certain amount of reserve until we may be positively assured that the past is not to be repeated in the future.¹⁸

III

Right-wing Diet members, speaking before a crowd of Tokyo residents not too long ago, flayed Syngman Rhee as "an enemy of mankind," and demanded that the Rhee Line be scrapped, all Korean diplomatic agencies be shut off, and every Korean national in Japan be expelled.¹⁹ Such an emotional outburst stems, in the main, from the embittered dispute over the fishing rights in the maritime zone around the Korean peninsula, demarcated by what the Japanese call the "Rhee Line," and the Koreans call the "Peace Line."

The maritime line extends, on the average, about sixty miles out from the Korean coast, covering some 136,000 square miles.

There exist within this line extensive fishing grounds for mackerel and hoisemackeral, "the richest in Japan's neighboring waters"²⁰ The Presidential Proclamation of January 18, 1952, establishing the Peace Line, states that "its issuance has been urged by impelling need of safeguarding, once and for all, interests of national welfare and defense," and defines in paragraph 1 the Korean sovereignty in the maritime area surrounded by the line

The Government of the Republic of Korea holds and exercises national sovereignty over the shelf adjacent to the peninsula and insular coasts of the national territory, no matter how deep it may be, protecting, preserving and utilizing to the best advantage of national interests, all natural resources, mineral and marine, that exist over the said shelf, on it and beneath it, known or which may be discovered in the future²¹

In advancing this claim, Korea contends, though questionably, that it is based on "well-established international precedents" It is also provided that the line may be modified when new situations arise, and that the line does not interfere with rights of free navigation on the high seas But the proclamation goes much further than such proclamations as President Truman's of 1945²² The Korean government set up prize courts, and also enacted the Law for the Protection of Fishery Resources in December, 1953, to implement the Presidential proclamation Under the law, persons fishing within the Peace Line must obtain the permission of the Korean Government Those who violate this provision are liable to penal servitude, or confiscation of the fishing vessels, fishing equipment, and the like²³ To put more teeth into the proclamation, orders for the use of force against the fishing vessels violating the line were given occasionally²⁴

The Japanese Government protested immediately Japan, theoretically adhering to the three-mile limit of territorial waters, and also frustrated by several other countries' restrictive measures against Japanese fishing, is vehemently opposed to what she calls "illegal, reckless" Korean measures²⁵ She has consistently maintained that the Rhee Line is not based on fully established

international law, and that the seizures of Japanese fishing boats were all illegal acts which violate the principle of the freedom of the high seas. She contends further that the line is entirely arbitrary, that is, largely politically motivated.

Ever since the establishment of the line, Japan has made the fishing rights issue the most important one in her talks with Korea. While Japan has sought to have the traditional principle of the freedom of the high seas recognized first, Korea has countered by stating that the Peace Line must be recognized first. Japan's position is that, in the last analysis, the extent of the compromise she will make to the Korean claim is entirely dependent upon how far the Korean side will concede to her on the issue.

The Koreans contend that in spite of Japan's obligation to conclude a fishery agreement with Korea under Articles 9 and 21 of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, she has been unwilling to do so, presenting one excuse after another.²⁶ They point out that the Peace Line was created as a countermeasure against Japan's unwillingness to conclude such an agreement at the first Japan-Korean conference in 1951. The Japanese are reminded that it was their Government-General in Korea which issued on December 10, 1929, an ordinance establishing a "prohibited zone" in which foreign trawlers were banned from a zone exceeding 100-150 miles off the Korean coasts.²⁷ Korea contends further that, apart from the aim to conserve marine resources, the Peace Line is also intended to forestall disputes between Korea and Japan, to defend the Korean coast against Communist infiltration and also against smuggling.

There are other reasons which are equally significant. Fearful as they are of Japan's superiority in fisheries, Koreans wish to minimize unrestricted Japanese competition with Korea's poorly equipped fishermen, also, they want to make the Peace Line a constant reminder that Korea is just as sovereign as Japan. They are convinced that the exploitation of marine resources may be a significant element in their economic development which, they believe, had been unduly delayed by Japanese imperialism. Korea also knows well the restrictions placed on Japanese fishing by such countries as the Soviet Union and

Communist China, which make the Korean water zone even more attractive than before to Japanese fishermen

A Korean source indicates that the estimated catch by Japanese is 300,000 tons against the total Korean catch of 340,000 tons per year "Such reckless fishing within the Peace Line," says a Korean official, "may eventually lead to the exhaustion of Korea's marine resources This harms tremendously the interests of Korean fishermen as well as the fishing industry"²⁸ Japan claims that the fishing in waters along the Rhee Line involves the welfare of more than 40,160 fishermen, and that the loss suffered by her being prevented from fishing along the Rhee Line runs to about 13 billion yen (360 yen equal to one US dollar) per year²⁹ Whatever the merit of each claim, it may be reasonably argued that, given the extreme poverty and increasingly serious population pressure in Korea, the marine resources seem more important for Koreans than for the Japanese

Japan has continued to stress respect for the three-mile limit of territorial waters She also proposed to set up a joint fishing committee, charged with research of fishing resources and study of conservation measures so as to come up with a fishing agreement which might replace the Rhee Line Yet no such agreement has been concluded, as Korea assumes that the Peace Line is based on the result of Korean research which it considers as well-developed as Japan's Only recently, Korea has become more receptive to a proposal for a joint fishing research committee But in the absence of an agreement, Korea went on strongly enforcing the laws on the Peace Line From 1952 to September, 1961, 183 vessels and 2,308 crewmembers were seized by the Korean authorities³⁰ The captured Japanese were interned in a compound in Pusan and only after serving their terms were they released Sometimes even those who served out their sentences were not released immediately

At times Korea has been too tough in enforcing its own fishery laws against Japan In the spring of 1953 two Japanese trawlers were seized by a Korean patrol boat near Chejudo Island, and their chief fishing officer was shot to death during the action Japan demanded compensation and the punishment of the killer³¹ Korea replied that it was the duty of the Japanese gov-

ernment not to allow Japanese fishermen to violate the Peace Line. Later Japan decided to use government ships for escort of fishing boats but, since they are not authorized to use force,³² this action brought no positive results, and even government ships are not always immune to Korean detention.³³ One is tempted to ask seriously how long Korea can, in the face of increasing Japanese power and nationalist sentiment, maintain her unrealistic claim on the fishing rights.

The Rhee Line issue has become explosive ammunition in Japanese politics, and a major block to the final solution of the discord between Korea and Japan. The Japanese people regard the Korean measures not only as monopolistic but also as highly insulting and uncivilized. The seizure of fishermen has been described as a hostage policy, meaning that Korea tries to utilize those captured for her bargaining against Japan. The fishing dispute has been linked with the reinforcing of armaments and the exercise of the right of self-defense. In the Lower House on February 21, 1953, a government spokesman stated that "the government, if necessary, might be compelled in the future to protect Japanese fishing boats even by force."³⁴ Similarly, Mamoru Shigemitsu, then the president of the Progressive Party, stressed the imperative need of creating an army of self-defense. He stated

the ROK seizes openly outside its territorial waters Japanese fishing vessels, and may in the future even dare to lay hands on Japanese territory. If things were left unrestricted, the South Korean troops might land on Iki and Tsushima islands. In that case, Japan, not possessing the self-defense armament, is bound to surrender. It is natural for an independent country to have the right to self-defense

by possessing the self-defense establishment, it is intended to defend our fatherland, and to protect our fishing vessels on the high seas.³⁵

More recently, in July, 1958, in the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Lower House, a representative of the Japan Deep-Sea Trawling Fishery Association, expressing the views of the fishing industry concerning the Rhee Line, called for the adoption of a stronger policy by Japan. He said

It is extremely questionable whether the rigid policy adhered to with

regard to the Rhee Line for the past several years is applicable today. Are we to be satisfied with the same old passive attitude toward a violent and reckless adversary holding a pointed dagger in one hand? The present age is no time for a foreign policy which turns the other cheek. It is not sufficient merely to retreat before violence from the other party.³⁶

There is a danger (though not serious at present) in the tendency to take advantage of the statements made by a small group of parochial nationalists or of businessmen. Fortunately, however, the Japanese on the whole seem anxious to avoid—at least at this time—"an eye for an eye" policy against Korea for fear they might antagonize the rest of the world (especially other Asian countries) rather than because of faith in genuine pacifism. It is a credit to the Japanese leaders that their patrol boats around the Rhee Line are under strict orders not to return Korean fire or use force, thus obviating an open physical conflict between the two neighbors.

IV

Within this maritime boundary there lies a rocky cluster of tiny, barren and economically insignificant islets. It is named *Dokto* in Korean and *Takeshima* in Japanese. Koreans claim that the island belonged to Korea before it was incorporated into Japanese territory. In taking away the island, the Japanese Government took advantage of the weakness of Korea in 1905, at the time, Korea was important diplomatically and militarily, while Japan was fighting the Russians over the control of Korea and Manchuria. Thus, Korea was in no position to protest the loss of the island. The Koreans say further that geologically the island is an offshoot of Ulryōngdo Island, and that the MacArthur Line excluded the islet from the Japanese reach.³⁷

The Japanese, on the other hand, assert that the island was legally incorporated into their territory in 1905 by a public notice of Shimane prefecture. It is pointed out that Korea was not under Japanese control at that time, therefore, there is no reason for Japan to accept the Korean position that Korea was too weak to contest the Japanese action or that Korea was then under

strong Japanese influence. Right after the incorporation, the governor of Shimane prefecture toured the island. Japan points out further that the Japanese peace treaty does not specify the islet as belonging to Korea, and that in their first Administrative Agreement with the United States the island was designated as a maneuver area.³⁸

The island is *de facto* occupied by Korea, although the Japanese and Koreans took turns planting territorial signposts on the island and removing those erected by their opposites. In July, 1953, when the Japanese tried to land, they were fired upon by Korean fishing vessels carrying armed police.³⁹ Both governments protested in this incident. On September 25, 1954, Japan tried to obtain an agreement to submit the dispute to the International Court of Justice. Korea rejected the proposal, arguing that it was a clever strategy by which Japan had everything to gain and nothing to lose.⁴⁰ Her government spokesman announced that it would be unwise for Korea "to agree to litigation over a portion of soil—already securely in her possession—[since] it might have been interpreted as uncertainty over the validity of ownership."⁴¹ In July, 1954, Korean guards were stationed on the island. The following month, a lighthouse was erected, then a warning was issued that Japanese boats attempting to invade the island would be fired upon.⁴² In late 1954 the Korean Government issued a new stamp bearing a picture of the island, which caused the Japanese Government to announce that all mail displaying the stamp would be sent back or confiscated.⁴³

Korea denied the Japanese contention that the Rhee Line was partially intended for the occupation of Takeshima. However, Japan, on the basis of her legal position with regard to the island, declared that the Rhee Line is illegal as it includes in its area a part of Japanese territory. As such, they contend that the Korean occupation of the islet is not only outrageous but also clearly an act of illegal occupation. Japan seems to base her claim on the doctrine of prescription and effective occupation. But it appears that what is really involved is the question of the original title or derivative title to the island, or—as even a cynic might very well say—a contest between the incompatible national egos.

V

No less controversial than the fishery and territorial issues was the property claims issue, until Japan withdrew her claims on December 31, 1957, on the basis of the American interpretation of Article 4(B) of the San Francisco treaty. To the Koreans this issue has been the real crux, as they expected from the beginning that Japan would pay what they regard as legitimate and reasonable claims.⁴⁴ Included in these claims are payment from Japan for property and personal damage, confiscation, and services arising from World War II and occupation before the war, refund on postal savings and other bank accounts taken away from Korea during the war, and the return of national relics taken to Japan.

Rather than considering the Korean demands with sympathy, Japan insisted that Koreans pay for Japanese private property which had been confiscated and transferred to Korea by the United States. "There have been no other problems," says a Korean professor, "throughout the fifteen years of history of the postwar Korea-Japan relations that made the Korean people [more] indignant and dumbfounded than the problem of the Japanese property claim."⁴⁵

This Japanese counterclaim was probably intended both to counter the Korean claim for reparation and to bargain for the Japanese fishing rights. However, Japan has clearly committed herself in her peace treaty to renounce all property rights—public as well as private—in Korea. Articles 2(A) and 4(B) of the treaty read as follows:

Japan, recognizing the independence of Korea, renounces all right, title and claims to Korea. Japan recognizes the validity of dispositions of property of Japan and Japanese nationals made by or pursuant to directives of the United States Military Government in Korea.⁴⁶

Paragraph 4(B) needs some clarification, as it bears reference to the initial American disposition of Japanese property in Korea. Section 2 of USAMGIK (United States Army Military Government in Korea) Ordinance No. 33 (December 6, 1945) states

The title to all gold, silver, platinum, currency, securities, accounts in financial institutions, valuable papers and any other property owned

or controlled by the Government or its nationals is hereby vested in the Military Government of Korea as of 25 September 1945, and all such property is owned by the Military Government in Korea ⁴⁷

This ordinance, read along with the provision in the peace treaty, makes it unequivocally clear that the Japanese private and public property was legally confiscated by the USAMGIK. These assets, viz., vested property, were later released to the constitutionally instituted Korean Government under the Initial Financial and Property Settlement between the Korean and American governments, signed on September 11, 1948 ⁴⁸ In addition, the United States expressed her opinion that "all right, title and interest of Japan and of Japanese nationals in property within the jurisdiction of the ROK have been divested. Accordingly valid claims to such assets or to an interest therein cannot be asserted by Japan" ⁴⁹

However, the Japanese side at the conference table acted entirely contrary to her promise in the treaty. She started to compound the property issue by playing with words which are so clearly stated that little room is left for speculation. The Japanese delegation said at the conference in 1952

The US Military Government in Korea effected the *de facto* transfer of Japanese property to the Korean government. This does not mean, however, that the US Military government transferred to the Korean government full rights over said property. If the legal right of disposal held by the US Forces as belligerent or occupation forces is construed as having been transferred to a third party which was neither a belligerent nor an occupation army, it would be following a logic which is quite against the principles of international law. Japan recognizes the validity of disposition of property of Japan and Japanese nationals made by or pursuant to directives of the US Military Government in Korea but does not waive her original rights and claims to property in Korea ⁵⁰

The Korean delegates were reportedly shocked by the Japanese claim to the property. Their chief delegate, You-Chan Yang, issued a formal statement insisting that "unless Japan drops her transparently obvious attempts to *bargain* on matters in which [she] has no legal or moral foundation for *bargaining*," good relations with Japan were impossible ⁵¹ As for the Japanese

claim to legality in the light of international law, he commented with bitterness

It is also interesting, in view of our people's long and intimate knowledge of *how* the Japanese acquired some of this property (by duress, bribery, terror, and other standard methods of the police state) to find a pious reference in your statement to "the principles of international law"

Syngman Rhee's reaction was even more biting, in his letter to Toyohiko Kagawa he claimed that

the Japanese representatives presented a preposterous claim to what amounts to 85% of all Korean property as belonging to Japan. By solemn oath, Japan signed the San Francisco Treaty which fully settled all these questions, but almost before the ink was dry Japan was ignoring the terms 52

The legal reasoning in the Japanese argument not only sounds much like a Lockean argument of property rights but it is extremely legalistic. The Japanese have argued that the phrases "vested in and owned by" do not affect the final transfer of ownership. In other words, the USAMGIK did not acquire the ownership, but only a trusteeship. Ordinance No. 33, according to their contention, does not order confiscation but control of property of the enemy nation and should be "subject to arrangements." A Japanese professor, writing on this problem, argues

the Japanese property in Korea has been merely "vested" in the United States military government, but has never been confiscated by the same authorities. Furthermore, under paragraph B of Article 4, Japan "recognizes" the validity of such a disposition as the vesting of her property, but does not abandon her claim for its return 53

The Japanese, in defense of their assertion, cited Article 46 of the Regulations attached to the Hague Convention of 1907, which prohibits the confiscation of private property 54. However, it is applicable only to such a case as belligerent occupation. The article therefore seems inapplicable to the occupation of Korea by the Allied armed forces, which was not an army in enemy territory. Korea ceased *de facto* to be a part of Japan by virtue of Japan's unconditional acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration

and their final surrender to the Allied Powers on August 15, 1945. The objective of the Allied Powers' occupation of Korea was also different from that of belligerent occupation, their ultimate aim was to implement the declaratory promises toward the achievement of Korean independence. Moreover, the secession of Korea from Japan was made absolute when Korea attained its independence and received international recognition of such attainment.

However, the chief Japanese delegate, Kanichiro Kubota—presumably provoked by the Koreans' insistence that the Japanese have only exploited their country—declared in 1953 that the repatriation of Japanese nationals from Korea was a violation of international law, that the establishment of the ROK by the United States and the United Nations prior to the conclusion of the Japanese peace treaty was also a violation of international law. He continued quite insensitively that the statement of the Cairo Declaration that there existed an enslavement of the Korean people, was nothing but war hysteria. Moreover, the transfer of Japanese property to the Korean Government by the USAMGIK was alleged to be a violation of international law. Finally, the thirty-six years of Japanese occupation of Korea was declared beneficial to the Koreans.⁵⁵

The last point was most obnoxious to the Koreans, who were probably more anxious than anything else to make the Japanese listen to and respect them in order to improve their national reputation. So enraged were they that they refused to meet their erstwhile enemy again at the conference table until Japan officially withdrew the statement. Japan, however, refused to retract the statement, probably because the Japanese believed seriously the full content of the statement or because it was unthinkable for them to apologize to a country of third-class nationals.

Pressed by the issue of the detained Japanese fishermen and also by the desire to overcome the impasse over the Rhee Line, the Japanese Government at last, on December 31, 1957, agreed to withdraw formally the Kubota statement. It also agreed to abandon its property claim in Korea.⁵⁶ After the United States Department of State had given its view that Japan had no right

to confiscated properties in Korea, and that Japanese-Korean claims in effect canceled each other, the Japanese apparently abandoned their blanket demand for compensation ⁵⁷

However, this did not remove the Korean claim for compensation and the return of their cultural property, nor did it eliminate the argument over the Japanese claims completely. As late as 1961 in the Upper House of the Japanese Diet, a councilman questioned the government strenuously on the issue. The government spokesman did reply that the Japanese claim was not abandoned but that it had simply disappeared completely when the peace treaty was signed ⁵⁸ As for the Korean claim for reparation payments, it is still unsettled. It remains the central issue in the minds of Koreans as they are preoccupied with their economic reconstruction. Japan has reportedly offered \$150 million in grants and \$150 million as a loan, whereas Korea has reportedly demanded a grant of \$600 million, ⁵⁹ Japan has already returned to Korea—in the words of Japanese officials, “given as gifts”—over one hundred cultural property items, but Korea charges that they are not gifts but stolen national treasures, and insists that many more are still to be restored ⁶⁰

VI

The most disturbing problem of all in the exacerbated relations, from the standpoint of human rights and the cold war, is that of the Korean minority in Japan ⁶¹ As is evident in various discriminatory measures adopted by the Japanese against the Koreans, Japan simply wants to get rid of them in an ostensibly humanitarian and legal manner irrespective of where they are shipped—even to a Communist country. On the other hand, the government of Korea wishes to protect Korean nationals who have, so it believes, been viciously exploited by Japanese imperialism. The Korean position is that their minority must be sent to the ROK only after they are adequately compensated for their services to Japan in the prewar period.

Today there are about six hundred thousand registered Koreans living in Japan ⁶² The 1930 census shows that the proportion of Korean residents actually born in Japan was only

82 per cent of the total. In 1962, however, it rose to over 60 per cent. The lives of most Koreans living in Japan are then already deeply rooted in Japan.

There were more than two million Koreans in Japan when the war ended, whereas less than three hundred resided there before Korea was made a protectorate of Japan in 1905. The mass movement of Koreans across the Strait of Korea to Japan resulted directly from that country's systematic exploitation of the Korean people during the thirty-six years of her colonial domination.⁶⁵ The migration was enormously accelerated by Japan's ill-fated imperialistic drive clothed in the slogan of "Asia for the Asians." Before and during the war, most of the migrants hired or taken by force to Japan worked for low wages at the hardest labor, that which the Japanese laborers were unwilling to undertake.⁶⁶

"Poverty-stricken" is too mild an expression to describe the economic position of most Koreans in Japan. Just as they did before 1915 as colonial people, the Koreans now residing in Japan find themselves in the depths of poverty and humiliation. Japanese people continue to call them *Daisankokujin* (third class nationals). Some of them even call the minority Jews, but in economic position there is no parallel at all between the Korean minority and the Jews in Europe or between the former and the Chinese in Southeast Asia. The overwhelming majority of Koreans in Japan are without decent, secure occupation, and many others eke out a scanty livelihood with the relief subsidies handed out reluctantly by the Japanese government. No wonder that Aidath W. Bunks describes the Japanese treatment of the minority as "shameful."⁶⁷

Almost all of the Koreans are concentrated in large metropolitan areas, in Tokyo, Kobe, and Osaka; many of them reside in slum areas. In Edagawamachi, Fukukawa-ku, Tokyo, for instance, 180 Korean families live, and of these families, Udaï Fujishima, an eminent Japanese political commentator, explains,

70 are on relief subsidies. With only 8,000 yen assistance, however, an average family of seven or eight can hardly live. This plight forces them to work on a job, if they can find one, even when it pays only 100 yen a day. With all the income added together, they can live about half a month fairly decently. Of the 180 families, only 10 have stable

jobs, and the rest are day laborers, rice scavengers, used-nail collectors, and other like occupations⁶⁸

Even Koreans with college degrees cannot find a decent occupation because of vocational discrimination. Some of them are compelled to work as scrap-iron collectors earning \$40 a month.⁶⁹ Most companies have rules barring the employment of Koreans, which forces even honest and serious youths to use false Japanese names.⁷⁰

Some Koreans in Japan have been successful as businessmen, but find it virtually impossible to obtain bank loans even for mere survival, much less for expansion, in the midst of Japanese competition. When they do succeed in getting loans, the terms are much stiffer than those granted to Japanese loan applicants.⁷¹

Socially, too, the Korean minority in some ways shares the lowest rank with the *Eta*, who are practically an outcast group living amidst the very hierarchically oriented Japanese. In the words of Hugh H. Smythe, "Japanese racialism, rising out of a rigid class pattern and an abhorrence of an intranational group physically like themselves, shows itself most forcefully in Japanese antipathy towards the Koreans."⁷² More than that, "for decades the Korean minority has been made the scapegoat for one misfortune after another."⁷³

It is not surprising then that the incidence of crime among the Koreans in Japan is high. The number of persons convicted during 1957 was 4,200 or 7 per 1,000 of the population, approximately ten times the corresponding rate for the Japanese population.⁷⁴

The socioeconomic plight of Koreans in Japan explains in part why hundreds of them have gone over from Japan to Communist North Korea, exchanging freedom for economic security, despite the bondage to communism. True, politically the two competing governments in Korea, each claiming for itself the allegiance of all the Koreans in Japan, have had a great impact on the Japan-based Koreans' communal politics. Although some of them are politically neutral or genuinely Japanese-minded, they are, generally speaking, divided into two main groups parallel to those in tragically divided Korea.⁷⁵ These

groups are represented by Mindan and the more powerful Chōsōren, the former aligns itself with the ROK, and the latter with North Korea ⁷⁶

In spite of the presence of South Korean diplomatic agents in Japan, presumably promoting the interests of the Korean minority, the Japanese (and Korean) Communists have succeeded overwhelmingly in winning that minority's friendship. This is in part because they have been the only Japanese political group that has openly sought the support of Koreans in Japan and, in turn, supported their demands, and in part because of the influence of events in Korea itself. Even when Korea was a Japanese colony, it was the Japanese Communists who supported both secretly and openly the political aspirations of Koreans ⁷⁷. Since the war, the party has successfully exploited the national and racial resentments of Koreans in Japan, their influence has reached the point where they can sway a substantial part, if not all, of the Chōsōren group. As early as 1949 there were 28,000 Koreans in the Japanese Communist Party (JCP) ⁷⁸.

Politically and economically, Koreans have become undesirable for the national interest of Japan, the connection between the JCP and the minority especially constituted a threat to Japan's security. Moreover, the Japanese government, inflamed by the uncompromising attitude of the ROK with regard to the Rhee Line, was readily persuaded to conclude a repatriation program of Koreans in Japan with North Korea in order to get rid of as many Koreans as possible. Not only do they allegedly cause a drain on the Japanese treasury but also they constitute powerful leverage for the Seoul government in its bargaining with Japan.

Also, the strict enforcement of the Immigration Surveillance Law of 1951 was accompanied by an increased number of Korean detainees for violation of other Japanese laws. The Korean Government accepted their deportation, but suddenly, beginning in 1954, refused to accept any except those who entered Japan illegally after the liberation of Korea ⁷⁹. In the opinion of the Korean Government, those Koreans who went to Japan before the end of World War II should be released there in view of their permanent residence resulting from the peculiar circumstances in

which they were taken to Japan. In addition, Korea, after the Korean war, was too poor to absorb more people into its economy. South Korea was already too crowded with thousands of refugees from North Korea. Also, the Korean Government was so enraged by the Kubota Statement that it was unwilling to show any sign of weakness to Japan.

As the Japanese Government grew tougher in dealing with the Koreans, so did the Korean Government in enforcing the fishery laws. This irritated the Japanese Government further. In spite of Japan's efforts to induce Korea to come to an agreement on Japan's own terms, the Korean side did not retreat an inch from its position of defending the Peace Line and continued to capture Japanese fishermen violating it. This is a serious insult to Japan's traditional sense of superiority, particularly for the more conservative Japanese, the Korean defiance appears "as the very acme of national humiliation."⁸⁰

Japan, frustrated by the Koreans' refusal to accept the deportees unless compensated, and also anxious to get rid of the minority, decided in 1959 to repatriate to North Korea those Koreans who chose to go there "voluntarily."⁸¹ Haunted by intense poverty, misery and discrimination, more than 75,000 of them as of June, 1962, were lured by Communist promises of food, jobs, and education.⁸² Yet the Japanese government asserted that its repatriation policy was based on the principle of freedom of residence and genuine humanitarianism in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.⁸³ This self-righteous contention raises a question as to why Japan, if she was so humanitarian, had done so little toward providing decent opportunities for the minority before this.

Japan's claim that the repatriation of Koreans was voluntary and humanitarian was echoed by the North Korean Government. Contrary to South Korea's expectations, even the government of the United States refused to pressure Japan to abandon the repatriation plan. The unhappy, disgraced Seoul government labeled it as inhuman expulsion, compulsory deportation, and, at best, a forced political repatriation, and immediately suspended the Japan-Korean conference and trade with Japan. It went so far as to hint at the use of force to prevent Japan from

carrying out the repatriation program⁸⁴ It maintained that "deportees" were being sent for political reasons into enslavement in a Russian satellite country which is still technically at war with the ROK and the United Nations It insisted that those who wished to leave Japan must be compensated by Japan for the wartime hard labor and military services rendered to their Japanese exploiters and then must be repatriated to South Korea. The Seoul government contends that it alone is the legal government of the entire peninsula, hence, the Koreans in Japan are citizens of the ROK Further, it asserts that those who want to remain in Japan should be guaranteed the right to earn a decent living in view of Japan's responsibility in taking them there and of the many hardships they have suffered already⁸⁵

Considered in the context of the cold war, the repatriation movement "has boosted the prestige of Communists and their" peace movement in that it is a reversal of the flight of people from the Communist world and, conversely, a discredit to the free world in which both Japan and Korea are allied with the United States In a sense, it was an important victory for the Communists for their skillfully executed "peace movement" offensive Also, this movement testifies again to the decline in the international effort to protect minorities in the postwar world For Japan and Korea, it proved to be one more point of bitterness in their already entangled diplomatic relations

These diplomatic conflicts, sharply aggravated by their old as well as new enmities, keep Korea and Japan bitterly embroiled even after a decade of negotiations toward the normalization of their relations The problem is much more than the mere conflict between law and politics or between a *status quo* country and a revisionist country Even the Communist aggression in Korea, which was a Soviet attempt directed more against Japan than against Korea, failed to narrow the basic cleavage between the two neighbors Nor did the downfall of Syngman Rhee, who had allegedly been responsible personally for the intense Korean feeling against Japan, diminish animosities In fact, it was not under the Rhee government but under the Chang Myun government that the Korean legislative assembly, alarmed by the possible

emergence of neo-Japanese colonialism through economic means, formally adopted in 1961 the so-called "four principles" with reference to the normalization of Korea-Japan relations. The four principles are: relations with Japan must progress gradually from limited to full intercourse, the Peace Line must be respected and defended for the sake of national security and the protection of fishermen, diplomatic normalization will come only after resolution of important pending problems, particularly settlement for damage and suffering caused by Japanese occupation, and Japanese-Korean economic cooperation other than current trade must be carried out only after the opening of formal diplomatic intercourse under state control, within limits that prevent damage to national industry.⁸⁶ Even the present military regime which, under increased American as well as internal economic pressure, has shown a much more positive interest in attempting to resolve the conflict with Japan, has never explicitly renounced these principles, although it indicts harshly its predecessors for the failure of negotiations between the two countries.⁸⁷

The present analysis tends to support the interpretation that the pending diplomatic issues are not necessarily the causes for the tragic antipathy between Japan and Korea. Not that the conflict of their national interests is unreal or that it can be easily resolved, but it is rather indicative of the highly emotion-laden historical and socio-psychological tensions. Manifestations of hostility, arrogance, hatred, distrust, fear and pride find explicit as well as implicit expressions in the issues that keep Japan and Korea apart. These well-nigh irreconcilable tensions have rendered a prompt removal or adjustment of diplomatic impediments most difficult.

While Japan's national interest demands amicable relations with Korea—a geopolitical dagger pointed at the heart of Japan—she cannot satisfy the Korean demand that Japan apologize for the suffering during the thirty-six years of colonial rule. A simple expression of regret and apology at the beginning of their conference might have gone a long way toward achieving reconciliation. But, as a high official in the Japanese Foreign Office confided to Lawrence Olson, "public opinion will not allow us to

take the initiative toward Korea"⁸⁸ Nevertheless, because the prejudices are "internalized," the leaders have done little or nothing to re-educate public opinion to reduce the deep-seated prejudices Evidence suggests that, on the whole, Japanese public opinion, in spite of the conflicting attitudes between the *Liberal-Democratic Party* and the Socialists with regard to the Japanese-Korean relations, does not speak with myriad voices about Korea,⁸⁹ instead, it crystalizes on one side—the contempt of Koreans

Korea, on the other hand, resents the Japanese arrogance, symbolized by the Kubota Statement and the treatment of their compatriots in Japan The Koreans hate the Japanese for causing suffering in the past, and are fearful of a resurgent Japan No other country has so much mistreated and exploited Korea as the Japanese, Japan's past diplomacy has been such that Koreans suspect her as much as they do the Chinese and Russians The Koreans seem determined to gain once and for all a firm guarantee of security and real equality with Japan, no matter what it takes More broadly stated, their nationalism, as with the same movement in other developing countries, is extremely assertive, seeking to find self-respect and to overcome the inferiority of self in the face of the old ruling country This explains partially why American military assistance to Japan is not welcomed by the Koreans They are fearful of a well-armed Japan, inasmuch as they have been the major target of Japanese aggression historically This is intensified by Japan's dazzlingly prosperous economic expansion and growing international prestige and her refusal to satisfy what Koreans regard as a just claim Korean desire to be treated as an equal, their hatred and fear of the old enemy, are therefore the crux of the impediment in their relations with Japan

One may contend that the evidence presented here is insufficient to support the hypothesis which has been suggested initially But where certain nexus between historical, socio-psychological tensions on one hand, and the substance and style of the two countries' diplomacy on the other is correctly identified, it should be clear that the linkage does exist To one degree or another, all the issues in conflict are caught up in that linkage

To that extent, it can be stated that the concept of national interest, as conventionally used, is inadequate for a well-balanced interpretation of such international conflicts as the Japanese-Korean debacle. The Czech-German, Anglo-Irish, and Arab-Jewish relations are also cases in point, many other similar cases can be cited. In these instances, the idiom of national interest tells one little about the differences between national communities, differences in attitudes, motives and purposes, which are revealed through the human beings who are involved directly and indirectly in conduct of foreign policy. It should then be stressed that systematic and rigorous studies of international conflict in particular and foreign policy in general must carefully take into account the interaction of historical socio-psychological tensions and other relevant variables.

Lest this interpretation, however, be regarded as deterministic, it must be added in haste that the possibilities for reconciliation between Japan and Korea are not without any hope. Even Germany and France, after three centuries of conflict, have finally emerged as partners in an attempt to create an enduring, peaceful and stable community of European nations. But blended into the unpleasant memories of those two nations are mutual respect, pride, and immediate, as well as long-term, idealism and ambitions, shared by the peoples of both countries within the great traditions of European civilization. Almost none of these "shared experiences" seem cherished by the Japanese and Korean peoples, although both nations owe their cultures to a significant extent to the Chinese civilization. Nevertheless, if their leaders patiently endeavor to ameliorate the intense prejudices for the development of enlightened public opinion, the two neighbors may eventually be able to accommodate their problems, needs, tensions, and their manifold implications. Inasmuch as historical, socio-psychological factors are dynamic, the people's moods and attitudes can continuously be created and recreated by wise and responsible leadership.

NOTES

1 Frederick H Hartmann, *The Relations of Nations*, 2nd ed (New York, 1962), pp 5-7 *passim*

2 For American interest in the Japanese Korean relations, see *United States Foreign Policy, Asia Studies Prepared at the Request of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations*, by Conlon Associates, No 5, 1959 (86th Congress, 1st sess, committee print) (Washington, D C, 1959), pp 5-12, 90-118 *passim*

3 Probably the most comprehensive study on the trade between the two countries is included in Asahi Shimbun Research Bureau (ed), *Namboku Chōsen no genjō (Part 1—South Korea)*, (Tokyo, 1962), pp 192-232 See also Republic of Korea (ROK), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Oemu haengchōng ui siphnyōn* (Seoul, 1959), pp 29-36

4 William J Jorden, 'Japan's Diplomacy between East and West,' in Hugh Borton *et al*, *Japan between East and West* (New York, 1957), p 250

5 The sequence of conferences the preliminary conference (October 20—November 20, 1951), first formal conference (February 15—April 25, 1952), second (April 15—July 24, 1953), third (October 6-21, 1953), fourth (April 15, 1958—April 19, 1960), fifth (October 25, 1960—May 16, 1961), and sixth (October 20, 1961—)

6 ROK, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *op cit*, p 30

7 Lawrence Olson, "Japan and Korea The Bitter Legacy," *American Universities Field Staff, East Asia Series*, IX, No 7 (1960), 2

8 Richard C Allen, *Korea's Syngman Rhee* (Tokyo, 1960), pp 183-185

9 Claude A Buss, *The Arc of Crisis* (New York, 1961), p 191

10 Even during the Korean war Japanese harbor workers employed by the UN forces, when they set foot on Korean soil, were arrested and tried by the Korean Government Mark Clark, *From the Danube to the Yalu* (New York, 1954), p 150

11 The most common Korean expression denoting Japanese colonialism

12 Heiji Shinosaki, *Zamichi Chōsenjin undō* (Tokyo, 1955), p 190

13 American Embassy, Tokyo, *Daily Survey of Japanese Press*, February 20, 1958, p 5

14 Tatsuo Haratani *et al*, "Minzokuteki stereotype to kōaku kanjō ni tsuite no ichi kōsatsu," *Kyōiku Shinrigaku Kenkyū*, VIII, No 1 (1960), 6 Similar reports can be found in *Gendai Asia shi* (Vol IV of *Sekai shi ni okeru Asia*) (Tokyo, 1956), 87-89 *passim*, and *Japan Times*, June 11, 1962

15 Research Committee of Japanese National Character, Institute of Statistical Mathematics, *Nihonjin no kokuminsei* (Tokyo, 1961), pp 335-345 *passim*

16 C M Wilburn, "Some findings of Japanese Public Opinion Polls," in Hugh Borton *et al*, *op cit*, pp 300-306 *passim*

17 Y S Juno, *Japanese Expansion on the Asiatic Continent*, I (Berkeley, 1937), 175

- 18 His opening statement at the conference ROK, Office of Public Information, *Korean Report* (1952-1953), II (1955), 53-55
- 19 S Griffin, "The Japan Korea Deadlock," *Japan Digest*, August, 1954, p 42
- 20 "High Seas and Japanese Fisheries," *Oriental Economist*, June, 1960, p 262
- 21 Tsuneo Mura, "The Rhee Line," *Japan Quarterly*, VI, No 1 (1959), 24-25, and Kosaku Tamura, "The Rhee Line and International Law," *Contemporary Japan*, XXII (1953), 389-390
- 22 Cf Il Yŏng Chŏng, "'P'ŏnghwasŏn' ū kukjepŏpchŏk kunkŏ," *Sa-sange*, June, 1960, pp 254-261
- 23 ROK, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *op cit*, p 168 See also Mura, *op cit*, pp 27-28, *Asahi Shimbun*, October 5, 6, 1952
- 24 *Asahi Shimbun*, September 8, 1952
- 25 Yoshihiko Seki, "The Foreign Policy of Japan," in Joseph E Black and Kenneth W Thompson (ed), *Foreign Policies in a World of Change* (New York, 1963), p 538
- 26 Article 9 Japan will enter promptly into negotiations with the Allied Powers so desiring for the conclusion of bilateral and multilateral agreements providing for the regulation or limitation of fishing and the conservation and development of fisheries on the high seas Article 21 Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 25 of the present Treaty, China shall be entitled to the benefits of Articles 10 and 14(a)2, and Korea to the benefits of Articles 2, 4, 9 and 12 of the present Treaty *Documents on American Foreign Relations*, XIII, January 1-December 31, 1951 (Princeton, 1953), 470-479
- 27 Tae Ha Yiu, "The Real Tragedy" (nd), p 12 (mimeographed) This is reproduced under the title, "A Series of Articles on the Korean-Japanese Overall Talks Released by Minister Tae Ha Yiu through the *Japan Times* between December 12 and 27, 1958," in ROK, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 4291 *nyŏndo juyo sŏngmyŏng mit yŏnsol jip* (Supplement) (Seoul, 1958), pp 170-213
- 28 Young-dal Ohm, "Problems and Prospects of Korea-Japan Talks," *Korean Journal*, II, No 4 (1962), 54
- 29 Mura, *op cit*, p 33
- 30 Japan, Asia Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (ed), *Chōsen binran* (Tokyo, 1962), p 42
- 31 *Nippon Times*, February 14, 20, 1953 The incident is described in detail in *Asahi Shimbun*, February 30, 1953
- 32 Douglas H Mendel, Jr, *The Japanese People and Foreign Policy* (Berkeley, 1961), p 188, and *Asahi Shimbun*, November 29, 1952 On several occasions fishery organizations, prefectural assemblies and governors conferences in western and southern Japan appealed for the forceful removal of the Rhee Line to the central government, but the latter stated consistently that such a forceful measure is unreasonable *Asahi Shimbun*, October 19, December 24, 1955, and January 22, 1956

33 *Asahi Shimbun*, September 29, 1953

34 "Japan-Korea Relations Doomed," *Oriental Economist*, March, 1953, p 114

35 Quoted in "Japan-Korea Relations in Crisis," *Oriental Economist*, October, 1953, p 480

36 Cited in Mura, *op cit*, p 34

37 For the Koreans' official account, see *Oemu haengchōng ui sŏpnyōn*, pp 174-179 See also Byeng Do Lee, *Kuksa daekwan* (Seoul, 1948), pp 453-457 It is interesting that an article by a Japanese in 1930 claims that Takeshima belongs to Korea Sekko Okehata, "Nipponkai ni okeru Takeshima no nissen kankei ni suite," *Rekishu Chiri*, LV, No 6 (1930), 590-591 North Korea also claims the island belongs to Korea This is interesting because the P'yōngyang government's basic policy toward Japan is to prevent her reaching rapprochement with South Korea—declaring, for instance, that it does not recognize the Peace Line—and conversely, to bring Japan closer to the Communist bloc See *Outline of Korean Geography* (P'yōngang Foreign Language Publishing House, 1957), p 5

38 For a detailed background study on the island and the official Japanese position, see Japan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Takeshima no ryōyū* (Tokyo, 1953) See also Consulate General of Japan, Chicago, *Japan Report*, (January 15, 1957), pp 7-10

39 *Nippon Times*, July 14, 1953

40 *Ibid*, September 26, 1954, *Asahi Shimbun*, September 25, and October 29, 1954

41 Hong Kee Karl, "Questions at Issue between Korea and Japan," *Korean Survey*, IV (May, 1955), 4

42 *Asahi Shimbun*, August 29, 1954

43 *Ibid*, November 19, 1954

44 This sentiment was made very clear by Syngman Rhee at a press conference in 1959 when he said "Time after time, we have asked Japan to give evidence that it wants good relations with Korea We suggested such demonstration of good feeling so that the Korean Government could convey it to the Korean people, and indicate that the Japanese had changed and wanted to make amends for the forty year occupation and its accompanying oppressions But to date the Japanese have returned nothing that they took away from Korea, and all too often have implied that they still harbor sentiments of thirty or forty years ago toward Korea and the Korean people ROK, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *ROK Bulletin*, No 18 (June, 1959), p 2

45 Kwan Sook Park, "Some Criticisms on Japanese Claims for Property in Korea," *Koreana Quarterly*, III, No 1 (1961), 42

46 *Documents on American Foreign Relations*, *loc cit*

47 ROK, Office of Public Information, *op cit*, p 57 See also SCAP, *Summation of Non Military Affairs in Japan and Korea*, No 3 (December, 1945), p 199

48 George M McCune, *Korea Today* (Cambridge, 1950), pp 96-99

49 Cited in Jin Won Lee, "Brief Survey of Korean-Japanese Relations (Post-war Period)," *Koreana Quarterly*, I, No 1 (1959), p 77

50 Quoted in ROK, Office of Public Information, *op cit*, p 56

51 *Ibid*, p 58

52 A copy of the letter (sent at Christmas, 1955) was made available by Professor P Allan Dionisopoulos of Northern Illinois University

53 Yasuo Yamashita, "Japanese-Korean Relations," *Contemporary Japan*, XXIV, Nos 10-12 (1957), 705 See also his "Title Claim to Japanese Property in Korea," *Japanese Annual of International Law*, No 2 (1958), pp 38-54

54 Article 46 and some of the important relevant points are concisely discussed in Hans Kelsen, *Principles of International Law* (New York, 1952), pp 72-75

55 You Chan Yang, "The Aspirations of Korea," *The Annals*, CCXCIV (July, 1954), p 44 A detailed discussion on the Kubota statement is in *Asahi Shimbun*, October 22, 1953

56 For the text of the agreement see *Asahi Shimbun*, January 1, 1958 It was also agreed that the American interpretation of property issue, dated 31 December 1957, would not be disclosed

57 Tatsuo Mitari *et al*, "Korea-Japan Diplomacy," *Oriental Economist*, April, 1958, p 188 See also *Japan Times*, January 7, 1958

58 38th Diet, *Sangun Kaigiroku*, No 9 (*Official Gazette extra*, February 24, 1961), pp 9-12 See also *Sangun Kaigiroku*, No 8, p 84

59 C A Johnson, "'Low Posture' Politics in Japan," *Asia Survey*, III, No 1 (1963), p 27 According to another source, the Korean side asked recently for a settlement of \$800 million Ohm, *op cit*, p 20 Whatever the case, the recent Korean property claims are far below what Syngman Rhee demanded in 1957—\$8 billion Rhee's reasoning was allegedly based on the assumption that if the Philippines received \$800 million for four years of military occupation by Japan, Korea should get \$8 billion for forty years of subjugation Mitari *et al*, *loc cit*

60 Yiu, *op cit*, pp 4-9

61 The overall aspect of the minority is well described in Edward W Wagner, *The Korean Minority in Japan 1904-1950*, (New York, 1951) (Mimeographed) Probably the more comprehensive is Jae-Il Pak, *Zainichi Chōsenjin ni kansuru sōgō chōsa kenkyū* (Tokyo, 1957) See also Kwang Chōl Lim, "Zainichi Chōsenjin mondai," *Rekishigaku Kenkyū* (*Chōsen shi no mondai tokushū*) (July, 1953), pp 66-72

62 Of the 600,000 Koreans, at least 97 per cent are of South Korean origin Japan, Asia Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (ed) *Chōsen binran* (Tokyo, 1960), p 67 This figure does not include unregistered Koreans estimated at about 200,000 *Asahi Shimbun*, February 5, 1959

63 "Basic Trends," *Japan Quarterly*, VI, No 2 (1959) 133

64 *Japan Times*, June 11, 1952

65 Udaï Fujishima *et al*, "Zainichi Chōsenjin rokujū mannin no genjitsu Chūō Kōron (December, 1958), pp 175-180 See also Kenichi Hikami Chōsen

nōmin no naichi ishutsu no hitsuzensai," *Shakai Seisaku Jihō*, January, 1941, pp 44-56

66 David Conde, "The Korean Minority in Japan," *Far Eastern Survey*, XVI, No 4 (1947), 43 See also J B Cohen, *Japan's Economy in War and Reconstruction* (Minneapolis, 1949), pp 326-328 *passim*

67 Ardath W Burks, *The Government of Japan* (New York, 1961), p 252

68 Fujishima *et al*, *op cit*, p 185 See also Kanichi Tanaka, "Kaihōchi Etagawa machi," *Kaijō*, July, 1952, pp 180-190

69 Dan Kurzman, *Kishi and Japan* (New York, 1960), pp 363-366

70 Fujishima *et al*, *op cit*, p 190 See also "Zainichi Chōsenjin no seikatsu to iken," *Chūō Kōron*, September, 1952, p 70, and *Japan Times*, June 15, 1962

71 Iiu, *op cit*, p 20, Fujishima *et al*, *op cit*, pp 189-190, "Zainichi Chōsenjin no seikatsu to iken," pp 70, 76

72 Hugh H Smythe, "A Note on Racism in Japan," *American Sociological Review*, XVI, No 6 (1951), 822-824

73 Delmar M Brown, *Nationalism in Japan* (Berkeley, 1955), p 271 In 1923, for example, following the famous Kwantō earthquake, angry mobs in Tokyo, releasing their pent up anti Korean sentiment, massacred thousands of innocent and helpless Koreans Shigeki Toyama *et al*, *Shōwa-shi* (new ed, Tokyo, 1960), p 18, Robert A Scalapino, *Democracy and the Party Movement in Prewar Japan* (Berkeley, 1953), pp 324-325

74 "Basic Trends," p 133

75 On the breakdown of Koreans by their political orientation, see Isamu Togawa, "Nihon no Korean Lobby," *Chūō Kōron*, June, 1959, p 242

76 The Koreans' political activities in pre war Japan are described in detail in Senji Tsuboe, *Chōsen minzoku dokuritu hishi* (Tokyo, 1959), pp 193-399

77 For a brief discussion of the relationship between the Koreans in Japan and the Japan Communist Party, see Roger Swearingen and Paul Langer, *Red Flag in Japan* (Cambridge, 1952), pp 259-263 See also Japan, Kōan chōsa chō, *Nihon kyōsanto no genjō* (Tokyo, 1955), pp 76-93, *Nihon kyōsantō no genjō* (Tokyo, 1957), pp 116-134, and Nikkan Rōdō tsūshin sho (ed), *Sengo Nihon kyōsantō undō* (Tokyo, 1955)

78 Shinosaki, *op cit*, pp 234-235 According to Shinosaki when Chōren (the predecessor of Chōsōren) was dissolved, the Japan Communist Party decided to increase its Korean membership by 32,100 This was an attempt to absorb the more active Chōren members Another official source, however, put the Korean members of the party at 1500 Kinya Nuseki, "The Postwar Activities of the Japan Communist Party," in Japan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Japan's Problems* (Tokyo, 1954), p 73 Still another official source put the number at 2800 *Nihon kyōsantō no genjō* (1957), p 117

79 *Oemu haengchōng ui sipnyōn*, p 171

80 I I Morris, *Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan* (New York, 1960), p 70

81 For the text of the repatriation agreement between Japan and

North Korea, see *Contemporary Japan*, XXVI, No 2 (1959), 365-369 In form the agreement involved neither the Japanese nor the North Korean government, but only their respective Red Cross societies

82 *Japan Times*, June 16, 1962

83 The official Japanese account of the repatriation issue is given in Japan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Waga gaikō no kinkyō*, No 4 (Tokyo, 1960), pp 67-77, Consulate General of Japan, Chicago, *Japan Report*, February 5, 1959, pp 2-3

84 New York *Times*, February 15, 1959, *Asahi Shimbun*, February 2 and 28, 1959 See also *Voice of Korea*, XVI, No 2 (1959)

85 Korea's official viewpoint is indicated in ROK, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *ROK Bulletin*, No 17 (March, 1959), pp 95-124 See also Korean Foreign Policy Association, *Truth About Deportation of Korean Residents in Japan* (Seoul, 1960)

86 *Asahi shimbun* Research Bureau, *op cit*, p 240

87 For the indictment, see Editorial Commission of the History of ROK Revolutionary Trial, *Hankuk hyōkmyōng jaep'ansa*, I (Seoul, 1962), pp 122-127, 210-213

88 Quoted in Olson, *op cit*, p 11

89 For the Japanese Socialist position on the Japanese-Korean relations, see Jotaro Kawakami, "Party Stand on Japan-ROK Normalization Talks," *Japan Socialist Review*, No 23 (October, 1962), pp 7-18

Some Aspects of Political Ideology in Malaysia

FRED R VON DER MEHDEN

University of Wisconsin

The former Federation of Malaya was once described by an Indonesian observer as "ideologically backward." Compared to Indonesia with its welter of ideological slogans such as USDEK, MANIPOL, NASAKOM, *et al*, present-day Malaysia appears to be at least quantitatively lacking. Yet the ideological pattern of Malaysian politics presents two comparatively rare attributes, its plural nature and the pragmatic content of the statements made by the country's leaders. Few Afro-Asian governments have tolerated rival organizations to proclaim and spread their ideologies, preferring to indoctrinate the people with the dogma of the party or leader. This single program has also normally been presented in ideological terms in an effort to emotionalize goals and focus mass attention. Malaysia's pattern of ideology contradicts both of these norms.

Six major political parties currently dominate the scene and present political programs: the Alliance, the Pan-Malayan Islamic Party, the People's Progressive Party, the Socialist Front, the People's Action Party and the Barisan Socialist, the last two based in Singapore. The ruling Alliance, formed in 1951 and led by Prime Minister Tengku Abdul Rahman, is Malay dominated but composed of three communal sections, the United Malay National Organization (UMNO), the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) and the Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC). The party's leadership is drawn from all three communities, although in the last elections in 1959 UMNO members led the

Alliance electoral list with 69 candidates while the MCA received 32 and the MIC 3. Other political parties in the pre-Malaysian Federation have been numerically smaller and geographically limited. The almost entirely Malay-Moslem Pan-Malayan Islamic Party (PMIP) has drawn its strength primarily from the Malay-populated states of Kelantan and Trengganu, the Indian-Chinese led people's Progressive Party gains its support mainly from the Chinese of the state of Perak, while the Socialist Front is concentrated in urban centers on the west coast, i.e., Kuala Lumpur, Ipoh and Penang. After the 1959 elections, seats in Parliament were divided among the Alliance, 73, PMIP, 14, Socialist Front and PPP, 13, and independents, 3. In Singapore the dominant party has been the People's Action Party (PAP) which has participated in that city's politics since 1955 and, since 1959, has controlled its administration under Lee Kuan Yew. A break-away group of legislative members of the PAP left the party in 1961 and formed the radical left-wing Barisan Socialist party, an organization accused of Communist leanings. In 1963 elections the PAP solidified its hold on Singapore politics.

Probably all of these Malaysian political organizations would like to dominate the scene, sans opposition, but at present that nation houses a pluralistic pattern of parties and programs. In analyzing these party programs it is possible to delineate at least three separate areas of difference with respect to ideology: (1) acceptance of ideology as an article of faith, (2) the economic system best suited for Malaysia, and (3) the defense of communal interests. These issues cause tensions and divisions both within the parties and between them, but in a paper of this length it is not possible to delve too deeply into internecine strife.

1. The place of ideology. Political parties in Malaysia differ among themselves initially in the extent to which they are willing to term themselves ideologically oriented. Four organizations, three socialist and one Moslem, publicly proclaim themselves parties of ideology. The Socialist Front, Barisan Socialist and People's Action Party may differ in their interpretations of socialism, but they would each accept for their own party the statement of the Socialist Front that it is "bound together by an ideology, a Socialist ideology." They may not, however, agree

with the Front that "the people will vote for ideology rather than personality"¹ Nor has there been a well-considered systemization of Marxist dogma among all sections of the socialists, although this would be almost universally denied

The Pan-Malayan Islamic Party on its part states that it combines a material and spiritual "ideology" under the banner of Islam, steering a course free from "conflicting ideologies of Western Democracy and Communism"² The PMIP has often been rather vague in defining the relation of Islamic principles to state programs, but it has normally upheld traditional Moslem books and laws as its precepts Political opponents have accused party leaders of an unwillingness to enter into the twentieth century or to make the compromises necessary to synthesize Islam with modern life In the past the PMIP has been willing to sacrifice material benefits for Islamic principles such as its refusal in Kelantan to collect revenue from liquor and pawn shops on religious grounds, in spite of heavy state deficits

While these parties proudly proclaim support of their respective ideologies, the ruling Alliance Party presents a program of noncommunalism and the establishment of a property-owning capitalist system while at the same time denying its close attachment to any "ideology" In the words of one Alliance senator, "The Alliance Party, fortunately, has not tied itself up too much with ideology To do so would have meant becoming dogmatic Dogmatism is not good Often dogmatism sacrifices pragmatism (practicalism)"³ It is difficult to imagine a statement of this sort from leaders of neighboring Indonesia. What the Alliance does not appear to be prepared to admit fully is that the politics of compromise and political pluralism is an ideology in itself However, conflicts with self-proclaimed ideological parties such as the PMIP and Socialist Front have made the word "ideology" a somewhat subversive term to the Alliance Between these two publicly expressed extremes is the People's Progressive Party which centers its program on the demands of its urban non-Malay members without reference to any formal ideology and which, in fact, rejects what it calls "foreign ideologies"

2 The economic system The aforementioned parties also differ in the content of their programs The economic spectrum

ranges from the socialist parties on the left to the Alliance on the right. The three socialist parties agree on socialism as the foundation of their ideologies, publicly denying affiliation to Marxist-Leninist tenets such as dictatorship of the proletariat and revolution. All tend to use Marxist semantics in one form or another although there are marked differences within the socialist movement on some questions of doctrine as well as on the methods of achieving goals. With relation to socialist theory there are variations such as the support of Marhaenism (a more pragmatic socialism fit to the country and situation)⁴ by a section of the Socialist Front and differences between the Barisan Socialist and most of the rest of the socialist movement on the flexibility of Marxism and the willingness to cooperate with capitalism. As well, the two sections of the Front differ on the roles to be given workers and peasants. The deepest rift has been between the PAP and the more left-wing Barisan Socialist in Singapore. Dogmatic Marxism plays a much larger role in Barisan Socialist ideological pronouncement and the party sounds like the People's Action Party did in its more radical moments before it attained a position of responsibility in Singapore. The party is less moderate than the PAP on a variety of issues connected with decisions necessary for a socialist party to rule an entrepot port. Specific differences have arisen over the continued presence of British troops (described as accommodation to imperialism) and PAP willingness to cooperate with capitalism (more accommodation). Perhaps an analogy can be made between the Barisan and the PMIP, both parties seeing no need to compromise their respective dogmas, while on the other hand the PAP and Alliance have sought a synthesis of dogmas with economic, social and political realities.

The PPP, PMIP and some smaller parties,⁵ while denying scientific socialism, mouth vague slogans supporting social welfare and the elimination of economic oppression in the nation. The PMIP has often spoken in indistinct terms of Islamic socialism, nationalization and the evils of capitalism, but neither the PPP nor the PMIP has set forth a systematic ideological program with regard to the economy. The PMIP has been more articulate in this matter but has not necessarily displayed greater clarity.

In an election statement a spokesman declared that "Nobody can deny that the really effective economic justice is the main basis of Islamic economy. Moreover, Islam preaches the wide extension of economy and brings forth the advancement of all people."⁶ Yet in another statement, while attacking liberal capitalism as against the socialism of the people, the party spokesman quoted a Koranic verse reading, "Islam stands for freedom and humanity and is against compulsion in whatever form."⁷ Given the Chinese businessman composition of the PPP and the Islamic teacher leadership of the PMIP, it is difficult to imagine any wholehearted acceptance of Marxist principles by either party.

On the right, the Alliance Party, composed as it is of the majority of the economic elite of the country, has described itself as a frankly capitalist party which seeks to spread that system through the establishment of a property-owning citizenry. At the same time, its leadership has attempted to present the image of a forward looking, pragmatic, social-development minded capitalism without strong ties to any one foreign ideology. Prime Minister Tengku Abdul Rahman has gone so far as to state that if the Communists had something worth borrowing he would do so and would, in fact, not restrict himself to any system.⁸ The brunt of Alliance statements, however, has centered far more on attacks on nationalization and the evils of communism and socialism. On the positive side, one of the best explanations of Alliance economic policy was made by the Minister of Finance, Tan Siew Sin, in 1963 when he declared

our economic objective is to build and to create a property-owning democracy. No, this is not a slogan. We feel we can deliver the goods, not by levelling down as the Socialists always want to do but by levelling up. And we also believe that one of the best ways to reach this goal is to have a liberal financial and economic policy. I have told our American friends, I have told our British friends that our financial and economic policies are more liberal even than that of the United States of America, which is the champion and the great protagonist of free enterprise.⁹

3 Communalism. The third facet of ideology publicly debated in Malaysia is the place of religion and race in the political life of the country. The socialist parties vigorously propound

secularist and noncommunal programs. They vary on the extent to which they accept the special position presently held by the Malay Moslems, but their ultimate public goal is racial and religious equality. At the same time, there is a general acceptance of Islam as the religion of the majority of the country, if it does not inhibit other religions or beliefs. For example, the Declaration of the Barisan Socialis in 1961 stated:

The Barisan Socialis is the party of the working people, irrespective of whether they are working by hand or by brain, and irrespective of their skin or their religion. We respect the religions of our people, in particular the teaching and traditions of Islam.

On the other extreme the PMIP proclaims the need for an Islamic state, special Malay rights and the compulsory regulation of Moslems according to the laws of Islam. In the state of Kelantan, which it controls, a variety of sumptuary laws have been passed while at the national level the PMIP has upheld a highly traditional interpretation of Islam. Thus PMIP leaders or public servants have supported stronger laws penalizing Moslems for drinking intoxicating liquors, non-payment of Zakat (the Tithe), close proximity between the sexes (Khalwat) and laxness in Friday religious observances. At the same time they have called for the elimination of Western dancing, the closing of all Government offices and private businesses on Fridays, and an expansion of Malay and religious education. On the racial issue the party has been the most aggressive supporter of Malay nationalism. However, most parties desire to extend their power and at times the PMIP has attempted to tone down the communal nature of its ideology by disclaiming communalism or stating that its support of Islam and the Malay was not to the detriment of other communities. In spite of these retractions, Malay-Moslem communal for we know what we are doing is right and this is leader has equated the Malay to the "red Indians" in America and has predicted a similar fate if the Malays do not act to protect their interests. Another officer of the party several years ago declared, "We are not worried if other parties brand us as being communal for we know what we are doing is right and this is the only way to save the Malay race."¹⁰ It should be noted that

efforts to gain wider support are not a PMIP monopoly and even the Socialist Front once published a document, described by a leader as "forward looking" which proclaimed, "Islam is Socialism and Socialism is Islam"¹¹

The PPP on its part uses the pretext of noncommunalism to foster non-Malay and particularly Chinese rights over the special rights now granted to Malays. By stressing a program of "equality" and attacking "racialists" (read Alliance proponents of Malay rights) the People's Progressive Party can appear ideologically committed to tolerance while at the same time supporting Chinese and Indian communal demands against the Malay-dominated Alliance. Thus, in the words of one of its leaders, D R Seenivasagan, "It is manifestly unjust for the majority community to reserve for itself special rights and privileges as against the minority"¹²

The Alliance finds itself in a somewhat delicate ideological position regarding communalism. It must publicly juggle support for Malay special rights, the communal demands of the Chinese, Indian and Malay sections which compose the Alliance Party and a broad anti-communalist program which is necessary to maintain peace and unity within the party and nation. The result of these cross-pressures has been more an accommodation of demands rather than a conscious solution. The central leadership forcefully advocates noncommunalism and the separation of race and religion from national politics, explaining this on both pragmatic and humanistic grounds. For example, in rebuttal to PMIP attacks Rahman once stated that "unless we are prepared to drown every non-Malay, we can never think of an Islamic administration"¹³ Meanwhile, the local communal divisions and particularly Malay backbenchers publicly express communal demands. At times these groups and individuals sound like the PMIP, particularly when faced with political opposition from the Islamic nationalist candidates of the latter. Local demands have called for an end to recognition of Israel, Friday as a national holiday, greater use of the Malay language, etc. Thus, the Alliance actually speaks with many voices, the dominant national one noncommunal while the local ones proclaim less tolerant views.

Malaysia consists then of three ideological cores. The domi-

nant one, the Alliance, is issue oriented, pragmatic, capitalist and communally based but nationally noncommunal in ideology. The socialist core, while disagreeing within itself on Marxist doctrine, upholds the banners of ideology, state regulation of the economy, and noncommunalism. The third core is composed of the PPP, PMIP and to a certain extent minor parties such as Party Negara and the United Democratic Party. Although they differ markedly, they are vague in their ideological programs, communally based and non-Marxist but generally anti-capitalist in outlook. Both the PPP and PMIP have attempted to cloud over their communalism but have always returned to their racial or communal base.

We can now ask the question, "Why does Malaysia have this plural ideological pattern?" Much of what follows is speculation, but it appears to me worth consideration.

1 Malaysia appears to uphold one of Lipset's hypotheses that "Federalism increases the opportunity for multiple sources of cleavage by adding regional interests and values to others which crosscut the social structure."¹⁴ To this he adds that federalism provides resistance to centralized power. The demography of Malaysia is such that except for the East Coast, federal lines cut across the communal structure, and where they do they may increase cleavages along noncommunal lines. As well, local power bases have been established by the PMIP in Kelantan, the socialists in places such as Singapore and Penang, and the PPP in Perak.

RACIAL BREAKDOWN OF ELECTORATE FOR PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS, 1959*

State	Chinese	Malays	Indians	Others	Total
Penang	105,570	62,043	16,511	—	184,124
Malacca	43,471**	50,312	—	—	93,783
Perak	199,765	201,115	50,560	—	451,440
Selangor	133,291	94,353	43,755	—	271,399
Negeri Sembilan	44,300	55,800	13,196	—	113,296
Pahang	32,690	65,445	5,452	—	103,587
Johore	124,063	155,669	11,844	—	291,576
Kedah	56,938	171,492	16,138	2,423	246,991
Kelantan	12,693	224,768	1,491	1,560	240,512
Trengganu	6,197	108,136	511	54	114,898
Perlis	5,307	27,916	—	—	33,223

* Mimeographed paper

** Includes other races

2 The communal composition of Malaysia also works for political pluralism. If the minorities were small, as they are in Ceylon, Burma or Kenya (whites and Indians), then the majority could dominate them and find in communalism a useful aggregative tool. In Malaysia the Chinese are too numerous to oppress or destroy and this has necessitated the politics of compromise which in turn has provided the environment for pluralism. Parties desiring national distribution have found it particularly necessary to follow the politics of compromise. In the words of one Alliance leader, "Political realism demands that any party which aims to be a really national one in the context of today must be able to unite and draw wide support from the three major communities in the country. It is this acid test which will determine the fate of any political party"¹⁶

3 Finally, one-party systems or oligarchic rule are in the majority in Afro-Asia. Where a two- or multiple-party system was initially formed it usually collapsed and the military or a one-party system took its place (Burma, Ghana, Pakistan). In these cases one of two factors were normally present: either the government was unable to provide sufficient economic and social development, or it could not successfully counter internal or external military threats. Malaysia has both the highest standard of living on the mainland and the ability to withstand internal threats, as evidenced by the Communist Emergency.

The key question for the future is "Can this plural ideological pattern in Malaysia withstand a severe economic crisis or continued military measures by its neighbors?"

NOTES

1 *Malay Mail*, July 23, 1959

2 *Radio Malaya Press Statement*, Director of Information, 7/59/181

3 *Malay Mail*, August 29, 1960

4 The Party Rakyat describes Marhaenism as "socialism which is suitable with climatic conditions of this country. It is not Utopian nor scientific socialism but practical socialism" (Typed summary of the Presidential address of Boesteman at Party Rakyat's Sixth Congress at Johore Baru)

5 Dr. Lim of the United Democratic Party has stated, "We are not a

party with a socialist trend. Rather we are a party with a distinct socialist problem' (*Malay Mail*, April 26, 1962)

6 *Radio Malaya Press Statement*, PMIP Party Broadcast, Director of Information, 8/59/75

7 *Ibid*, 7/59/181

8 UMNO, 15th General Assembly UMNO, Kuala Lumpur, August 23, 1962, mimeo

9 *Siaran Akhbar*, Pen 3/63/362

10 *Malay Mail*, December 27, 1956

11 *Straits Times*, April 8, 1961

12 *Radio Malaya Press Statement*, Director of Information 8/59/4

13 *Straits Times*, May 1, 1959

14 Seymour Lipset, *Political Man*, 1960

15 *Straits Times*, April 24, 1962

Communist Party Politics in Israel

SCOTT D JOHNSTON

Hamline University

Among the countries of the Middle East, Israel is the only one in which a local Communist Party as a regular matter of course has participated openly in electoral and parliamentary life. In all five national elections to date the Israel Communist Party (Maki) has presented and seriously campaigned for a parliamentary slate. These efforts have been partially rewarded by the election of from three to six Knesset (parliament) members under a system of proportional representation which provides for the selection of all 120 Knesset members on a countrywide basis. Within a multi-party system which currently includes eleven distinguishable parliamentary groups the Communist Party occu-

• This study represents part of a larger research project on the political party system of Israel that involved research trips in Israel in 1960, 1961, and 1963, as well as further interviews and investigation of Zionist materials in the United States. Over 120 formal interviews were obtained in the course of this work. Information secured from the following individuals in one or more interviews per person has been used specifically in this study: Z. S. Abramov, Member of the Knesset, General Zionist and Liberal Parties; Ahmed Daher, Member of the Knesset, Progress and Development List; Emanuel Gutmann, faculty of Political Science, The Hebrew University; Subhi abu Gosh, resident of the Arab village of Abu Gosh, and doctoral candidate at Princeton University; Mordecai Oren, Secretary General of the World Union of Mapam; Arie Pyctan, Director of the Israeli Government Press Office, Tel Aviv; Arie Rath, political writer for *The Jerusalem Post*; Moshe Sneh, Member of the Knesset, Communist Party (interviews in 1960, 1961, and 1963); Gideon Weigert, writer for *The Jerusalem Post* and other journals, and specialist in Arab affairs of Israel.

pies a position which in important respects is more distinctly outside the system than within. In parliamentary affairs, for instance, the party finds itself substantially boxed off in terms of other parties, including cooperation by everybody to keep the Communists off certain key standing committees in every Knesset session to date. Communist Party activities, nevertheless, have had an impact in some fields of Israeli political life, such as Arab affairs. In this field the Communists are in significant competition with two socialist parties, namely Mapai (the Israel Labor Party, and the nation's one major party) and the more doctrinaire Mapam (the United Workers' Party) *

The location of the national headquarters of the Communist Party of Israel in the former Arab city of Jaffa (now a part of one large metropolitan entity, Tel Aviv-Yafo) has, perhaps, some symbolic significance. Every other organized Israeli political party, with the exception of the most orthodox of the religious parties, is headquartered in Tel Aviv proper, the bustling banking and commercial center of the nation. There are perhaps other things about the party's headquarters location which may also strike the inquiring observer as symbolic. In the process of getting there no one seems to quite know or really care where it is. The short street on which the nondescript headquarters building fronts is unmarked at that location. On a return trip a year later the instructions by phone from the top party member being revisited are to get off the bus at the Paz Petrol station, walk a short block, and turn sharply left, with still no address or street designation in the offing.

THE PALESTINIAN PERIOD

As is the case for every other organized political party in Israel (excluding two "Arab lists" which are satellites of Mapai), the Communist Party has an organizational history running well

* Mapai is the party of David Ben Gurion and incumbent Prime Minister Levi Eshkol. Its socialist Zionism is of a pragmatic and non Marxist variety. Mapam's dogmatic socialism is of a distinctly Marxist character. Mapam is clearly within the tradition of Zionism and basic loyalty to Israel, despite a rather extreme left wing position in foreign affairs.

back into the pre-state period. But while there is a history, it is one which involves such tortuous convolutions in organizational development, shifts of policy, and changes of personnel that the party itself apparently prefers to forget it. Indeed, its difficulties in this respect led it to be one of the few Communist Parties in the world which steered away from writing its own history, even in the form of articles or newspaper accounts.¹ It has not celebrated anniversaries, and prefers to abstain from citing the party press of earlier years. "Though one of the oldest parties in Palestine, it is, or at least wishes to appear, as a party without a past."²

Communist activities in Palestine go back to 1919-1920, and represent part of the larger current of revolutionary movement and activities which were spreading through Eastern and Central Europe following World War I. Jewish Communists in these areas were as convinced as their party brethren that world victory for the movement was an imminent prospect. Zionism to them was an anachronism, a reactionary movement which would cut Jewish workers off from the larger struggle. There was little reason for Jewish Communists to migrate to a distant and to them unimportant territory, a move which they felt in effect would merely strengthen the hold of British imperialism.³ Consequently while many socialist-Zionists came during the immediate postwar years, very few Communists did. While some of the new pioneers became Communists, most of them did not remain in Palestine because of the many frustrations and disappointments of those years. Once such persons had become Communists there was little reason for them to stay in the country and contribute any further to the Zionist mission which they now rejected. As a result the Palestinian Communist Party experienced a rapid turnover of membership, a tendency which has characterized the movement throughout its very checkered history and contributed to its organizational weaknesses and other difficulties. By the time of Israeli statehood the party did not have a single member who belonged to the organization since even its early years, let alone from its actual founding.⁴

A number of small groups which had cast themselves away from Jewish labor parties in Palestine and Eastern Europe estab-

lished themselves as the Socialist Workers' Party in September of 1920. This organization lasted for less than one year, showing considerable confusion of purpose and aims, and coming to a sudden end following May day riots in Jaffa. Another group made a new attempt to form a Palestine Communist Party after first making an effort to infiltrate a left-wing Zionist party, Poalei Zion (Workers of Zion).

The pattern that followed throughout the 1920's and into the next decade revealed characteristics of internal feuding, and frequently rapid shifts of leadership as well as of general membership. Recognition as a member party of the Comintern came from Moscow in 1924. Increasingly bad relations developed with the rest of the Jewish groups in Palestine over the development of a pro-Arab policy, which became one of the most consistent features of the local Communist movement.

The pro-Arab orientation of the Palestinian party was directed by Moscow. At the time of its admission to the Comintern that body had called upon the Palestine Party to "support the national freedom of the Arab population against the British-Zionist occupation."⁵ The Comintern Executive Committee in 1930 described Zionism as "the exponent of the exploiting, big power, imperialist oppressive strivings of the Hebrew bourgeoisie," and added that "Zionism was converted into a weapon of British imperialism in order to suppress the national liberation movement of the Arab masses, while it converted into its own weapon the Hebrew population of Palestine."⁶ The Palestine Party, however, remained a Jewish party until the late 1920's, and it was with the greatest difficulty that it was able to find Arab sympathizers, let alone Arab members for the party. The attempt to obtain Arab support continued, however, with the party propaganda organs saying one thing in its Arab publications, and something else again in its Hebrew and Yiddish materials.⁷

Following the Arab riots of 1929 the Comintern ordered the Palestine Party to appoint an Arab majority to its Central Committee, and at the 1935 Comintern Congress Palestinian delegates were able to report that the "Arabization" of their party was proceeding, and that only "the reliable and honest Jewish comrades in the party ranks" were allowed to continue in their

participation.⁸ Successes among Palestine Arabs were insignificant. The small number of urban Arab workers were strikingly uninterested in Communist ideology, and the Arab peasantry tended to prefer the type of extreme nationalism represented by Haj Amin al Husaini, the ex-Mufti of Jerusalem. It is interesting to note that during the "Arab Revolt" of 1936-1939 the party cooperated with the ex-Mufti. By mid-1937 the party was in a state of major disorganization again. Two years later there were a number of ragtag Communist factions and not much more. Fewer than three hundred Jewish members were left and only a scattering of Arabs.

The slavish support of Kremlin policy through a succession of twists and turns was nowhere more completely demonstrated by the Palestinian party than in its support of the Nazi-Soviet Pact of August, 1939, after an initial period of shock. A difficult enough test for Communist parties throughout the world, the fanatical character of Nazism with relationship to European Jewry made this support particularly striking and odious. As a consequence another splinter group broke away, unable to stomach Hitler even temporarily for the sake of the larger vision of a world ultimately redeemed by communism. It was not until months after the German invasion of the Soviet Union in June, 1941, that the party line came around to the concept of a united front against the Axis powers.

Another noteworthy milestone occurred in 1943 when, at the time of the official dissolution of the Comintern, permission was granted from Moscow for the establishment of two groups. These were an Arab party and a Jewish party, an arrangement which continued until the fall of 1948. The record of the Arab party during that period of time involved considerably greater successes than was the case for the Jewish group. The Arab Communists appeared as a real nationalist group among the Arabs, and not something in opposition to pan-Arab aspirations.

Even before the end of World War II the two Communist groups had been trying to become more respectable in appearance. New leaders had come to the fore who busied themselves with the bureaucratic affairs of the movement and were quite different from the revolutionary types of the 1920's. These

included people who have continued in leadership positions to the present day, such as Shmuel Mikunis, Meir Wilmer, and Tewfik Toubi of the Arab party. It is interesting to observe that the Jewish party had now lost its former militant anti-Zionism. It still came as a deep shock to the party faithful, however, when Andrei Gromyko in a United Nations speech in the summer of 1947 indicated that although the Soviet Union still regarded a bi-national Palestinian state as preferable, that the establishment of two separate states would also be acceptable. This Soviet turn, however, was ultimately conducive to the new tactics of the Jewish party and its attempt to cloak itself with respectability, which included its efforts to capitalize on the new prestige of the Soviet Union, and its emphasis upon economic and social programs which differed little from those of left-wing Zionist parties. Some Communists even joined the Haganah, the Jewish defense force in Palestine. When the Soviet Union backed the partition plan in the crucial General Assembly debates and vote of November, 1947, the Jewish Communists, after waiting to make sure that they had the correct message from Moscow, fell into line on this as well.* The party became properly patriotic during the Arab-Israeli War, even criticizing Prime Minister Ben Gurion for discontinuing offensive operations toward Suez!

During the period of Soviet support for partition, followed by a relatively brief period of not unfriendly responses by Moscow toward a Jewish state, the predicament of the Palestinian Arab Communist group known as the "Arab League for National Liberation" was, for a change, more touchy than that of its Jewish counterpart. One group within the League defended the Soviet position, while a second faction took an opposing stand. By August, 1948, however, the pattern of military action had indicated the survival of the new Jewish state. Talks were started

* The difficulties of slavishly following the Moscow line were nowhere more graphically revealed than over the question of Internationalizing Jerusalem. As usual, Moscow gave no advance warning of a forthcoming policy change to its satellite organization in Palestine. Soviet policy at the United Nations switched twice on the Jerusalem issue, leaving the Palestine Communists up in the air on both occasions with organized drives and demonstrations.

in that month between representatives of the Arab group and the Jewish party, which under the developing circumstances presumed to be the senior partner. Negotiations were successfully concluded, and in October of 1948, Maki, the present Israeli Communist Party, came into being.

THE COMMUNIST PARTY SINCE STATEHOOD

The position of the Communist Party in Israeli politics has been a decidedly peripheral one, with the exception of its position and activities among Israel's Arab citizens. The Communists participated in the Provisional Government Council during the Arab-Israeli War, although not in the smaller and more important Cabinet. The Communists, along with the right-wing nationalist Herut Movement (with its background in the underground paramilitary organization the Irgun Zvai Leumi, and the Zionist Revisionist Movement), never have participated in a coalition cabinet since 1949. As has been pointed out, however, the party has been represented in all five Knessets to date. Its current strength is five seats, an increase of two from the Fourth Knesset.

Although the Communist Party is and has been a marginal force in Israeli politics, it has shown itself to have a greater attraction than during previous decades. As far as Jewish voters are concerned it would perhaps seem surprising that the party should be able to attract any support, considering the overall pattern of Soviet hostility toward Israel, accompanied by Soviet wooing of Middle East Arabs. On top of this was the Communist Bloc campaign against the "cosmopolitans" (i.e., Jews) as represented in the Prague treason trials of the early 1950's, and the weird "doctors' plot" in Stalin's last days, to say nothing about discrimination against Soviet Jews in more recent years. Furthermore, after its stand during the Arab-Israeli War and with the turning of Soviet policy, Maki returned to an anti-Zionist position. It has faithfully followed every turn of the Soviet line, and when Soviet-Egyptian relations have been such as to permit it, it has blatantly campaigned among "Nasserites" in the Arab districts of Israel as being the next best thing to a vote for Nasser, and

as the party that would further Arab interests in the country as well as work for a "peaceful solution" to outstanding issues in the Middle East

That the Communists would have an appeal to many of the nation's Arab citizens is not surprising. It should be observed that apart from the built-in advantages that the Communists have concerning anti-Zionism, and the position of the Soviet Union vis-a-vis the Middle East, there are other factors which contribute to the party's appeal. In some elections over half of its voter strength has come from the Arabs, although probably less than half of its actual members are Arabs.⁹ The Communist Party, along with the doctrinaire Marxist party Mapam, is the only general party on the Israeli scene which Arabs can belong to as members. Mapai has organized and operated several satellite Arab political entities (the term "party" can hardly be employed). These emphasize family ties, standing in the community, bloc voting within related social units, and an almost complete lack of organizational structure and systematic activities. These Mapai Arab representatives in the Knesset have not been very impressive. The type of system they represent is not the kind of political vehicle that younger Arab voters in the country want, and there is increasing evidence of disaffection among rank-and-file Arab voters with the traditional lists.

In addition to the points already suggested concerning the Communist appeal among Israeli Arabs there is another factor of obvious significance. The Communist Party is the only party that actively works in the daily affairs of the Arab population on a reasonably systematic basis. The party has recruited competent and energetic Arab leaders from young intellectuals. It has been observed that a number of prominent Arab members of the Communist Party are indeed the only Arabs in the country who enjoy political stature of a wide, almost national significance.¹⁰ Emil Toma, the party's main Arab ideologist, and the author of a controversial book on Arab history, is one such individual. Even more in this category are Tewfik Toubi and Emil Habibi, both members of the Knesset and journalists. The influence of these men extends much beyond their home communities and reaches all Arab Communists as well as a not inconsiderable

group of non Communist Arab workers. The persistent opposition of these men to both the Israeli Government and traditional Arab dignitaries, expressed as it is in Knesset speeches, at public meetings, and in newspaper articles, all contribute to their popularity.

The popular totals for the Communists over the years in Knesset elections have had an overall increase from around 15,000 votes in 1919 to over 12,000 in the election to the Fifth Knesset in 1961. The percentage figure for this latter contest was almost exactly the same as for the first election (4.1 per cent in 1961 and 4.0 per cent for 1949). In the face of the very great expansion of the state's Jewish population during the intervening years, it is interesting to speculate on how the Communists have held their own in the scramble for new votes. Indeed, in the 1961 Knesset contest, the Communist percentage actually increased somewhat among the Jewish population.¹¹

A number of explanations can be suggested for this development, which would hardly be expected considering the deterioration in Soviet-Israeli relations since 1948-1949 and the generally pro Arab policies in the Middle East of the Soviet Union. The hundreds of thousands of Jewish immigrants who have flooded into Israel since 1919 had no experience or any particular sophistication concerning the Communist record in Palestine during the previous decades. More immediate issues involving jobs, housing, and other pressing matters faced these people. While the Communists have not had the organizational advantages and entrenched positions in governmental and/or economic and social organizations which the Zionist parties have had, their relative competitive position still has not been as unfavorable as was the case during the Mandate.* Out of a situation of considerable economic and social dislocation, coming as a natural consequence

* Second only to the government itself in terms of economic power in Israel is the great labor federation and system of economic enterprises, the Histadrut. By a "key system" concerning jobs, positions, and more or less under-the-table election campaign expenses, the various parties that share in Histadrut's management have staked out areas or realms of interest where their respective positions are preeminent. By common agreement of all these other parties the Communist Party is denied these perquisites.

to mass immigration and other growing pains of the new state, the Communist Party was able to make at least some capital Promises are easy enough when unaccompanied by responsibility in either governmental administration or trade union economic affairs Furthermore, indeterminate numbers of new immigrants had been Communist members or sympathizers in the Eastern or Central European countries of their origin An additional pressure along this line may very well be the continued presence of relatives and close friends in Iron Curtain countries, and consequent concern for their safety In more recent years Soviet technological achievements, including space and missile successes, have not passed without admiring notice and comparison, regardless of what Russia and the Communist world do in other matters

During the early years of Israeli statehood the Communists made important inroads into Mapam, after the establishment of that entity in 1948 through the merger of two Zionist socialist-pioneering parties During the first years of its existence, Mapam followed a slavishly pro-Communist line, which Moscow snubs or embarrassing policy positions seemed incapable of jarring Mapam opened its eyes to some extent after the Prague Treason Trials of 1952 One of the prominent members, Mordecai Oren, ironically was returning from a Communist-sponsored conference in East Berlin when arrested and convicted in Prague * This disquieting event was followed shortly by news of the Moscow "Doctors' Plot" with its additional anti-Semitic overtones The strongly pro-Communist faction in Mapam had been headed by the able Dr Moshe Sneh, whose previous career, interestingly enough, had included a top leadership position in the Haganah and membership in the free enterprise General Zionist Party before joining Mapam In the face of attacks within Mapam by

* Oren had been warned by the Israeli ambassador in Czechoslovakia and some trade union people in Prague His trial was secret and, he feels, of a completely mock nature, including the activities of his lawyer, over whose selection he had no control It is interesting that it was hinted to Oren at Prague that if he would follow a pro Communist group leaving Mapam he would be allowed to go home In October of 1963 the Supreme Court of Czechoslovakia overturned Oren's conviction

other factions and individuals, Dr Sneh and his supporters attempted to brazen out the situation by demanding that the party accept the orthodox Stalinist position on the Prague and Moscow trials. The immediate consequence was the "expulsion" of Dr Sneh and a few hundred of his group from Mapam in January of 1953. Their attempt to form a Left Socialist Party following the complete Communist line failed, and finally the Sneh group joined Maki in November of 1954. It is interesting to note that although Sneh was a relative latecomer to the Communist Party, he has been its most important voice in the Knesset, where his debating skills and personal qualities among parliamentary colleagues of many parties have been prime assets.

In organizational structure and operations the Communist Party does not appear to differ from Communist organizations elsewhere. Maki operates formally under a party constitution, a matter of very little real importance. An elected national convention, which is required to meet every three years, is provided for, but the traditional "democratic centralism" of Communist parties is strongly present. A Central Committee, a Secretariat, and a small Political Bureau headed by the party's Secretary-General are the most important bodies. The seven-man Political Bureau is clearly the key body. It included all of the party's parliamentary members in the Fourth and Fifth Knessets and had a composition of five Jews and two Arabs.

It is interesting and ironic that the party distinguishes itself by its lack of organizational work in the field of collective and cooperative agricultural settlements, for which Israel is well known. The Communist Party cannot be thought of as a labor party either in terms of its leadership or of its electoral record among workers.

Reference has already been made concerning Maki's echoing Moscow's foreign policy line. That line more often than not has been a difficult burden for the party to bear. This was particularly the case during the period of the Suez-Sinai Campaign and its aftermath. The party lumped "imperialist aggression against Egypt" with the "counter revolution in Hungary," and complimented the "brave resistance of the Egyptian people."¹² Widespread resignations of Jewish members followed this stand. *Kol*

Ha'am (Voice of the People), the party newspaper, lost heavily in circulation, and party workers met with physical resistance on numerous occasions ¹³

The party now seems to be on less precarious grounds than was the case during earlier decades, and its difficulties during and immediately after the Suez-Sinai events were not as disruptive as had been the case in earlier crises. Certainly its Arab support is more substantial than in pre-World War II days, and it has already been noted that the 1961 Knesset balloting brought at least some recouping of Jewish support as well.

The Communist explanation of Soviet hostility to Israel has been that Israel has brought about such hostility by her own actions, including alignment toward the West. Maki also maintains that the Soviet bloc's arms aid to Egypt in 1955-1956 was to help Egypt prepare for self-defense against British and French colonial aggression, with the ultimate hope of trying to help establish a "neutralist" Middle East.

This type of approach continues to be the cornerstone of Maki's position on international questions in the Middle East, as is illustrated by written remarks to the *Jerusalem Post* in early August of 1963 by Shmuel Mikunis, Secretary-General of the party and ranking member of its Knesset delegation ¹⁴. Returning from a mission to Moscow, which was for the purpose of "an exchange of view," Mikunis maintained that it was not the Soviet Union which was an obstacle to the lessening of Middle East tensions and the stopping of the arms supplies, but "At fault are the Western powers and the ruling circles in Israel and neighboring countries who base their power in an arms race."

Following a position that Maki has taken over the years in deprecating persistent reports of anti-Semitism in the Soviet Union, Mikunis took strong exception to a question whether the East-West detente of 1963 might influence the Soviet regime to allow Russian Jews to rejoin their families in Israel. Referring to a "slander campaign" on this question, he insisted that "The key to any improvement in Russo-Israel relations lies in the hands of the Israeli Government," adding that only a radical change in Israeli policies could bring this about ¹⁵.

In the field of Israeli domestic politics the Communist Party

has taken a consistent position of hostility toward dealings with the Federal Republic of Germany, although this is by no means an isolated position in Israel. American economic aid and capital investment are condemned.

The position of the party on domestic policy is not surprising. Its call for the nationalization of land is a rather incongruous one, however, considering the fact that more of the land in Israel is collectively or cooperatively run than is the case in many of the "peoples' democracies" and that the Communist Party has taken no working interest in the hard-grinding job of agricultural pioneering. The party calls for a ceiling on profits without any accompanying wage freezes, higher property taxes, and lower expenditures on defense and security forces.

PROSPECTS

The future of the Communist Party in an independent Israel is a most unpromising one, with the exception of prospects among the country's Arab citizens. It has been suggested that even in this respect it is doubtful that the party has a great deal more leeway for success beyond its 1961 election gains. Indeed, if the other parties were to make a serious effort in Arab districts (particularly on a sustained basis in the non-campaign periods), including the granting of party membership to Arab citizens, the Communists probably would be hard pressed to hold on to what they have. It should be noted, however, that there are enough uncertainties present on the Israeli political scene, including the presumed passing of Ben Gurion's active public role, to give pause to any reasonably confident predictions on future electoral prospects for any of the parties.¹⁶ A drastic decline for Mapai or its client Arab lists in Arab districts is at least a possibility, particularly if the pervasive system of Military Government obtaining in such districts should be abolished.* That the Com-

* Mapai has insisted upon the necessity for continuing such military government, beating down attempts to wipe out the system by very close Knesset votes in February of 1962 and 1963. In the fall of 1963, however, Prime Minister Eshkol announced the relaxation of some of the restrictive features of the system pertaining to travel permits.

munist Party would be an important gainer from such a development, however, can not be taken for granted. Indeed, the emergence during the 1961 campaign of the first serious independent Arab Knesset candidates since statehood suggests to some competent observers that such lists can and likely will be effective competitors for the Arab vote in the future. It is important to remember, however, that Arabs constitute only 11 per cent of the nation's population, and by the very nature of things represent a substantially less important force than even this in Israeli public life.

Among the overwhelming majority of Jewish voters the Communist Party has no standing or prestige in the slightest. The party's record and statements offer little to attract any meaningful segment of the Jewish population, either among the earlier settlers from Europe and their offspring, or the more recent Oriental Jewish immigrants. While these latter (who along with their children now constitute over half of the Jewish population) have many economic and social grievances against the existing state of affairs, their backgrounds in terms of religious observance and/or tradition and as settlers from surrounding Arab countries tend strongly to predispose them against Communist blandishments, despite their lower degree of political sophistication.

Communist activities in the pre-state period were adversely affected from time to time by internal factionalism and splintering. There are some recent evidences that suggest the Israeli Communist Party may be entering a significant internal crisis, although the trend of this crisis and its consequences are difficult to assess at this stage. A pro-Chinese faction emerged in 1963 and published several issues of a journal, which by July, 1963, was quite open in its sentiments, including detailed and favorable treatment of Mao Tse-tung. This movement appears confined to Jewish party members. Presumably, it can have serious consequences within the party as a disruptive force, affecting the internal balance of power between Arab and Jewish members.¹⁷

There are, of course, uncertainties about the future role and standing of the Communist Party in Israel. However, barring a radical realignment of the international situation and the role of

the Great powers (particularly the Soviet Union in the Middle East), there is no reason to anticipate that the basic position of the Communist Party (or parties, as the case may be) will change in any material respect from the long-term minor and isolated role

NOTES

1 A Hiram, "The Communist Party of Israel," *Jewish Frontier*, July, 1951, p 14

2 Walter Laqueur, *Communism and Nationalism in the Middle East* (Praeger, 1956), p 102 This volume contains excellent material on the detailed development of the Palestinian Communist Party, with some treatment of the post independence period as well

3 *Ibid*, p 74, Hiram, *op cit*, p 14

4 Laqueur, *op cit*, p 102

5 Martin Ebon, "Communist Tactics in Palestine," *The Middle East Journal*, July, 1948, p 256

6 *Ibid*, p 257

7 Laqueur, *op cit*, p 81

8 Ebon, *op cit*, p 257 There was definite resentment within the party at Moscow's demands for "Arabization," but at the Seventh Conference of the Palestine Party there was an acknowledgement of previous errors that "we enclosed ourselves in a Jewish ghetto and viewed the Arab question from a Jewish angle" (Hiram, *op cit*, p 15)

9 The percentage of the vote cast in Arab towns, villages, and Bedouin camps for the Communist Party in the five Knesset elections to date has been as follows 1949, 23.6%, 1951, 15.1%, 1955, 15.6%, 1959, 11.2%, 1961, 22.5% The Communist figures run higher in Arab towns than is the case in villages and Bedouin tribes, coming to 45% in the 1961 election It should not be assumed at all that these represent actual Communist strength A large part represents as strong a protest as possible against the government

10 Jacob Landau, "A Note on the Leadership of Israeli Arabs," *Il Politico*, XXVII, No 3 (University of Pavia, 1962), 631

11 Approximately 7,000 additional Jewish voters cast their ballots for the Communists in 1961 It should be noted that Arab and Jewish votes are not cast separately as such, and that there is a considerable sprinkling of mixed polling stations around the country

12 "Resolutions of the Central Committee of The Israeli Communist Party for the Approaching Thirteenth Party Convention" (1957) Translated and published by a Near East Documentation Project, the University of Michigan, pp 1-10 The comments on Suez Sinai and its implications run on for many pages in a document that is mainly concerned with foreign affairs

13 Oscar Kraines, *Government and Politics in Israel* (Houghton Mifflin Company, 1961), p 73

14 *The Jerusalem Post Weekly*, August 9, 1963, p. iv Mikunis refused to allow himself to be interviewed, requiring instead that questions be submitted to him by phone, with the replies given in writing

15 *Ibid*

16 For some thoughts on these topics see the following article by the writer (Johnston) "Election Politics and Social Change in Israel," *The Middle East Journal*, Summer, 1962, pp. 309-327

17 In the ideological conflict between Moscow and Peking the Arab Communist parties are reported to have sided strongly with the Soviet Union. One commentator sees the explanation in the fact that they see the Soviet Union as a shield against Israel. Edward Crankshaw, "The Split Between Russia and China," *Atlantic Monthly*, May, 1963, p. 63

British Responses to Indian Nationalism—The Irwin Declaration on Dominion Status, 1929

MINOO ADENWALLA

Lawrence University

On October 31, 1929, the Viceroy and Governor-General of India, Lord Irwin (later Viscount Halifax), issued a statement, part of which said that

the goal of British policy (towards India) was stated in the declaration of August, 1917, to be that of providing for "the gradual development of self governing institutions, with a view to the progressive realization of responsible government in India as an integral part of the British Empire. I am authorized on behalf of His Majesty's Government to state clearly that in their judgment it is implicit in the declaration of 1917 that the natural issue of India's constitutional progress, as there contemplated, is the attainment of Dominion Status"¹

No official pronouncement to the people of India prior to this ever explicitly mentioned the term "Dominion Status." Few created such turmoil on the British political scene, mitigating the statement's beneficial aspects within India, and negating for

NOTE The author wishes to express his gratitude to Lawrence University for a grant from its Asian Studies Research Fund, and to the George A. and Eliza Gardner Howard Foundation of Rhode Island for a research fellowship during the academic year 1962-1963 to work at London University, where material for this article was collected.

a while the policy aims of Lord Irwin and the Labor government which ruled in the United Kingdom

By focusing on this episode, by using it as a case study, it is the intention of this paper to investigate the British political process as it related to the problem of reform in India. Specifically, an attempt will be made to answer three questions

1 To what extent was the Irwin declaration initiated voluntarily by the British government, and to what extent was it a response to the actual pressures of the independence movement within India itself?

2 How did the leadership of political parties within Parliament vary in their attitudes and responses to the Indian problem? What area of fundamental agreement, if any, existed among them on this subject?

3 What factors within British political life influenced these leaderships in their courses of action?

These answers will not be, and cannot be given in statistically accurate terms. For, essentially, they will be concerned with the clash of ideas and values, as set within a framework of pressure and counter-pressure. The British political response to the Indian challenge, so often conceived by students of Indian nationalism in monolithic terms, was a complex and many-sided one. To untangle the many-colored skein is a delicate, often frustrating, yet rewarding task.

FORMULATION OF THE IRWIN DECLARATION

In November, 1927, the Conservative government of Stanley Baldwin appointed a seven-man Parliamentary Commission headed by Sir John Simon, of the Liberal Party, to inquire into the workings of the Government of India Act of 1919, and to determine what the next step of the British government in India might be. It was the Act of 1919 that provided for the appointment of such a commission, but this appointment was not due until 1929.

The updating of the Commission's appointment was due to the initiative of the Conservative Secretary of State for India,

Lord Birkenhead But his motive was political Birkenhead was no friend of Indian aspirations He alone in the Lloyd George War Cabinet had opposed the Act of 1919 which granted India limited reform After his appointment as Secretary of State for India in 1924 he wrote Lord Reading, the Viceroy "It is frankly inconceivable that India will ever be fit for Dominion self-government"² Yet a year later Birkenhead realized that in the next general election in Britain the Conservative party could be defeated by Labor This could mean leaving the nomination of the commission in "dangerous and radical" hands Birkenhead had written Reading in December, 1925

When I made my speech in the House of Lords suggesting that it might be possible to accelerate the Commission of 1928 I always had it plainly in mind that we could not afford to run the slightest risk that the nomination of the 1928 Commission should be in the hands of our successors You can readily imagine what kind of a Commission in personnel would have been appointed by Colonel Wedgwood and his friends I have, therefore throughout, been of the clear opinion that it would be necessary for us, as a matter of elementary prudence, to appoint the Commission not later than the summer of 1927³

The seven-man commission, all drawn from Parliamentary backbenchers, did include two members of the Labor party Yet the fact that it was purely a Parliamentary team, that no Indian was on it even though the House of Commons contained one, raised a storm within India All parties in India—the Congress, the Moderates, the Muslim League—united in denouncing its composition In the House of Commons, Ramsay MacDonald supported the setting up of a pure Parliamentary Commission but suggested that the Indian Parliament at New Delhi also appoint a commission of their own which would report, in harmonious cooperation, to the House of Commons

Moreover, 1928 was a turbulent year within India In 1927 the Congress Party at its annual session, under the inspiration of Jawaharlal Nehru, passed a resolution declaring complete independence to be India's goal The following year the All Parties Conference Report—the Motilal Nehru Report—was published This document proposed a constitution for India with Dominion

Status as its aim All Indian parties, except the Muslim League, accepted it The Congress Party, however, was itself split into factions over the question of accepting Dominion Status (That term still had to be more clearly defined by the Statute of Westminster in 1931) Its younger, more ardent wing clung to the concept of complete independence At its annual session in 1928 a compromise was reached The Congress would settle for Dominion Status rather than complete independence if the British government accepted the All Parties Conference Report within one year If not, a civil disobedience campaign would be launched It was during this year that the Simon Commission came out to India It was met by complete boycott and hostile demonstrations

Within this framework of pressure the Viceroy and Governor-General, Lord Irwin, had to work Unlike Birkenhead, the deeply religious Irwin was a friend of Indian national aspirations, "a donnish embodiment of most of the Christian virtues"⁴

Ever since his appointment as Viceroy in 1926 Irwin attempted to keep open the door of communication between the leaders of Indian nationalism and the British government of India In this uneasy dialogue he valued the special role played by the leaders of the small but influential Indian Liberal Party—the Moderates—who often mediated between the Congress and the Government But the composition and coming of the Simon Commission had alienated even them And at year's end India marked time on the verge of non-cooperation and civil disobedience To keep open the closing doors of political communication, to give the British government in London time to formulate actual proposals for reform following the report of the Simon Commission, to rally the Moderates both outside and within the Congress to his side, Irwin decided to act His memoirs make explicit his concern

The first result was of course the boycott, which greatly damaged relations between Government and the political intelligentsia Nor was resentment and suspicion confined to the extremists of the Congress Party Moderate and proven friends of Great Britain felt the exclusion of men of their race from the official review, on which their country's future was to be planned, as bitterly as did the Congress leader Pandit Motilal Nehru By some means or other contact had to be regained and confidence in British purpose restored⁵

Irwin decided to suggest to the British Government at Westminster "the two ideas of Round Table Conference and formal declaration of Dominion Status as the goal of British policy for India"⁶

The idea of a Round Table Conference between leaders of all shades of Indian opinion and leading members of all three British political parties, following the report of the Simon Commission, would do many things. For India it would do away with the humiliation of not being represented by her own leaders on the commission, and bring them once more on seemingly equal terms into the dialogue of debate. Moreover, if the recommendations of the Simon Commission were staid and unprogressive, as Birkenhead had hoped they would be, and as Irwin suspected they were, then the whole question could be renewed at the conference table without a violent explosion on the Indian scene.

But Irwin knew that Simon was to refuse the fences without which the Commission could not logically complete the course it had set itself. Diarchy was to be condemned, no doubt, but Provincial Autonomy was to be so safeguarded as to be virtually meaningless and Federation to be postponed *sine die*. The bitterness aroused by the exclusion of Indians from the Commission's personnel would be as nothing compared with the fury when it was known the Commission's recommendations offered no substantial redress.⁷

A declaration on Dominion Status being the final goal of British policy in India, made in conjunction with the announcement on the proposed Round Table Conference, would further quench the spark of incipient non-violent rebellion and create the right atmosphere for genuine future cooperation. For ever since the Montagu declaration of 1917 stating British policy to be "the gradual development of self-governing institutions, with a view to the progressive realization of responsible government in India as an integral part of the British Empire,"⁸ debate raged as to the exact meaning of the term "responsible government." How did it differ from "Dominion Status"? What did "progressive realization" really mean? Malcolm Hailey, the Viceroy's advisor, threw fuel on the fire, on one occasion, by talking

in the Legislative Assembly about possible gradations of Dominion Status. Year after year, leaders of Indian nationalism, especially the Moderates, demanded clarification of the term, with a view to securing a pledge on full Dominion Status. Irwin sympathized with the Indian viewpoint. He believed that an assurance on Dominion Status was what political India really wanted, that given such pledge the subcontinent would be prepared to wait for its natural fulfillment. In November, 1929, in a revealing memo to the Government in London on "Dominion Status as understood in Great Britain and India," he wrote:

Whatever he may feel it necessary to say in public the Indian is not so much concerned with the achieved constitutional state, in the British sense, as he is with what he would consider the *indefeasible assurance* of such achievement. What is to the Englishman an accomplished process, is to the Indian rather a *declaration of right*, from which future and complete enjoyment of Dominion privilege will spring.⁹

And so in the summer of 1929 Irwin went to London, on leave, to discuss his proposals with the British government. However, on May 31, 1929, a general election had been held in which the Conservatives under Baldwin had been replaced by Labor under the leadership of Ramsay MacDonald. Labor did not have an absolute majority in the House of Commons. They numbered 288, the Conservatives 260, and the Liberals 59.

In England, Irwin met with Wedgwood Benn, Labor's new Secretary of State for India, Sir John Simon of the Liberal party and Chairman of the Commission, Stanley Baldwin, who led the Conservatives, Lord Reading, who preceded Irwin as Viceroy and now led the Liberal Party in the House of Lords, and Lloyd George, leader of a Liberal faction in the House of Commons. In his memoirs Irwin mentions only the meetings with Wedgwood Benn, Simon, Baldwin, and Winterton. From a biography of Reading (written by his son) we learn that Irwin also met with him and Lloyd George.¹⁰ Whether Irwin met directly with Ramsay MacDonald is not clear.

Wedgwood Benn concurred with Irwin's proposals, "but wished to be satisfied that we were not going behind the backs

of Simon and his Commission, who were then preparing their report "¹¹ Without an absolute majority in the Commons, Labor was in a delicate position and needed the support, or at least the passive acquiescence, of the Liberals to be able to continue in office. At first Simon saw no objection to the statement on Dominion Status but objected to the Round Table Conference, "principally on the ground that it would be likely to affect adversely the status of the Commission's report when it appeared, by making this only one among other papers that the Conference would presumably have before it, and this before the Government would have made their own attitude to the Commission's report plain "¹² However, Simon did not object to the proposal on Dominion Status since he saw no essential difference between it and the term used in the declaration of 1917—"responsible government " A little later, to Irwin's surprise, Simon changed his attitude on both proposals. Irwin surmised that he was influenced by Lord Reading.¹³ Now Simon accepted the announcement of a Round Table Conference if this proposal were made to appear an idea put forward by his own Commission. "But as regards the Dominion Status declaration, Simon remained critical both of its wisdom and of the propriety of making it in advance of the Commission's report and its consideration by Parliament "¹⁴

From the start Reading was unalterably opposed to the declaration on Dominion Status. Perhaps he shared some of Birkenhead's pessimism on Indian Affairs. As Viceroy, he had worked intimately with the former Conservative Secretary of State for India. The Birkenhead-Reading correspondence on India as found in the biography of Birkenhead (by his son) certainly justifies the author's comment that "Birkenhead, at the India Office, found himself in harmonious partnership with his old friend and often rival Reading, who had been Viceroy since 1921 "¹⁵ However, Reading voiced his opposition in purely legalistic terms. Not only would the declaration seriously detract from the value and prestige of the Simon Commission's report, but "he was anxious that a specific declaration should be made in any announcement published by Lord Irwin that all the reservations on Indian Home Rule contained in the Preamble to the 1919 Act still held good, and that no change in the British Gov-

ernment's Indian policy could be expected until after Parliament had considered the Statutory Commission's report"¹⁶ Lloyd George accepted Reading's judgment

If the Labor government was dependent upon Liberal support for its continued existence, why did Wedgwood Benn and Ramsay MacDonald persist with Irwin's policy in the face of opposition from Simon, Reading, and Lloyd George? Perhaps the answer lay in Irwin's special relationship with the leader of the Conservatives, Stanley Baldwin, and the latter's pronounced views on India

When selected Viceroy in 1926 Lord Irwin (then Edward Wood) was a member of Baldwin's Cabinet and a close personal friend of the Prime Minister Baldwin was loath to part with him but "on reflection I felt that India must have the best we could send"¹⁷ While in England, Irwin had already secured Benn's permission to "put Baldwin *au courant* of what was proposed, and found him very ready to accept my judgment On that sort of question his mind was predisposed towards the view I was advocating, and was quite unruffled by any of the legalist misgivings that weighed with Reading, or Birkenhead"¹⁸ With Baldwin's support Irwin and Benn could afford to ignore the opposition of the Liberals Yet Baldwin was motivated by more than personal affection In 1929, even though out of power, the theme of Indian reform preoccupied his mind A close associate gives an intimate glimpse of this

From 1929 onwards his [Baldwin's] mind was not really on the economic crisis nor on Empire preference, nor even his fight with the Press barons, it was already on India, and in certain moods he would talk in private about nothing else¹⁹

But many prominent Conservatives disagreed with him on the subject Eddie Winterton, who had been Conservative Under-Secretary of State for India, informed Irwin that he, Birkenhead, and Austen Chamberlain had grave misgivings and doubts about the proposed declaration²⁰ Winterton confirms this in his own memoirs

During the summer of 1929 Lord Irwin, the Viceroy of India, who was home on leave, asked me to meet him in the absence from town

of the two senior members of the Conservative Party—the late Lord Peel and the late Lord Birkenhead, who were, as ex-Secretaries of State for India, concerned with Indian affairs. He lunched with me at the Belgravia Hotel. I was surprised and alarmed by the views he expressed²¹

Moreover, in 1929 Baldwin was battling for his political life within the Conservative party. Many who opposed him on India were part of the anti-Baldwin faction. Lord Birkenhead, Winston Churchill, and the press-lords Lord Rothermere, who owned the *Daily Mail*, and Lord Beaverbrook of the *Daily Express*. In addition, spontaneous Tory discontent followed their electoral defeat by Labor. On the sidelines, waiting his chance to make a comeback, stood Britain's wartime coalition leader, David Lloyd George. No love was lost between him and Baldwin. With the Liberals almost a rump party in the Commons, Lloyd George's only opportunity lay in the formation of another coalition, between his group and the Conservatives. And within the latter party he had powerful allies among some of the anti-Baldwin faction—Birkenhead, Churchill, and Beaverbrook. Before the 1929 elections Lloyd George had proposed an alliance with the Conservatives, only to be blocked by Baldwin.

On 18 February [1929] Lloyd George had made a reconnaissance in a long talk with Churchill. He had suggested that if, as he himself foresaw, the Tories lost the forthcoming contest, they might consider coming to terms with the Liberals, and not at once resigning. Baldwin was not interested. He wanted nothing to do with Lloyd George²²

Given this situation, India could well be the cause of rallying the entire opposition to drive him from leadership of the party. And Baldwin knew this as well as anyone else. After his initial talks with Irwin in August, when he agreed in principle to the declaration, the Tory leader left for his annual trip to France during the Parliamentary recess. On the twentieth of September, while in France, he received a letter by messenger from Ramsay MacDonald asking him to concur "in the issue of a statement concerning Dominion Status *in the event of the Simon Commission being consulted*, and the consent of all Parties being obtained"²³

Baldwin agreed on condition that the Simon Commission did so also

What would anyone in my position have done. He could have done one of two things. He could have taken the coward's course and have said, "I will give you no answer." I took upon myself personal responsibility with some risk, as I have done before and shall do so again if necessary. I replied that so far as I was concerned myself I concurred. I could not speak for my colleagues, because they were scattered, I could not speak for the party. When I got home, if the circumstances of the situation were that the other concurrence was obtained, I would do my best to persuade them to take my view. There was only one matter with which I could possibly state my agreement, namely to support the Prime Minister in the event of the Simon Commission expressing its approval of what the Prime Minister proposed to do²⁴

Whether Irwin knew of these conditions to Baldwin's approval is not clear. On the basis of the evidence available it seems he did not. His memoirs only say "Baldwin then went off for his holiday, and I do not think I had any further occasion to discuss the matter with him"²⁵

On his return to England, on October 23, the Conservative leader discovered that the Simon Commission had not approved of the proposed declaration²⁶. This created a new and potentially dangerous situation for him. Obviously he knew of the storm brewing, within his own party, on India. It seemed as if his trust and confidence had been betrayed by Ramsay MacDonald, and Irwin had already left for India shortly before his arrival. On October 24 there appeared a warning letter from Lord Birkenhead in *The Daily Telegraph*. It purported "to point out the danger of any intervention by Government in a matter which, by the consent of all Parties has been committed to a commission representative of all those parties"²⁷. On October 13 the *Sunday Times* had already published a story by its Diplomatic Correspondent which said

I understand that soon after Lord Irwin resumes the Viceroyalty a fortnight hence, he will make an important pronouncement of future policy. The Viceroy's statement will make it clear that the Government adheres to the Declaration of 1917. It will be laid down in set

terms that Dominion Status for India is the goal to be aimed at when conditions are practicable ²⁸

Baldwin acted almost immediately. He met with a few of his colleagues and wrote the Acting Prime Minister (since MacDonald was out of the country) that his party could not agree to support the publication of the Irwin declaration ²⁹. It is not clear whether Baldwin's opponents on India, within his party, knew of this action. Even if they did, it is clear that they continued to mistrust him, if one judges from Winterton's diaries. The incident described below took place on October 25 two days following Baldwin's arrival in England.

Lunched with Willie Peel (Lord Peel) at the Carlton, F. E. (Lord Birkenhead) was there too, a somewhat serious situation has arisen. Edward Irwin is anxious to make a declaration defining "Dominion Status" as the final goal. I knew of Edward's desire some time ago but the disturbing thing is that S. B. (Stanley Baldwin) seems to have given contingent assent on behalf of the Party—contingent that is on the agreement of all three parties and the Simon Commission. Even so, some of us think it is dangerous to do so without prior consultation with former colleagues ³⁰.

While the pot simmered in London, Irwin arrived in New Delhi on October 25, empowered by the Labor government to make his proposed announcement. Time was running out in India. The Congress ultimatum expired in two more months. On October 31, 1929, the momentous declaration on Dominion Status was published. The night before publication Irwin received a personal telegram from Baldwin "asking me if possible to hold the matter up to give time for more consideration" ³¹. But the Viceroy did not think it a good idea. Moreover since "most of the important people had been warned, to delay the plan was obviously impossible." ³²

RESULT AND REPERCUSSION

For the moment, within India, the clouds cleared. The Liberal Party, the Muslim League, and even the "Moderate" section of the Congress welcomed both the Round Table Conference and

the declaration on Dominion Status. The Liberals joined with the Congress in issuing a manifesto welcoming the Declaration and indicating acceptance of the Round Table Conference if certain conditions or recommendations were fulfilled: immediate release of all political prisoners, the Congress to have a majority of representatives at the proposed Conference, which was to meet "not to discuss when Dominion Status is to be established, but to frame a scheme of Dominion Constitution for India"³³. The doors of communication seemed open once more.

But in England the storm broke. Controversy was fanned by sections of the press, and at the center of the conflagration stood Stanley Baldwin, Ramsay MacDonald and Wedgwood Benn. But the key position was Baldwin's. To maintain his precarious hold he could repudiate Irwin, join forces with Lloyd George's Liberals in the House of Commons, and turn the Labor party out of office. Or he could attempt to stem the rushing tide using all his old political skill, prevent a complete rupture with India, and support, as far as politically possible, the man he appointed Viceroy in 1926. He chose the latter course.

As a first, immediate step Baldwin met with the Conservative Shadow Cabinet, faced his critics within it, and obtained a letter from Ramsay MacDonald in which the latter declared that the statement on "Dominion Status" meant no immediate change in the course of English policy. Sir Samuel Hoare (later Lord Templewood), himself a future Secretary of State for India, gives an intimate glimpse of this confrontation:

We met in an uncomfortable room in the Conservative Office in Palace Chambers. Criticism of the statement, started by Birkenhead and supported by Austen Chamberlain, at once became very bitter. Baldwin obviously approved of Irwin's action. He had, in fact, already agreed with it in principle at the time of the discussions between Irwin, Simon and MacDonald. He had not, however, then seen the actual words in their final form, and when MacDonald sent them to him, he was on his way to his annual cure at Aix, and could not or would not give them his careful attention. His answer, therefore, to MacDonald was a perfunctory agreement provided that Simon also agreed. Baldwin also had been placed in a difficulty. His condition had been ignored, *but none the less as he fully approved of the statement,*

he had no intention of repudiating it. All that he could do in the circumstances was to sit back, listen to Birkenhead's scathing criticisms, and obtain a letter from MacDonald in which it was made clear that the Viceroy's words meant no change in British policy³⁴

On November 1, Rothermere's *Daily Mail* fired the first shot of one more virulent anti-Baldwin campaign. Ever since the Conservative defeat in 1929 the press-lord had been in full cry³⁵. In its sensational story headlined "Mr Baldwin's Crowning Blunder, Blind Promise to Socialists, To Support Indian Dominion Status, Withdrawn Under Party Pressure, Rank and File Furious," it said

By an extraordinary blunder made during the Parliamentary recess, Mr Baldwin, the Conservative ex-Premier, has plunged the country into a political crisis of the first magnitude on the vital question of the British administration of India.

His Conservative colleagues in the last Cabinet are aghast to discover that without their knowledge he had committed them to support the Socialist Government's policy of granting full Home Rule and Dominion Status to the natives of India. Yesterday the Shadow Cabinet of the Conservative Party took the unprecedented step of insisting that their leader should formally repudiate his personal pledge in this matter. They required Mr Baldwin to write a letter to the Prime Minister withdrawing the approval and promise of support for Indian Home Rule, which, without any consultation with his colleagues, Mr Baldwin had given to Lord Irwin, the Viceroy of India, two months ago.

The predicament in which Mr Baldwin finds himself is extremely grave. In highly influential Conservative circles last night the feeling was strongly expressed that his inexplicable vacillation in a matter of such gravity has placed the leadership of the party in urgent question³⁶.

In an editorial on the following day the *Mail* called for a vote of censure against the Labor Party³⁷. It is tempting to speculate whether Lord Rothermere hoped to kill three birds with one stone—to defeat the Labor Party, form a Conservative-Liberal coalition, and unseat Baldwin from the leadership.

Perhaps this is just what the *Times* hinted at when it published a short item, "The Indian Crisis," by its Parliamentary

Correspondent on November 4

Those who follow the currents of party politics in England are familiar with the irresistible attraction in some quarters of any movement calculated to unite Conservative and Liberals in a Coalition against Labor on what might be represented as a high Imperial Issue—all the more if it had the incidental advantage of displacing Mr Baldwin, but this particular issue is beginning to seem a little thin³⁸

All through this crisis the *Times* stood by Irwin and Baldwin Goeffrey Dawson, its editor and close confidant of the Conservative leader, kept in intimate touch with him

Nov 2 I amused myself by writing at intervals—largely to clear my own mind—a survey of the Indian crisis The afternoon was entirely devoted to talking about it, for Baldwin (Leader of the Opposition) came to see me about three and stayed til 5 30—rather worried about it all and by the intrigue behind it³⁹

On November 1, the day following publication of the declaration, the *Times* in an editorial had already defended Irwin's action It also attempted to forestall criticism that was sure to arise because of the neglect of the Simon Commission

Nor is there anything in the statement which anticipates in the slightest degree the Report of the Statutory Commission, or questions the undivided responsibility of the Imperial Government in framing proposals for the consideration of Parliament. The Statutory Commission, representing all parties in Parliament, remains the appointed channel of information about existing Indian conditions, as they appear to a delegation of impartial and sympathetic observers industriously working over a period of two years⁴⁰

It went on to warn

There will be pressure upon Labor to give a party twist to their scheme There will be pressure upon the Conservatives, and perhaps upon Liberals too, to look for opportunities of disagreement. Only the strongest conviction on all sides that the security and well-being of India matter incomparably more than any party success in this country can make the policy sound and practicable⁴¹

Dawson and the *Times* hoped for too much! That very after-

noon of November 1, Lloyd George stirred the pot in the Commons by asking Wedgwood Benn whether the Simon Commission had been consulted about the announcement on Dominion Status, and whether the statement indicated any change of policy announced by previous governments. Benn admitted that the Commission had not been consulted. He went on to allay fears by denying that the declaration indicated any immediate change of previous policy.

Questions of policy involving changes either in substance or in time cannot be considered until the Commission or the Indian Central Committee have submitted their Reports and His Majesty's Government have been able, in consultation with the Government of India, to consider these matters in the light of all the material then available, and after the meeting of the Conference which it is intended to summon.⁴²

Lloyd George was followed by a Labor member who asked Benn whether the article in that morning's *Daily Mail* was true with regard to Baldwin being consulted about the Irwin statement before it was made. This gave Baldwin the opportunity to fire his first shot in the war against the press barons. He replied in a House electric with excitement:

I rise for a moment to ask the indulgence of the House to make an observation with regard to an article which has been brought to my notice as having appeared in today's issue of the "Daily Mail." It is sufficient for me at the moment to say that every implication of fact contained in that article is untrue, and in my opinion gravely injurious to the public interest, not only in this country, but throughout the Empire. I shall have occasion, I hope, at any early date, to examine and make clear the whole position.⁴³

Exactly a week from that day, the House decided to hold a full-dress debate on the "Dominion Status" declaration. Few weeks in contemporary parliamentary history have been more charged with tension and excitement. Rumour and counter-rumour erupted. Would the Conservative party join with Lloyd George's Liberals and vote Labor out of office? Would the Irwin statement thus be completely repudiated? Would Baldwin be swept along by the hostile tide within his own party, perhaps

willingly, since he had not been informed by MacDonald about Simon not being consulted? Or would he still put the cause of India first, bring dissident elements within his party to heel, and stand by his ex-colleague and friend, Irwin?

Unfortunately there is little evidence available as to what went on within the ranks of the Conservative party during that week. However, on November 4, Lord Beaverbrook's *Daily Express* published a news story that was vindicated in every detail four days later. Under the headline "No Conservative Revolt Against the Government," it said

The Government, which was facing the greatest crisis of its short career at the end of last week, now finds the danger is passing.

When the Conservatives demanded next Thursday's debate on India the situation seemed a menacing one for the Government. It was revealed that the Liberal leaders to whom the Irwin correspondence had been shown had refused to support the Irwin declaration. The attitude of the Conservatives, and Mr Baldwin's letter to Mr Wedgwood Benn withdrawing his approval of the Simon correspondence—which was substantially the same as Lord Irwin's declaration—indicated that the Government would face a hostile majority in the House.

The extremist politicians even went so far as to say that next Thursday would see the defeat of the Government, with all the disastrous consequences that would be entailed.

What has brought about the change? *The key position is once more with Mr Baldwin.* During the week-end he has decided to revert to what might be called his pro-Irwin attitude.

On Thursday, therefore, the Conservative Party position will be one of approval of Lord Irwin's declaration, modified, of course, by regret that it was made without consultation with the Simon Commission.

All this will naturally bring comfort to Mr MacDonald. Even if there are murmurings within the ranks of the Conservatives, the Prime Minister supported by the leader of the Conservative Party, can afford to ignore the Liberals. 44

THE DEBATES

On November 5 the House of Lords debated the Dominion Status issue. Lord Reading, the Marquess of Crewe, the Marquess of Salisbury, Earl Peel (who replaced Birkenhead as Secretary of

State for India in 1928), and the Earl of Birkenhead, all spoke against the wisdom of the declaration. Reading feared the impact of the declaration upon the people of India. It would create expectations that could not be fulfilled. Moreover the prestige, the influence, and the authority of the Simon Commission had been impaired. Reading's speech attempted to push the Labor spokesmen into declaring that Dominion Status was for the future, not the present, that it would be Parliament acting of its own volition, not pressures from India, that would decide the issue.⁴⁵

Birkenhead, in a rude, caustic, arrogant speech, accused Irwin and the Labor government of attempting to appease Indian extremism. The Term "Dominion Status" changed and evolved through time.

Does Dominion Status at this moment mean the same thing that it meant a month before the last Imperial Conference? Most plainly not. Does it today mean the same thing that it will mean in five years from now? Who can tell? Here is this word loosely and ignorantly employed, employed as I believe for the first time, employed with a certain significance, and, as I am persuaded, in the hope that in order to deal with a disloyal campaign and with seditious threats men would be persuaded they would receive that which we now know they were not intended to receive and never can receive.⁴⁶

Tamely, weakly, the Labor spokesman defended their policy. Irwin's announcement was not an attempt to frustrate the work of the Simon Commission. No real change from previous governments' policies was intended. In their speeches the emphasis was all on reservations, on the evolutionary process, on the necessity to do nothing more than create the right atmosphere within India.

In conclusion Reading expressed satisfaction and withdrew his motion. At least the House of Lords was not called to vote upon the issue. It made little difference. The damage done here was almost irreparable.

On November 8 came the turn of the Commons. Only here could the future of the Labor government be decided. The very first speech indicated that Ramsay MacDonald would not fall,

that the Irwin declaration would continue to stand as official government policy, even though it did not presage an immediate change. It was Stanley Baldwin who spoke first.

The first part of his speech was an explanation as to how he had come to give his blessings to the Irwin declaration, and why he had been forced to withdraw them on discovering that the Simon Commission had been ignored. Next he attacked the *Daily Mail* and repudiated the accusations made against him, point by point. He had, as his explanation already showed, not committed his party without their prior knowledge to supporting the Socialist government. It was untrue to state that the Conservative Shadow Cabinet insisted that he repudiate his personal pledge. What he did was with their approval, not their coercion.

The *Mail* had challenged him to explain to his followers how he could have appointed a man like Irwin to the Viceroyalty in 1926. This was Baldwin's opportunity. On a technicality he had repudiated his role in the issuance of the declaration, but he would not repudiate his friend and ex-colleague. He had chosen Irwin since India deserved the best, and if the day ever came "when the Party which I lead ceases to attract to itself men of the calibre of Edward Wood (Lord Irwin), then I have finished with my party."⁴⁷

In conclusion Baldwin went on to discuss the general problem of India. The problem was difficult. It would take time to solve. But whatever the phrase "Dominion Status" meant when India had responsible government, one thing would be certain. She would be a full member of the Empire. It was the function, therefore, of the Tory party to toil in faith among the foundations, so that future generations would not be forgetful.

Though moderate in tone, though it also emphasized evolution and reservation, Baldwin's speech did do three things.

- 1 It made it clear that there would be no vote of censure against the Labor government over the Dominion Status declaration.

- 2 It supported Lord Irwin and his aspirations.

- 3 It did not attack the Labor government directly for having authorized the statement.

Given the agonizing situation he was in, little more could

have been asked of the Conservative party leader

The speeches that followed Baldwin's—Lloyd George's vitriolic attack upon Labor, Simon's plaintive yet innocuous statement, Wedgwood Benn's long-winded explanation, Ramsay MacDonald's mild defense—all these would not now change the outcome of the debate. The House eventually accepted MacDonald's suggestion that no more discussion was needed. In England the first chapter in the battle for Indian reform, which was to last till 1934, was over.

But in India the debates had grim consequences. Their tone strengthened the hands of those within the Congress who looked upon the Dominion Status announcement as an empty statement. It was one important factor in the revival of Civil Disobedience in 1930 when the Congress ultimatum expired. Few have summed up the effects of the battle in Parliament better than Lord Irwin himself.

Political India was puzzled and perturbed by this British reaction. India could hardly be expected to understand how it was that the collective appeal on such an issue of Birkenhead, Churchill, Austen Chamberlin, Lloyd George, Reading and Lloyd would fail to weigh as heavily with the British public as the less brilliant but more solid judgments of Baldwin. How different, one reflected, might have been the Indian reaction if in place of this outburst the response had taken the form of saying that of course as to purpose there would be no dispute, and that, whatever might be the difficulties in the way, it would be the proud privilege of British and Indians working together to remove them.⁴⁸

Yet, transcending the conflict of the moment, the goal of British policy in India had been enunciated for the future. Ultimately this was to have significance not only for the sub-continent but for all those areas that traversed the slippery and circuitous route from Empire to Commonwealth.

NOTES

1 *Times* (London), November 1, 1929

2 William Camp, *The Glittering Prizes: A Study of the First Earl of Birkenhead* (MacGibbon & Kee, 1960), p. 186

- 3 The Second Earl of Birkenhead, *F E—The Life of F E Smith—First Earl of Birkenhead* (London Eyre & Spottiswoodie, 1959), pp 511–512
- 4 Camp, *op cit*, p 187
- 5 Earl of Halifax, *Fullness of Days* (London Collins, 1957), p 116
- 6 *Ibid*
- 7 Alan Campbell Johnson, *Viscount Halifax—A Biography* (London Robert Hale, 1941), p 218
- 8 Edwin Montagu, *Parliamentary Debates—House of Commons*, Vol 97, Col 1695
- 9 Johnson, *op cit*, p 232
- 10 The Marquess of Reading, *Rufus Isaacs—The First Marquess of Reading*, (London Hutchinson, 1945) The author is the son of the First Marquess
- 11 Halifax, *op cit*, p 117
- 12 *Ibid*
- 13 *Ibid*, p 118
- 14 *Ibid*
- 15 Second Earl of Birkenhead, *op cit*, p 506
- 16 Marquess of Reading, *op cit*, p 350
- 17 Baldwin in the House of Commons, November 7, 1929, *Parliamentary Debates—House of Commons*, Vol 231, Cols 1304–1306
- 18 Halifax, *op cit*, p 119
- 19 Lord Percy of Newcastle, *Some Memories* (London Eyre & Spottiswoodie, 1958), p 131
- 20 Halifax, *op cit*, p 119
- 21 Rt Hon Earl Winterton, P C, *Orders of the Day* (London Cassell, 1953), p 158
- 22 Frank Owen, *Tempestuous Journey Lloyd George, His Life and Times* (London Hutchinson, 1954), p 109
- 23 Baldwin in the House of Commons, November 7, 1929, *Parliamentary Debates—House of Commons*, Vol 231, Cols 1304–1306
- 24 *Ibid*
- 25 Halifax, *loc cit*
- 26 Baldwin, *loc cit*
- 27 *Daily Telegraph* (London), October 24, 1929
- 28 *Sunday Times* (London), October 13, 1929
- 29 Baldwin, *loc cit*
- 30 Winterton, *op cit*, pp 158–159
- 31 Halifax, *op cit*, p 120
- 32 *Ibid*
- 33 Text of the Manifesto as found in B Pattabhi Sitaramayya, *History of the Indian National Congress*, Vol I (Bombay Padma Publications, 1935), pp 350–351
- 34 Viscount Templewood (Sir Samuel Hoare), *Nine Troubled Years* (London Collins, 1954), p 46
- 35 See Robert Blake, "Baldwin and the Right" in John Raymond, ed,

The Baldwin Age (London Eyre & Spottiswoodie, 1960), p 50

36 *Daily Mail* (London), November 1, 1929

37 *Daily Mail* (London), November 2, 1929

38 *Times* (London), November 4, 1929

39 John Evelyn Wrench, *Geoffrey Dawson and Our Times* (London Hutchinson, 1955), p 278

40 *Times* (London), November 1, 1929

41 *Ibid*

42 Wedgwood Benn in the House of Commons, November 1, 1929, *Parliamentary Debates—House of Commons*, Vol 231

43 Baldwin in the House of Commons, November 1, 1929, *ibid*

44 *Daily Express* (London), November 4, 1929

45 Lord Reading in the House of Lords, November 5, 1929, *Parliamentary Debates—House of Lords*, Fifth Series, Vol 75

46 Lord Birkenhead in the House of Lords, November 5, 1929, *ibid*

47 Baldwin in the House of Commons, November 7, 1929, *loc cit*

48 Halifax, *op cit*, pp 122–123

Founding of the Ming Dynasty as an Event in Chinese Social History

ROMEYN TAYLOR

University of Minnesota

The concept of charisma is still sometimes explicitly used in explaining the social basis of imperial Chinese government¹ It may also be implicit in the attribution of a special influence or prestige to certain groups or persons in the government and society² A charismatic authority would be one that is accepted on the ground that the person exercising it possesses, or has a special access to, powers that are greater than merely human, or than ordinarily human Is the concept of charisma relevant to an understanding of Chinese institutions? Two suggested loci of charisma have to be considered one would be in the person of the ruler, the other would be in the possessors of the kind of learning generally thought requisite to governmental office, i e., the scholars To prove that the emperor's authority was essentially charismatic, one would have to show that his authority was accepted because he was revealed by certain signs to enjoy a special relationship to cosmic forces, rather than on grounds of his demonstrated ability to provide certain services The question whether scholars as a class, because of their acknowledged attainment of the required learning, possessed charismatic authority, or something like it, could be answered negatively if it could be shown that their mere adherence to a regime in large numbers, or their opposition to it, did not cause it to stand or fall, irrespective of other factors Their role in government would have to be explained in the more modest terms of their ability

to read and write fluently and to articulate and solve governmental problems in generally understood classical terms

Periods of imperial breakdown may offer particular advantages for the investigation of such questions as this, because the recruitment procedure of imperial government, in Ming and Ch'ing, largely prevents the separation of the possible "charismatic" element from other factors. There were few civil officials, during most of this period, who were not scholars or who had not at least been granted some token of scholarly qualification. It is hard to say, therefore, whether the scholarly character lent authority to the office, or whether the official, whether scholar or not, derived his authority from his place in the government and from his conduct as an official.

A period appropriate to our purpose is that from 1351-1368, a time of competing claims to imperial authority and of partial breakdown of government. The Yuan Dynasty strove, with some success, to mobilize Chinese support against several Chinese rebel regimes, most of which claimed affiliation with the White Lotus Society. It was the leader of one of these, Chu Yuan chang, who founded the Ming. During these years, no regime enjoyed a monopoly of imperial authority and normal recruitment methods were in abeyance. Each regime had to design its policies in such a way as to make the most effective possible claim to legitimacy. Did personal or scholarly charisma triumph here? Did the Ming founder win general acceptance by asserting a claim to a supernatural sanction unique to himself? Did scholars, by some power of legitimation that was theirs to grant or withhold, determine the outcome of the struggle?

By 1360, the rebel regime of Chu Yuan-chang was firmly established in the great Yangtze metropolis of Nanking, and during the following seven years, he destroyed his major rivals to the east and west of his state. In Chu's own writings and in statements attributed to him, one can see the large outlines of his leadership. Three factors are about equally prominent: 1) economic and administrative policies aimed at winning popular support, 2) sound military strategy and technique, 3) an apparently genuine piety toward spirits and the will of Heaven.

In so far as anything that might be called charisma entered

the picture, it is to be found in certain stories regarding Chu Yuan-chang, some of which were recorded before and some shortly after his death. It was said, for example, that there had been a red glow and an apparition of the Buddha over his monastery on the night he first entered it,³ that a small dragon appeared on the tassel of his hat,⁴ and that a dragon was seen perched on a cloud above the field of battle during one of his victories.⁵ The presence of a supernatural factor is confirmed by Chu's own accounts of his use of divination in deciding to rebel against the Yuan,⁶ and in his successful intervention with a local spirit to end a drought.⁷ He was also reported to have made much use of experts in astrology and geomancy.⁸ To show that Chu was a charismatic leader, however, such evidence in itself would not be sufficient. It would also be necessary to show that well advertized accounts of such signs had been sufficient to cause him to be preferred over his rivals. Evidence against this conclusion may be found in the fact that Chu's own autobiographical writings provide a sketchy but plausible explanation of his success in terms of his policies and strategy. References to the supernatural intrude themselves occasionally, not as explanations of his success or as, in any way, relieving him of the necessity of meeting practical problems with appropriate action. Rather, they appear as heartening confirmation that he was on the right track in his pursuit of victory. This is borne out by the speech he made to his new subjects at Nanking.⁹ He offered no supernatural signs, promised no wonders, but simply imputed certain evils to the old regime, promised reforms and called on his hearers to join him in building a better government. In acting thus, he may have felt that he was working with cosmic forces (or the will of Heaven) that would assure his eventual success, but the critical factor for him, and for those evaluating him as a leader was still his adoption of the appropriate policy and not any unique and personal access to supernatural power.

If the case of Chu Yuan-chang argues against the operation, at this time, of personal charisma in imperial rule, what can be said of charisma in relation to scholars as a class? On the one hand, it may be pointed out that Chu Yuan-chang, even before he became emperor, brought scholars into his service made a

point of rehabilitating public classical academies, and devoted some time and energy to his own study of classical literature, despite the pressures of active leadership in a rebellion still in progress. These facts suggest the possibility that a charismatic virtue was attributed to masters of classical learning. There is reason to believe, however, that they may be better explained as the kind of ambiguous appeal indulged in by our politicians when they protest their devotion to the principles of the founding fathers, an implied promise to conform simultaneously to various current notions of how government should be conducted. In the first place, Chu Yuan-chang had little respect for scholars in general, although he admired and sought counsel from some of them. This is reflected in certain disparaging remarks about scholars as ineffectual, venal and unmanly.¹⁰ It is reflected, too, in the way in which he employed them. It is clear that many served him under duress¹¹ and he showed his lack of trust in them by forbidding his generals to employ more than one each, owing to the danger of combinations against him.¹² Nor, it appears, did he feel that the visible presence of scholars in his regime was of overriding importance, for he awarded some of the highest civil office and a large majority of titles of nobility to his military men, most of whom were poorly educated. On the contrary, the most important principle in bestowal of high offices and honors would seem to have been length and intimacy of association with himself. Chu was well aware of the provincial character of his regime and was proud of it. After he became emperor, he boasted, with some exaggeration, that all his leading officials were old comrades from his native place.¹³ Apart from evidence found in Chu's relations with the scholars, it is also significant that the tendency of Chinese civil officials, most of them scholars, to support the Yuan loyally against the rebel regimes failed to prevent that dynasty's fall. Some of them, having reputedly served their communities well, had strong local support. Others, as evidenced by wholesale defections of Yuan militia, did not.

In conclusion, it would seem that charisma is not a useful concept in explaining either the nature or the distribution of governmental authority, at least in the period considered. Suc-

cessful rule may have been popularly attributed to cooperation with cosmic forces in a rationally ordered universe, but this cooperation was defined in terms of practical standards. This leads to the further conclusion that the attribution of a special prestige or influence to scholars as scholars or to the ruler as ruler may go far beyond the evidence. Careful study of the exchange of services and support (both material and immaterial) between the government and the rest of society may contribute more to our understanding of this relationship.¹⁴

NOTES

1 Professor Charles O. Hucker's *The Traditional Chinese State in Ming Times (1368-1644)* (Tucson, 1961), a pioneering and richly informative study, does full justice to the complexity of the subject and avoids simplistic explanations. At the same time, however, the author treats charisma as an element in the government's authority. He states that court ritual and the magnificence of the palace "invested the throne with a kind of charismatic aura" (p. 41). On page 65 "I suspect the Confucian bureaucrat was indispensable to rulers because the Chinese people at large would not contentedly be governed by others. Such was the charismatic prestige of Confucian learning!" Also, on page 76 "For good government was thought to depend, in the last resort, on the charismatic virtues of the ruling class." Perhaps the most familiar use of the concept of charisma in the study of Chinese society is that of Max Weber in his *The Religion of China*, translated by Hans Gerth (Glencoe, 1951). This, unlike Hucker's work, is out of date and based on Western materials of pre-1920 vintage. It is still at least indirectly influential, however, and should be mentioned here. On page 110 "Only the adept of scriptures and of tradition has been considered competent for correctly ordering the internal administration and the charismatically correct life conduct of the prince, ritually and politically." On page 135 "High mandarins were considered magically qualified. They could always become objects of a cult, after their death as well as during their lifetime, providing that their charisma was 'proved'." It should be noted here, however, that charisma, being a personal quality, is not thought of as an attribute of scholars or officials *as such*.

2 These concepts are so closely related, albeit carefully distinguished, in Weber as to suggest that even where charisma is not explicitly invoked, some such concept may underlie many other descriptions of Chinese institutions.

3 Anon. 天潢五牒 *T'ien-huang yü tieh*, (compiled in the Yung-lo period) p. 2a.

4 明太祖實錄 *Ming t'ai tsu shih lu*, 1355, first month

5 *Ibid.*, 1355, sixth month

6 朱元璋 *Chu Yüan chang*. 御製皇陵碑 *Yü chih huang ling pei*, pp 2a-2b

7 *Shih lu*, 1354, seventh month. Also, *Chu Yüan chang*. 栢子潭神龍效靈記 *Po tsu t'an shen lung hsiao ling chi*

8 For his association with a Buddhist monk astrologer, see Liu Ch'en, 劉辰 *Kuo ch'u shih chi*, 23a 國初事蹟

9 *Shih lu*, 4.2a

10 For example, *Shih lu*, 6.2a-2b, *Ming shih*, 128 15a. Also, Chu's preface to his 皇陵碑 *Huang ling pei*

11 Liu Ch'en, *op cit.*, 20b, 24a, asserts that Chu ordered that any scholar caught attempting to escape a city on the approach of his forces was to be cut down. The same author also recounts an incident in which a scholar "escaped" his entourage

12 *Ibid.*, 20b

13 *Shih lu*, 21 1a

14 An appeal for such an approach may be found in S. N. Eisenstadt's review article in the *Journal of Asian Studies*, LVII (May, 1958)

The Origins of Whampoa Graduates Who Served in the Northern Expedition

RICHARD B LANDIS

Montana State College

You will carry on the ideals of the revolutionary martyrs, laying down your lives and shedding your blood, making the foundation of the Chinese Republic secure, causing the *San Min Chu I* to be manifested in a practical way, and then the revolution will be proclaimed loudly, like Russia's. If the revolution is not finished, China shall die, and a race of 400,000,000 will become extinct. The death of our country and the extinction of our race [are questions which] are dependent on the life and death of you gentlemen. Therefore, we definitely must open this school, and we must make a revolutionary army of men who will save the country and the people.¹

These words of Sun Yat-sen's inaugural speech to the first class of the Whampoa Military School mirrored the intensity and frustration of the Kuomintang in the mid-1920's. This extremely significant period witnessed the beginnings not only of the strengths but also of the weaknesses of the revived Chinese revolutionary movement.

Despite the intensity and resultant significance of this period, only since World War II has the United States witnessed far-reaching efforts to encourage the systematic study of the Kuomintang and the Nationalist movement as part of the larger Chinese revolutionary fervor and agitation. With the expectation of assisting in these efforts, the author is presently engaged in an investigation of Whampoa Military School, whose commandant from 1924 to 1928 was Chiang Kai-shek.² As far as possible, this

study will be of an institutional nature, and will include emphasis on the geographic origins of cadets and staff, the political training provided within the school, the types of strategic and tactical training and general military philosophy offered, the subsequent military careers of selected graduates, and the varied and changing relationships of the school to other organs of the National Government, and to the Kuomintang.³

As the first step in this plan, the present paper offers an analysis of the geographic origins of the cadets who graduated from the first four classes.⁴ These were the classes which graduated in time to participate in all or part of the Third Northern Expedition (May 1926-1928), which carried the Kuomintang and its National Government to Nanking. Table I indicates the size and dates of attendance of the first four classes.

TABLE I
SIZE AND CALENDAR DATES OF FIRST FOUR WHAMPOA CLASSES

Class	Number of Graduates	Entered the ranks	Entered Whampoa	Graduated Whampoa
1	613		May, 1924	Dec., 1924
2	419		Oct., 1924	Summer, 1925
3	1,225		Summer, 1925	Winter, 1925
4	2,650	Aug., 1925	Spring, 1926	Oct., 1926

* Chiang, *Last Three Years*, pp. 147-154. *Directory*, pp. 37-66. The column headed "Entered the ranks" refers to the practice begun with the fourth class of providing a trial period of training for cadets before they entered Whampoa. While the *Directory* lists 613 cadets in the first class, an initial comparison with various materials of Chiang Kai-shek's authorship leaves some question as to the size. In an undated report written in May, 1924, the first class was noted as numbering 460. See Chiang Kai-shek, *Chiang Chieh-shih ti ke-ming kung-tso* [Chiang Kai-shek's Revolutionary Works], Wen Ti ed. (Shanghai, 1928) II A, 12. C. Martin Wilbur and Julie Lien-ying How, eds., *Documents on Communism, Nationalism, and Soviet Advisers in China, 1918-1927, Papers Seized in the 1927 Peking Raid* (New York, 1936), p. 150 gives the same figure, here after cited as *Documents*. In a May 11, 1924 speech to the assembled cadets, Chiang stated that there were more than 500 to 600 in the school. See Kuo-min ke-ming chün chung yang chün-shih cheng-chih hsüeh-hsiao ed., *Whampoa ts'ung-shu* [Whampoa Collection] (Shanghai, 1928), p. 22. Finally, in Chiang *Last Three Years*, the figure is 500. See p. 154. This all leads to two conclusions. Chiang's figures are probably approximations of the number of cadets in attendance at various times in the late spring of 1924. In approximating, Chiang consistently estimated too low for all of the classes, see *Last Three Years*, pp. 147-154. Secondly, the *Directory* without a doubt lists the number of cadets who graduated at the end of a training cycle.

While many of the newly recruited cadets in any particular class might not have come directly from their native places as listed in the Whampoa *Directory*, nevertheless it cannot be questioned that provincial or local loyalties formed bonds of great

and lasting importance to young Chinese students who had middle school or college backgrounds, and who were thus eligible for entrance to Whampoa. Indicative of this importance is the continuation of provincial groupings in the contemporary Chinese Communist and Nationalist political scene.

A number of conclusions may be drawn from Table II. First of all, in all four classes three provinces furnished roughly 50 per cent of the total number of cadets. Hunan, Kwangtung—and Shensi and Kiangsi in a tie for third place—provided over 50 per cent of the first class while Chekiang was next. Kwangtung, Hunan, and Chekiang were the most important for the second class, followed by Kiangsi and Szechwan. In the third class, Kwangtung, Hunan, and Chekiang furnished 50 per cent

TABLE II

ABSOLUTE NUMBERS OF CADET GRADUATES AND PERCENTAGE ANALYSIS BY PLACE AND CLASS*

(Percentages refer to the relationships between place and total class numbers)

Place of Origin	First Class		Second Class		Third Class		Fourth Class	
	Abso- lute	As Percent	Abso- lute	As Percent	Abso- lute	As Percent	Abso- lute	As Percent
Anhwei	26		15		77		49	
Chekiang	34	6%	67	15%	171	14%	148	6%
Gihli (Hohpei)	6		2		2		51	
Fukien	10		6		15		54	
Honan	10		0		10		129	
Hunan	188	31%	72	16%	221	18%	843	32%
Hupei	16	3%	25	6%	78	6%	150	6%
Kansu	4		0		0		3	
Kiangsi	43	7%	52	12%	101	8%	127	5%
Kiangsu	22	4%	11	2%	102	8%	79	3%
Kwangsi	32		17		35		83	
Kwangtung	94	15%	98	22%	224	18%	265	10%
Kweichow	12		13		25		24	
Shansi	5		2		13		111	
Shantung	10		6		24		58	
Shensi	45	7%	4	1%	7	1%	154	6%
Szechwan	20	3%	50	11%	94	8%	206	8%
Yunnan	11		3		18		44	
Inner Mongolia	2		1		0		24	
Manchuria	3		0		2		11	
Korea	0		0		4		24	
Taiwan	0		0		0		2	
Unlisted	19		5		2		11	
Totals	613	76%	449	85%	1225	81%	2650	76%

* *Directory*, pp. 37-66, for the raw data. Percentages are here given only for the eight provinces which furnished the largest total number of cadets for the four classes.

of the total number, while Kiangsu, Kiangsi, and Szechwan were tied for the next position. Hunan, Kwangtung, and Szechwan held the important positions for the fourth class, while Shensi, Chekiang, and Hupei were tied for the following place.

Quite obviously, Hunan ranked first overall as a source of cadets. Of the total of 4,937 who graduated from the first four classes, Hunan furnished more than one quarter—1,324. The historical analysis at the end of this paper hopefully will shed light on the reasons for the importance of Hunan. Kwangtung, the base of the Kuomintang's financial and military strength, might have been expected to furnish the largest number, but ranked only as a poor second, with a total of 682 graduates. In descending order, even fewer came from Chekiang, 420, Szechwan, 370, Kiangsi, 323, Hupei, 269, Kiangsu, 214, and Shensi, 210. Below this, provincial representations fell to very minor significance.*

While the eight important provinces have been identified, it is possible to locate the geographic sources of cadets even more precisely. The index for each class listed in the *Whampoa Directory* indicates the native place—district (hsien), or city (shih)—for each cadet, except for the group whose place origins are entirely unlisted. In order to analyze further, the terms, "rural hsien," and "urban units" may be applied†. For reasons of economy and emphasis it may be helpful to summarize for the eight important provinces the rural hsien and urban units which furnished cadets for at least three of the first four classes. The map will further clarify the situation.⁵

In Hunan, the valleys of the Hsiang and Tzu Rivers, and the area to the west of Tung-ting Lake were significant. Interestingly enough, Hsiang-t'an, the native district of Mao Tse-tung, who had not yet begun to rely on the masses as a source of power, accounted for less than 5 per cent of Hunan's representation in

* See pp. 10-12 for a discussion of the variation in provincial representations from class to class.


† A rural hsien is defined here as a district capital of less than 100,000 population, and its surrounding hsien. An urban unit includes a city (shih) of over 100,000 population, and the hsien (singular or plural) surrounding the city. These units are further subdivided as large (with a city of over 500,000 population), or small (with a city of 100,000-500,000 population). See footnote 7.

GEOGRAPHIC ORIGINS OF WHAMPOA GRADUATES

Eight Most Important Provinces

Places which furnished graduates for three of the first four classes.

- Capital of rural hsien
- Small urban unit
- Large urban unit



any one class Indicative of the then current Kuomintang Communist interest in areas of modern labor concentration as fertile sources of revolutionaries was the importance of the rural hsien of Li-ling Midway up the Hsiang valley and on the Ping-hsiang-Lu k'ou railway, Li-ling furnished for three classes a larger percentage of Hunan's representation than any town of similar size

first class, 22 per cent, third class, 7 per cent, and fourth class, 5 per cent

The rural hsien of Wen ch'ang, Ch'ung-shan, Teng-mai, and Wan-ning on Hainan Island furnished a surprising portion of the cadets in the Kwangtung totals first class, 23 per cent, second class, 43 per cent, third class, 25 per cent, and fourth class, 21 per cent Elsewhere, the valleys of the Hsi (West) and Tung (East) Rivers provided cadets for three classes, the Canton urban unit furnishing cadets for four classes, with a high of 3 per cent of Kwangtung's total in the first class Finally, rural hsien seventy-five to a hundred miles north of the Hai-lu-feng area east of Canton were represented by cadets from at least three classes

In Chekiang, rural hsien south of Hangchow, on the extension of the Shanghai-Hangchow railroad into the central part of the province, were the outstanding sources of cadets for at least three classes Secondly, the area from Ningpo south along the coast was significant The rural hsien of Feng-hua, Chiang Kai-shek's birth-place, accounted for 29 per cent of the province's representation in the first class, but fell to insignificance thereafter, furnishing only seven cadets in the last three classes

The region south from Chengtu to a distance of about a hundred miles, i.e., the area between the valleys of the Min and Fou Rivers, was significant in Szechwan Secondly, the urban unit of Chungking furnished cadets for four classes, with a high of 18 per cent of the provincial total in the second class

In Kiangsi, the important area was to the south of the Yangtze River and west of Po-yang Lake This included the urban unit of Nanchang, the provincial capital Secondly, the small urban unit of Ping-hsiang, a major coal-mining center economically oriented by railroad toward Lu-k'ou in the Hsiang valley of Hunan, furnished large groups of cadets for each class first, 14 per cent of the provincial total, second, 12 per cent, third, 6 per cent, and fourth, 20 per cent.

As for Hupeh, the areas to the east and north of Wuhan furnished cadets for at least three classes In Kiangsu, the important areas were adjacent to the Yangtze, south along the Grand Canal, and in the northwest along the divergent course of the Hwang-ho And finally, in Shensi the important area was the

valley of the Wei River, including the capital of Sian, a small urban unit.

From the above analysis, it is clear that in the eight most important provinces, the cadets came from the densely populated Han areas—river valleys and along railroad rights-of-way. Within these areas, the majority of cadets were recruited from rural hsien having capitals of less than 100,000 population. Variations in the number of cadets from class to class were proportional roughly to the rise or fall in the number of their native places. As the classes rose in size beginning with the third, not only were existing sources further exploited, but now large additional numbers of rural hsien were tapped for the first time, many of them providing only one cadet for a particular class. Only in Kwangtung, where four rural hsien furnished a heavy percentage of cadets, were so few hsien of such great importance.

Table III will illustrate the general unimportance of small urban units, i.e., with cities of 100,000 to 500,000 population. Even less important were the large urban units with cities of over 500,000 population. Peking, Tientsin, the Wuhan complex, Chungking, Soochow, Shanghai, Foochow, Changsha, Hangchow, and Canton. With the exception of Changsha, Chungking, and Canton, each of these urban units furnished a smaller total number of cadets than any of the units listed in the table.*

In general both large and small urban units were of lesser importance as sources of cadets. This statement is subject to some qualification, however. First of all, both in Hunan and Szechwan all urban units when grouped together consistently furnished from about 20 per cent to 40 per cent of each province's cadets, depending upon the class. These percentages were higher than those for urban units in any other province. Secondly, Chungking and Changsha, together with the units noted in the table—excepting Ping-hsiang, Ling-ling, and Ningpo—provided greater percentages of provincial totals for the second than for any other class.

* Changsha provided a grand total of 76 cadets, with a high of 10 per cent of Hunan's total in the second class, while Chungking furnished 36 with a high of 18 per cent of Szechwan's total in the second class, and Canton provided 13 with a high of 3 per cent in Kwangtung's total of the first class.

Indeed the entire pattern of recruitment for the second class was characterized by a restriction of effort. Not only were small urban units drawn on intensively, but also the total number of native places was the fewest of any class while the class itself was the smallest of the four. At the same time the eight numerically important provinces furnished a high of 85 per cent of the total class as against 76 per cent to 81 per cent of the other three classes.

TABLE III

REPRESENTATIVE SMALL URBAN UNITS AS SOURCES OF GRADUATES*

(Percentages refer to the relationships between urban and provincial numbers within the class)

Unit	First Class		Second Class		Third Class		Fourth Class	
	Absolute	As Percent	Absolute	As Percent	Absolute	As Percent	Absolute	As Percent
Hengyang Hunan	5	2%	5	7%	5	1%	24	5%
Huangpei Hupeh	5	10%	5	20%	7	9%	12	8%
Lingling Hunan	0	0	5	4%	9	4%	11	1%
Nanchung Kiangsi	5	7%	8	15%	7	7%	2	2%
Nanking Kiangsu	1	5%	5	45%	1	1%	8	4%
Ningpo, Chekiang	0	0	2	3%	6	4%	3	3%
Ping-hsiang Kiangsi	6	14%	5	10%	6	6%	2	2%
Sian, Shensi	2	4%	1	25%	0	0	21	14%
Tzu-chung Szechwan	1	5%	5	6%	1	1%	1	2%

* Derived from 5-65 for absolute numbers.

The marked variation from class to class in the number of cadets from any particular province may be explained in general terms. Ever since the death of Yüan Shih-k'ai in 1916, China had been sadly disunited. *Tuilians* (provincial military governors appointed by the Peking government) and other militarists wielded supreme military and political power in every province with little regard for the interests or needs of the central government at Peking. Consequently the effectiveness of Whampoa recruitment efforts in any particular province were dependent upon both the provincial military situation—the presence or absence of warfare—and the relationship between the local military chiefs and the Kuomintang.

For example, in September 1924, war broke out in Kiangsu between two rivals. Within a month, interlocking military alliances had turned this struggle into a much more significant one

involving Wu P'ei-fu and Chang Tso-lin, North China's most powerful militarists, both unfriendly to the Kuomintang. The issue was settled in November when Feng Yü-hsiang, one of Wu's satellites, revolted and forced Wu to flee. During the precise period of this struggle, the second Whampoa class was recruited. Undoubtedly, the small size of this class was due in part to the general military unrest in north and central China.

By the end of 1924, Feng joined Chang in an uneasy alliance which lasted until October, 1925. During this period, generals in Honan, Chihli, Shensi, Kansu, and Inner Mongolia allied themselves with Feng,⁶ while others, such as Yen Hsi-shan of Shansi, tended to follow Feng's general direction. Thus, Feng was a pivotal figure in the year 1925.

Just prior to the new year, Feng and Chang invited Sun Yat-sen to Peking in the interests of national unity. Sun accepted the invitation, and although in the name of Kuomintang he soon became disgusted with the two generals, the feeling was not entirely mutual. Feng gradually assumed a favorable attitude toward not only the Kuomintang, but also its Russian sponsors, who were willing to send arms to militarists who espoused revolution. In April, 1925, the first Russian military mission arrived to advise one of Feng's three armies, and by August a group of cadets was dispatched from Whampoa to serve in Feng's personal army in Shensi.⁷

In general, under Feng's rule "Kuomintang and Communist members were able to engage in propaganda and organizational activities with far greater freedom than under the previous regime."⁸ Certainly both the relative peace and Feng's favorable disposition facilitated recruitment in north and central China for the third, and especially the fourth, Whampoa classes.

Meanwhile, during the period of August to October, 1924, strong opposition threatened the very existence of the Kuomintang in Canton and on Whampoa Island, about seven miles downstream on the Pearl River. The Canton Merchants' Association armed its own militia in these months in an effort to limit or eliminate the power of the Kuomintang. Although Whampoa cadets of the first class in their first military action aided other troops to disband the militia, the very immediate threat prob-

ably accounted in part for the restriction of effort in the recruitment of the second class. When the effects of the unsettled situation in north and central China were added, it was inevitable that the second class would be smaller than the first.

No sooner had the threat of the Merchants' Association subsided than the Kwangtung general, Ch'en Ch'ung-ming (Ch'en Hsiung-ming), in alliance with other militarists from Yunnan and Kwangsi, renewed his extended struggle against the Kuomintang. Only after two hard-fought Eastern Expeditions in the spring and fall of 1925 did the Whampoa cadets and the Kuomintang armies eliminate Ch'en's power along the East River, and end his military career. Significantly, no rural hsien and only one urban unit furnished cadets for three classes from this valley, which had been the preserve of Ch'en ever since 1923.⁹

Obviously, during 1925 the Kuomintang's prospects for recruiting young men as cadets improved markedly. In the South, the Kuomintang armies with their spirited Whampoa junior officers and cadets were in the process of conquering Kwangtung and Kwangsi, and of developing a reputation for success in battle, while in the North, Feng Yu-hsiang was progressing along the road to greater cooperation with the Kuomintang and the Russians. As a result of these favorable conditions, the third and fourth Whampoa classes, which entered the school and the ranks, respectively, in the summer of 1925, greatly exceeded the size of the previous classes.

While we can analyze in a general way the political and military factors bearing on the origins of the Whampoa graduates, any attempt to explain these origins in historical terms within a particular province becomes exceedingly complex. Nevertheless, at least several significant developments can be brought to light as they bear on the most important province, Hunan.

Ever since the middle of the nineteenth century, Hunan had been a center of creative and sometimes aggressive reaction to the Western impact. In the longer historical view, this reaction must also include the willingness, even eagerness, of Hunanese youth to enroll in the Whampoa School, thereby fulfilling Sun Yat-sen's principle of Nationalism, i.e., the reestablishment of

the political unity which the Western impact had helped to destroy

The first significant response to the Western penetration of Hunan occurred during the Taiping rebellion when Tseng Kuo-fan successfully lead Hunanese troops against the Taiping rebels, who advocated a bizarre form of Christianity. In the process of defeating the Taipings, Tseng developed a military system which served as a model for regional and provincial military rule down to the middle of the twentieth century. While he saved the central government in his own day, the system which he fostered lay the groundwork for an insidious erosion of the central power in Peking. Thus, Hunanese leaders, followed by those in other provinces, began to acquire the custom of ignoring the central administration.

Early in the twentieth century when Hunan was deep in the morass of regional politics, local Hunanese investors provided the capital necessary to construct one section of railway which later was incorporated under foreign pressure into the Canton-Hankow-Peking line, nominally controlled by the Peking government. The use of local financing was quite unusual, and certainly manifested a spirit of positive reaction to the usual practice of utilizing foreign railway loans. Indeed, in Hunan, Szechwan, and Kwangtung, local revolutionaries opposed foreign railway loans, and local merchants established railway protection clubs in 1911 to protest the nationalization of the proposed Hankow-Canton and Hankow-Szechwan lines. This nationalization under the nominal control of Peking was viewed as a cover behind which Britain, France, the United States, and Germany could penetrate the economy of interior China.

In the period of World War I, local fear of foreign economic penetration was not limited to the merchants or revolutionaries. The United States' consul at Changsha noted that Hunanese officials actively opposed foreign economic development in the province.

The official attitude toward foreign investments is characterized by caution and a fear that the free introduction of foreign capital into Chinese mining enterprises will take the mining property away from

[provincial] Chinese official control Every obstacle has therefore been placed in the way of allowing foreign investors a free hand¹⁰

Another group, often akin in its ideas to the revolutionaries, came to prominence in the twentieth century Ever since 1900, some Chinese intellectuals had been tantalized by the prospect of solving China's problems through the establishment of a federal type of government, based on the French or American patterns During the period of Yuan Shih-k'ai and the succeeding *Tuchuns*, non military groups, including certain of the Kuomintang membership, favored a federal system which would separate civil and military authority on the one hand, and local and central authority on the other After Yuan's death, the *Tuchuns* and lesser military chiefs in Hunan, Yunnan, Kweichow, and Kwangsi began to support their own brand of federalism the political and military autonomy of each province under its own militarist unless he were strong enough to acquire another province In any case, wide separation from the Chihli clique which controlled Peking and north China was essential

In Hunan, the demands of the intellectuals and pragmatism of the military coalesced in the years 1921-1922 In the light of history, the resulting provincial constitution stood as the only one enforced even in a nominal way during the period of the Chinese Republic Hunanese political and military authority were sharply differentiated from the authority of the nominal government in Peking, certain rights were reserved to citizens, both men and women, a governor was to be elected by a small electorate, and the provincial assembly was to continue to function Although this constitution continued to operate until the conquest of Hunan by the National Revolutionary Army of the Kuomintang and National Government in 1926, the Hunanese generals, with their varying political and military sympathies, continued to hold paramount power within the province, and their fratricidal warfare did not abate¹¹ Quite to the contrary, their struggles seem to have intensified because of the assumption of unique rights and powers by the Hunan government Meanwhile, the population of the province could only wait and hope for peace, prosperity, and an orderly

government

Early in 1925, T'ang Sheng-chih, a divisional commander in the Hunan army, waged a military campaign which drove Chao Heng-ti, the commander-in-chief, out of the province. At this juncture, T'ang despatched an emissary to Canton to begin negotiations for an alliance with the Kuomintang.¹² Obviously, T'ang wished to prevent Chao Heng-ti or any of the Chihli men from taking Hunan, but only an alliance with a superior counterforce would assure the success of this policy. Too weak to resist the Chihli military force, too late not to accept the provincial constitution, and just in time to face the growth in demand for power among the non-military groups in Hunan, T'ang indeed held an impossible position.*

On the other hand, the opportunities of others rapidly evolved after 1925. In Canton, the Kuomintang and its newly formed National Government and National Revolutionary Army preferred the Hunan route to the Yangtze. In this preference, they were not only following the pattern established in the two earlier Northern Expeditions of 1922 and 1924, but also working to prevent the extension of Chihli power into Hunan.

If we assume the importance of provincial bonds, then it appears that a large Hunanese representation in the National Revolutionary Army would be of critical importance to the success of the Third Northern Expedition of 1926. These young men were especially suited for the role of revolutionary cadre, having grown up with a heritage of aggressive response to the West and to the Peking government. As we know, extraordinarily large numbers of Hunanese were recruited for the third and fourth Whampoa cadet classes in the summer of 1925. Both of

* Whatever their internal quarrels, Tang and his military subordinates in Hunan apparently felt compelled to support the constitution as a tool for unifying the province against exterior military threats. Simultaneously, other groups with the Hunanese heritage of aggressive action demanded new rights. Not only were there the young intellectuals and revolutionaries such as Mao Tse tung, but also, beginning in the autumn of 1922, union labor struck frequently for better working conditions in central Hunan including Changsha. Until 1926, these strikes were not lead by members of the Kuomintang, or by Communists.

these classes graduated in time to participate in all or part of the Third Northern Expedition. Undoubtedly, the presence of these young, spirited men facilitated the success of the National Revolutionary Army as it pushed up the Hsiang valley.

Within Hunan itself, it was not only the ardent youth, merchant-landlord groups, industrial proletariat, and intellectuals who craved something new in society.¹³ As Mao-Tse-tung learned so well during his agitation among the peasants in 1926, the peasantry was ripe for a change, although not necessarily one compatible with landlord interests. Most of the population was ripe for overturning, and in the name of bringing order, self-respect, and a new life to China, the Kuomintang, the National Government, and the National Revolutionary Army with its Whampoa graduates were preparing to capitalize on this sentiment. By 1928, not only Hunan, but most of the country, would find itself in a new era.

NOTES

1 Excerpt from Sun Yat-sen's inaugural speech to the first cadet class of the Whampoa Military School, see Sun Yat-sen, *Kuo fu ch'üan chi* [Complete Works of Sun Yat-sen], Chung-yang tang shih shih k'o pien tsuan wei yüan hui, ed. (Taipei, 1957), III, 437. The speech is also printed in *Chung-yang lu chün chün kuan hsüeh hsiao ti shih san ch'ü t'ung-hsüeh lu* [Student Directory of the Thirteenth Class (1938) of the Central Military Officers' Academy] (T'ung liang, 1938), unnumbered section in front of Directory. Hereafter cited as *Directory*. While the School opened early in May, 1924, Sun did not speak until June 16.

2 The name of the school changed several times during the period 1924-1928. From May, 1924, to January 12, 1926, the title was Whampoa chün hsiao (Whampoa Military School), from this time until January, 1928, the name was Chung-yang chün shih cheng chih hsüeh hsiao (Central Military and Political Academy), in January, 1928, the school was formally moved from Whampoa Island in the Hsi River near Canton to Nanking, and from then until 1937 was known as Chung-yang chün kuan hsüeh hsiao (Central Military Officers' Academy). See Chiang Chung-cheng, *San nien lai ti kuo min ke ming* [Chiang Kai-shek, *The Last Three Years of the National Revolution*] (Shanghai, 1929), pp. 147-154. Hereafter cited as *Last Three Years*.

3 The best English treatment of Whampoa is included in Frederick F. Liu, *A Military History of Modern China* (Princeton, 1954).

4 *Directory*, pp. 37-66. The *Directory* includes not only personal and

family names, but also the hsien or city native places for virtually every cadet in the first thirteen classes

5 Albert Herrmann, *Historical and Commercial Atlas of China* (Cambridge, 1935), is the basic source for the sizes of populated places. The present terms "rural hsien" and "urban unit" are based on Herrmann's three population categories, see p. 68. Because relatively reliable population figures for cities were unavailable during the period in question, Herrmann's figures were checked against those found in Julean Arnold, comp., *China, A Commercial and Industrial Handbook*, U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, Trade Promotion Series, Number 38 (Washington, 1926), pp. 3-15, and relevant chapters in the book, and in *The China Year Book, 1926-1927*, p. 31.

6 Wilbur, *Documents*, pp. 320-321.

7 *Ibid.*, pp. 321, 323.

8 *Ibid.*, p. 324.

9 On the Canton Merchants' Association and Ch'en Ch'ung-ming see Li Chien-nung, *The Political History of China, 1840-1928*, Ssu-yu Teng and Jeremy Ingalls, trans. and eds. (Princeton, 1956), pp. 464-466, 495-496. Cited hereafter as *Political History*.

10 Julean Arnold, comp., *Commercial Handbook of China*, U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, Miscellaneous Series, Number 84 (Washington, 1919), I, 417.

11 Materials on federalism in Hunan may be found in Li, *Political History*, pp. 402-405 and Chien Tuan-sheng, *The Government and Politics of China* (Cambridge, 1950), pp. 77-78. On women and the Hunan constitution, see Chow Tse-tung, *The May Fourth Movement, Intellectual Revolution in Modern China* (Cambridge, 1960), pp. 258-259, cited hereafter as *May Fourth*. Li and Ch'ien disagree on the question of the longevity of the Hunan constitutional government. Since Li gives more detailed and specific information on Hunan, his dating is accepted as correct.

12 Wilbur, *Documents*, p. 230, n. 109.

13 Chow, *May Fourth*, pp. 74-75, 258-259, and 348-349 gives some understanding of the vast and complex ferment of ideals current among Hunanese intellectuals and youth in the 1920's.

Family Roles as Conceived by Japanese Children¹

J L FISCHER

Tulane University

This paper reports and discusses some findings of a study of the personality characteristics of people in various family roles as conceived and reported by a sample of Japanese school children, using the technique developed by the psychologist Charles E Osgood and his colleagues known as the "semantic differential"² This study is part of a research project investigating the effect of household composition on the personality development of Japanese children, although this paper does not deal with household composition except in passing The field work for this was conducted in the city of Fukuoka, on Northern Kyushu, during the US academic year 1961-1962 As a unit of study we chose a middle-school district in a fairly homogeneous middle-class area of the city and an elementary school district within this In each grade from third through ninth (i e, third grade of middle school) three classes were chosen for investigation This amounted to about 150 students per grade, divided about equally between boys and girls, although the ratio of boys was somewhat higher in the middle school, as was the number of students per class and grade

The semantic differential questionnaire regarding family members was one of four paper-and-pencil instruments administered during the year The actual instructions to the children were given in all cases by one man, Mr Fumitake Yamashita, who assisted full-time during the entire period of field work Mr Yamashita had undergone graduate training in anthro-

pology and had himself had experience as a teacher in elementary and middle school. The questionnaires were given on a group basis, each class answering separately.

We devised the form of questionnaire in Fukuoka after examining material kindly provided by Prof. Osgood and Dr. Yasumasa Tanaka, then a graduate student of Osgood's. Especially important for our purposes were the results of a factor analysis of a series of adjective scales elicited specifically to describe personality³ and a series of Japanese adjective scales for personality elicited by Dr. Tanaka for a study he was then conducting.⁴ Using this material we endeavored to choose six adjective scales which would cover as many different aspects of the personality as possible. We assumed that most children would be loyal to their families and accordingly tried to avoid adjective pairs one of which would imply severe criticism of family members and therefore be little used by the respondents. On this criterion, scales 1, 4, and 5 were the most successful. The six scales finally chosen were, in order of appearance on the form:

- 1 "Quiet/noisy" (*shizuka/urusai*)
- 2 "Bad-natured/good-natured" (*hito ga warui/hito ga yoi*)
- 3 "Bright/dark" (*akaiui/kurai*)
- 4 "Strong-willed/weak-willed" (*ki ga tsuyoi/ki ga yowai*)
- 5 "Frightful/gentle" (*kowai/yasashii*)
- 6 "Different/ordinary" (*kawatte iru/fustai*)

While no factor analysis of these adjective scales in Japanese existed at the time we began our study, the difference in profiles of family members on each of them compared to any other suggests that they are all fairly independent of each other. Additional scales would have been of interest but after pretests we felt that more than six would have been an undue imposition on the time of the teachers and school children.

The family members listed as "concepts" to be rated on the adjective scales included those relatives, from the child's point of view, who might be expected to be living in a traditional Japanese stem family household: grandfather, grandmother, the two parents, two older siblings, and two younger siblings. We also added "self." Of course, not all students had all of these

relatives in their homes or even in existence. We asked them to rate an imaginary relative or a friend's relative if they themselves had none in a certain category. In the case of older and younger siblings there is no definite limit to the number of relatives one might have in each category. We therefore asked those who had more than one in a category to rate the most extreme individual. For instance, if a boy had three elder brothers and four younger sisters he should think of his eldest brother and youngest sister as making the ratings. We also asked the children to indicate for each relative whether or not they had such a relative. Using this information we intend to analyze the differences between real and imaginary relatives at a later date.

TABLE I
MEAN RATINGS ON SIX ADJECTIVES ASSIGNED BY EGO TO SELF AND EIGHT RELATIVES (BY SEX AND SCHOOL GROUP)

Relative	Elementary School N = 285						BOYS						Middle School N = 246					
	Adjective*												Adjective					
	1	2	3	4	5	6	1	2	3	4	5	6	1	2	3	4	5	6
GFa	2.56	4.02	1.97	2.23	3.54	3.92	2.71	4.17	2.08	2.28	3.79	3.81	2.54	4.09	2.15	2.69	4.06	4.04
GMo	2.16	4.31	1.97	2.68	4.10	4.19	2.54	4.09	2.15	2.69	4.06	4.04	2.85	4.06	1.98	2.17	3.32	4.08
Fa	2.73	4.16	1.77	1.88	3.17	4.13	2.85	4.06	1.98	2.17	3.32	4.08	2.66	4.22	1.80	2.53	3.86	4.44
Mo	2.50	4.23	1.73	2.34	3.59	4.38	2.66	4.22	1.80	2.53	3.86	4.44	2.98	4.03	1.80	2.32	3.60	4.03
EBr	3.00	3.87	1.84	1.97	3.19	4.02	2.98	4.03	1.80	2.32	3.60	4.03	2.70	4.02	1.76	2.65	4.02	4.20
ES ₁	2.82	3.75	1.78	2.74	3.66	4.15	2.70	4.02	1.76	2.65	4.02	4.20	2.77	4.07	1.69	2.78	3.84	4.12
Ego	2.90	3.92	1.70	2.51	3.54	4.17	2.77	4.07	1.69	2.78	3.84	4.12	3.55	3.84	1.62	2.22	3.67	3.97
YBr	3.61	3.54	1.71	2.42	3.40	3.83	3.55	3.84	1.62	2.22	3.67	3.97	3.14	3.74	1.68	2.53	3.76	4.12
YS ₁	3.22	3.72	1.85	2.68	3.55	3.72	3.14	3.74	1.68	2.53	3.76	4.12						

Relative	Elementary School N = 283						GIRLS						Middle School N = 208					
	1	2	3	4	5	6	1	2	3	4	5	6	1	2	3	4	5	6
GFa	2.58	4.31	2.37	2.48	3.83	3.90	2.72	4.25	2.16	2.59	3.86	3.93	2.68	4.12	2.16	2.64	4.10	4.18
GMo	2.32	4.41	2.05	2.89	4.23	4.21	2.68	4.12	2.16	2.64	4.10	4.18	2.89	4.23	1.92	2.33	3.65	4.18
Fa	2.74	4.30	1.75	2.06	3.74	4.23	2.89	4.23	1.92	2.33	3.65	4.18	2.86	4.32	1.50	2.51	4.00	4.55
Mo	2.62	4.28	1.66	2.55	3.78	4.50	2.86	4.32	1.50	2.51	4.00	4.55	3.08	4.08	1.60	2.31	3.82	4.14
EBr	3.23	3.83	1.73	2.17	3.59	4.08	3.08	4.08	1.60	2.31	3.82	4.14	2.62	4.25	1.59	2.55	4.11	4.37
ES ₁	2.58	4.15	1.76	2.63	3.98	4.24	2.62	4.25	1.59	2.55	4.11	4.37	3.07	4.01	1.69	2.73	3.70	4.32
Ego	2.91	3.88	1.78	2.65	3.85	4.16	3.07	4.01	1.69	2.73	3.70	4.32	3.65	3.93	1.47	2.57	3.68	4.01
YBr	3.55	3.67	1.56	2.44	3.52	4.15	3.65	3.93	1.47	2.57	3.68	4.01	3.29	3.96	1.50	2.38	3.87	4.14
YS ₁	3.18	3.84	1.55	2.47	3.81	4.01	3.29	3.96	1.50	2.38	3.87	4.14						

* Scoring was on a 1 to 5 scale with 1 indicating most and 5 indicating least or the opposite of the trait specified by the adjective. Key to adjectives

1—Quiet

2—Bad natured

3—Bright

4—Strong willed

5—Frightening

6—Different

A summary of the statistical results is given in Table I

In this table our sample of students is divided into four groups boys and girls in elementary school and in middle school. For each of the four groups of students, the table gives the average value for each kind of relative on each of the six personality adjective scales. The scales each contained five points, one of which the respondent was required to choose. For statistical purposes we have assigned the value of "1" to the extreme position by the first adjective of each scale pair with successive numbers up to "5" for the extreme position by the second (opposite) adjective. Thus, for example, on the first scale "1" means "very quiet," "2" means "somewhat quiet," "3" means "neither quiet nor noisy" or "about equally quiet and noisy," "4" means "somewhat noisy," and "5" means "very noisy."

Needless to say, English translations of the adjective scales are only approximate and for convenience in reference. For instance, the adjective *akarui*, here translated as "bright," might also have been translated as "sunny" or "cheerful," since it refers in Japanese to disposition rather than intelligence as it does in English. Nevertheless its basic meaning is that of "bright" in an optical sense. The meaning of the adjective scales will be somewhat clarified in the discussion of results which follows.

A full discussion of the contents of the table would require considerable space. Moreover, some of the differences in ratings of relatives are rather small and statistically very unreliable. I shall therefore confine myself to noting and discussing briefly for each of the six scales the maximum contrasts between relatives, and certain other outstanding patterns which seem to say something of interest about family structure in our sample.

Scale 1 "Quiet/noisy" For both sexes and both age groups of respondents, male relatives are consistently rated as "noisier" than the corresponding female relative. All four sex-age groups rate "younger brother" as "noisiest." Both age groups of boys and the elementary-school girls rate "grandmother" as the "quietest," although middle-school girls rate "elder sister" as more "quiet" than any other family member. The middle-school girls' rating of "elder sister" as most "quiet" may reflect the increasing pressure on children for proper behavior as they enter adolescence and approach adulthood. "Quietness" would seem to be a

generally desirable personality trait, but one which is especially important for women

Scale 2 "Bad-natured/good-natured" In spite of the frequent use of the phrase *yoi ko*, "good children," in Japan, the children themselves rate all the adult relatives as "better-natured" than their age-mates. For elementary-school children of either sex the "best-natured" adult is "grandmother," while for middle-school children the "best-natured" adult is "mother." The shift from "grandmother" to "mother" may be due to the declining importance of grandparents for the middle-school children, due to death and progressive enfeeblement. The middle-school children have a higher opinion of their elder siblings' "good nature" than do the elementary-school children. This suggests that socialization is having a cumulative effect on the children: by the time they get to middle or high school their dispositions in this respect are approaching adult standards.

The one exception to the general tendency of the younger children to rate their peers as relatively "bad-natured" is found with respect to elementary-school girls rating their older sisters as rather "good-natured." That this effect is already noticeable among the elementary-school girls suggests that socialization pressures on girls may start or become effective at an earlier age than for boys.

Scale 3 "Bright/dark" "Brightness" as applied to personality in Japan appears to be a mixture of at least two factors: (1) a stoic cheerfulness which successfully conceals all displeasures, (2) genuine cheerfulness, which is mainly the result of indulgence and being given service, and also of physical health. Each sex tends to think of younger siblings of the same sex as especially "bright." Maybe this is partly the result of envy of the indulgence received by the younger sibling, with the thought, "If I received all that attention I would be 'bright'." Generally children would tend to be more envious of siblings of the same sex.

Both boys and girls agree that grandparents are the least "bright." Apparently the loss of vitality and health accompanying old age is enough to darken the lives of the old people, in spite of the relatively great respect and indulgence which they traditionally receive in Japan. Alternately, one might take the "dark-

ening" of the grandparents as an index of the cultural decline of respect for old age among the families of our sample children. Personally, in view of other evidence, I doubt that this shift accounts for much of the results.

Scale 4 "Strong-willed/weak-willed" For both sexes, "father" and then "elder brother" are "strongest-willed." This would appear to reflect the prestige of the active male in the Japanese family, and the deference to the first son. For middle-school boys and girls of either sex the "weakest-willed" relative is "grandmother," presumably because of her traditional penchant for indulging the whims of her grandchildren. For elementary-school boys, however, "elder sister" is even more "weak-willed" than grandmother. Possibly when they are fairly young elder sisters especially enjoy taking an indulgent pseudo-maternal attitude toward their younger brothers, and the boys themselves enjoy this. Perhaps later, as the boys reach puberty and become more independent of home, more reserve develops in the relationship with elder sister: she is not asked for so much and does not volunteer so much, and thus appears "stronger-willed" than she did when younger.

Scale 5 "Frightful/gentle" For middle-school children of either sex the most "frightful" relative is "father." However, for elementary-school boys the most "frightful" relative is "older brother," while for girls it is "younger brother." "Grandmother" is the most "gentle" relative for elementary-school children of either sex, while "elder sister" is "gentlest" for middle-school children of either sex.

The relative decline in "frightfulness" or increase in "gentleness" of siblings as the children grow older and enter middle school support the idea that sibling rivalry is relatively muted in Japan and is successfully brought under control by adolescence.

In general one would expect the most "frightful" sibling to be an older sibling of the same sex, since the greatest rivalry would be likely to exist between siblings of the same sex, and the older sibling would be powerful enough to be a formidable rival. As noted above, this holds for elementary-school boys (and also for middle-school boys, incidentally), but does not hold for elementary-school (or middle-school) girls, who rate "younger

brother" as the most "frightful" sibling. Probably this may be explained by a difference in the roles of male and female children in the Japanese family, namely, that boys are permitted much more aggression than girls. When this is combined with the greater permissiveness extended to young children to be aggressive it is not surprising that girls should fear their younger brothers above all siblings.

Scale 6 "Different/ordinary." For the most part the results on this scale pattern quite neatly. The children of either sex rate male relatives as more "different" than the corresponding female relatives, e.g., "father" is more "different" than "mother," etc. For many respondents to agree that people in certain family roles are more "different" suggests that the social structure actually gives more freedom to these individuals to follow their personal inclinations. It is therefore interesting that the age distribution of ratings of "different" follows the "shallow U-curve" of freedom in the Japanese life cycle which Benedict described in *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword*.⁵ The most "different" relatives are first, younger siblings, and then grandparents, who are in the "free areas" of relatively early childhood and old age, respectively.

One exception to the pattern outlined above may be worthy of note. Elementary-school children of either sex rate "younger brother," though male, as more "ordinary" than "younger sister." I suspect that this is another bit of evidence of the differential effect of elementary school on boys as compared with girls. It appears that it is harder for boys than for girls to adjust to elementary school. This may be partly because girls anywhere mature somewhat more rapidly than boys, on the average, but also probably involves a comparison of school with home by the children. For boys, who have been more indulged at home than the girls, the relatively impartial treatment which they receive from their teacher seems threatening and restrictive, while to girls, who have been more suppressed at home, the school seems liberating. Other evidence from a dream questionnaire administered both in the homes and in school supports this view. More of the boys who answered the question in school recalled and reported restrictive dreams than those answering at home, while for girls

the reverse effect was observed.⁶ Since the respondents to the semantic differential questionnaire range from third to ninth grades it seems likely that more of their younger brothers would be somewhere in elementary school. The results of this questionnaire suggest that the boys not only feel the school as restrictive but that the school experience makes them for a while visibly more conformist than their sisters.

In the answers of the middle-school boys the general principle of greater freedom for males in Japan reasserts itself and "younger brother" is rated as clearly more "different" than "younger sister." In the view of the middle-school girls, however, "younger sister" is still rated as a little more "different" (and "free?") than "younger brother," although middle school girls rate the two younger siblings as almost the same on this scale, while elementary-school girls have a marked difference in rating.

CONCLUSION

In general, the pattern emerging from the ratings of family members which this sample of middle-class, urban Japanese children produced is consistent with certain traditional features of Japanese family life, such as the greater deference to and indulgence of males, the importance of seniority, greater personal freedom and less responsibility at both ends of life, including specifically the freedom of the grandmother to "spoil" her grandchildren, and moderately strong sibling ties with a fairly effective suppression of sibling rivalry in older children.

These findings are not necessarily to be taken as indicating that the Japanese urban family is undergoing no important changes, but they may suggest that the changes are not yet of truly revolutionary scale in this class group at least. To utilize these findings for the investigation of change in family structure in Japan will require replications of this study in other Japanese samples, ideally over a period of a number of years. It is quite possible that we would then be able to observe differences suggesting that the various family members are rising and falling on different scales and that these movements would make sense in

terms of theories of social change Hopefully additional field studies can be arranged in the future

NOTES

1 This is a revised version of a paper presented at the annual Midwest Conference on Asian Affairs, Lincoln, Nebraska, October, 1963 Financial support for the field research was provided by the US National Science Foundation (Grant G-16817) and the Wenner Gren Foundation I would also like to acknowledge with thanks the cooperation in Fukuoka of Prof Teigo Yoshida and other members of the Research Institute of Comparative Education and Culture of Kyushu University, of the City Board of Education of Fukuoka and Principals M Inoue and F Yoshitake of the West Takamiya Elementary School and the Takamiya Middle School respectively, and their staffs and pupils, and of three volunteer ladies, Mrs H Morimoto, Mrs M Shimizu, and Mrs S Morita I would also acknowledge further financial support from the National Science Foundation for the analysis of the data collected (Grants G-24517 and GS-269), as well as the helpful assistance of the staff of the Tulane University Computer Center In preparing this paper I have had the useful advice of Mr Kazukimi Ebuchi of Kyushu and Tulane Universities, he should not, however, be held responsible for the deficiencies of the paper

2 Charles E Osgood, *et al*, *The Measurement of Meaning* (Urbana, Ill University of Illinois Press, 1957)

3 Charles E Osgood, *Studies on the Generality of Affective Meaning Systems*, (Urbana, Ill University of Illinois, Institute of Communications Research, 1961)

4 Personal communication

5 Ruth Benedict, *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword* (Boston Houghton Mifflin, 1946), p 254

6 J L Fischer, "Typical Dreams in Japanese Children" Paper presented at annual meeting, American Anthropological Association, Chicago (Nov, 1962)

Split Selves and Fractured Karma

WINSTON L. KING

Vanderbilt University

About two years ago, quite unexpectedly, I received in the mail one day from Mr. T. Magness of Bangkok—a person totally unknown to me, even though I had spent a full five days in Bangkok in 1958—two paper-covered volumes entitled *Samma Ditthi* (Right Understanding) and *Sammā Samādhi* (Right Concentration). Immediately I began to read one of them, being intrigued to find a Theravada Buddhist quoting from Alfred North Whitehead, but then they got somehow displaced from my mainstream of reading. And thus it was not till this past winter that I actually got around to reading them straight through. And not till I was well through my second volume, the *Samma Ditthi*, did I realize that I was encountering something brand new, at least to me, in Theravada Buddhism. When I discovered this I wrote Mr. Magness, who promptly and generously gave answers to my questions about his theory of split-personality or psychic-offshoots and their relation to the Buddhist doctrines of karma and rebirth. From his books and letters I will attempt to present something of his doctrine.

But first it will be best briefly to present an outline of the basic Buddhist doctrine of selfhood as a background before dealing with the psychic-offshoot doctrine.

THE TRADITIONAL BUDDHIST THEORY OF SELFHOOD

According to this doctrine each of us sentient individuals here assembled is one life-moment of an endless chain of life-moments of individualized existence, which has been projecting itself anew,

moment by moment, life by life, and age after age, in many forms from some primordial but unspecifiable beginning about which Buddhism refuses to speculate. This chain-of-being will continue to project itself forward into an indefinite future eternity, propelled by the blind will to be (or *tanhā*, the thirst for existence), unless it achieves an absolute detachment from all desire-to-be in some new form, and thus gains Nirvana.

This process may be viewed from two somewhat different perspectives. We may take it in *cross-section*, i.e., by an analysis of an existent sentient being at any one moment of its existence. In this perspective Buddhism holds that there is no integral self to be found in the final analysis of self, though of course there is an empirically perceptible being-of-sorts. This conviction it states in its doctrine of *anattā*—non-self, no self, or no-soul. What appears to be a personal individual, says Buddhism, is actually a composite bundle of five loosely related factors, one of *tangible form* (including *physical form*) and four others comprising the feeling, volitional, and consciousness components. These have no true center, be it repeated, the so-called persons which we conceive our selves to be, are of *dependent origination*, i.e., formed by the momentary association of our component factors which *together* make up a kind of "person" of illusory substantiality. But this person is never a true unity and comes completely unglued or unwound at physical death. It is more like a stream, to use another favorite Buddhist analogy, which is contained within the rough limits of its banks, i.e., individualized form, but it is really a flowing, momentarily changing current of mental-physical events, rather than a substance, an "amorphous plurality," to use Mr. Magness' excellent phrase. It is only an impersonal blind will-to-be that thrusts forward from moment to moment and life to life, taking unto itself ever different sets of five-fold factors to form a new pseudo-being at each rebirth.

There is also another way of portraying this essential unreality of the so-called individual being. And this is the doctrine of the "four heaps" or streams of personality. This differs from the above view of the individual as a fivefold bundle of constituent factors, only in emphasis and context, by describing individuality in its formative process. Each heap or stream is one of four *successive* and *causally related* stages of development, but each state, heap,

or stream is itself fivefold And secondarily, in some sense that I am not fully certain of, these heaps are also constitutive *levels* of being

1 The first heap or stage, and basic ingredient or fundamental level of a new being, is "The aggregate stream of the immediately past life which descends to rebirth in a womb" at the moment of conception It is comprised of ignorance (of its former births and its own illusory nature), desire, grasping tendencies toward new life, and "mental impulsions of becoming" These comprise the basic karmic deposit from the past, as yet only potential but reaching out hungrily for new form "The bulk of Kamma [Karma] is condensed into the first heap, the other three heaps preserve only the residue For it is the first heap that is to be built into the parami self"

2 The second heap, stage, stream, or level of personal being is the receptacle-vehicle comprising the empirically perceivable "substance," as it were, of the fivefold body-mind individuality which each one of us is It comes into being as a result of the combination of the first-heap karmic thrust or stream with the male and female physical elements The thrusting-desiring-grasping karmic impulse of the first stream draws to itself the as-yet-dissociated second-heap elements of new being, as a magnet attracts iron filings The elements of this new fivefold being at first are "purely receptive and negative, and at birth are devoid of immediate ethical responsibility"

3 The third heap, stream, or level represents the past karmic inheritance of the first heap or stream, having received its renewed actual embodiment in the second-heap elements, and "it is this third stream which accumulates fresh kamma [karma] and condenses it down into the two preceding streams, leaving an impress therein" In other words, this third stage or stream of becoming is the new "self" *in active engagement with its environment in thought and action*, taking into itself at its deepest levels abiding influences and characteristics which will thenceforth be components of its essential nature This is the dynamic-positive aspect of the new sentient being, in qualifying, altering, and interactive relation to what has been given it by karmic inheritance and to its new mind-body form (i.e., the sum of the first two streams) These two first streams, interacting with the individual's

environment, form the enlarging, Karma-accumulating individuality of the third heap, and comprise the ongoing base of personal process

4 From the third stream or heap or stage, as active and dynamic, arises the fourth one which is "futuristic in content. That is, a negative group for future rebirth and reception of impressions" This stage, or this stream, in confluence with the other streams and resulting from the other stages, represents the total "self" of successive states interacting externally with environment, internally with its own component streams, and all together thrusting forward in time by futuristic intention, thus accumulating a new karmic destiny¹

Now whether or not we grasp all the subtleties of this analysis, it is clear that it emphasizes in a second way the non-integrality of personal being, by portraying it as a bundle of streams or levels of energy-for-becoming, neither more nor less. But it brings into play another factor which represents the second perspective from which we can view the process of selfhood, namely the *longitudinal-section* view which calls attention to the factors of *continuity*. Now this *continuity*, even if not continuing *identity*, of successive states or stages of becoming, is fully as important as the non-integrality (according to the cross-sectional view) of the becoming-process (or person) at a given moment. *For it is then continuity that gives the successive states their significance.* And that continuity, within the individual life stream, is *absolutely integral*, with no mingling sidestreams, no confluence of separate personal-being streams with each other. There may be a slight porosity of the banks of that stream of being that is "I"—that is, "outside" influences may penetrate my consciousness and influence my course—but the central identity of the forward thrust into new being, moment by moment, life by life, is purely my own, and this, not in the sense of an identical soul or self that passes from life to life, but in the sense of a self-contained Karmic stream of forward-thrusting-into-being, whose new states or positions in time are the result of one and only one linear set of previous body-mind events. To repeat: The karmic integrity of this individualized stream of being is absolute through the ages.

Now it is important for our purposes here to observe briefly the ideal perfection of the factor of *continuity* as achieved in the lives of the saints and Buddhas. They are initially subject to karma as other men, and are composed of the same four-heap and five-factor selfhood. But theirs is a superior use of karma. *For they are the embodiment of a victorious and ever-cumulative will-to-perfection*. Whereas the lives of ordinary beings describe an indecisive seesaw of varying karmic fortune and uncertain will, those who become saints and Buddhas do so by the unceasing performance of worthy and insightful deeds which cumulatively bear their fruit in an increased capacity for spiritual accomplishment and self-control that finally achieves a superior kind of cohesiveness. One may say that with such persons, the longitudinally-viewed cumulative continuity of their will-to-liberation becomes dominant over the cross-sectional quality of individuality as *anattā*, or "amorphous plurality." The forward-upward tending dynamism of this will-to-perfection is the *essential* quality of their karmic life-stream, they represent self-created centers of dynamic power for good. The mere blind thrust of Karmic energy into a new existence is progressively transformed into a fully conscious, deliberate and irresistible drive toward the perfection of enlightenment.

In passing, it may be observed that the only difference between the saint and the Buddha is the relative thickness, so to speak, of the sheaf of capacities composing this dynamic new self which each carries on into the future. Sainthood (as seen in Theravada Buddhism) is composed of a sheerly individualized will-to-release of the thickness of a needle-pointed thrust toward Nirvana. Buddhas, because of a millionfold number of existences lived under the compulsion of a vow to achieve ultimate Buddhahood, are by contrast massive forward thrusts of moral-mental perfections (*pāramīs*) which enable them, upon their final enlightenment, to teach and sustain others in the way to Nirvana, besides achieving their own Nirvana. And such is the force of these accumulated perfections that they somehow remain as a mystical and dynamically present force in the world *after* the Buddha has entered into his own inaccessible Nirvana.

SPLIT-PERSONALITY KARMA AND ITS CURE

We are now ready to turn to the split-personality doctrine proposed by Mr Magness. This doctrine may be stated thus. The loose congeries of factors that make up the pseudo self of the cross sectional view (*anattā* or non-self stream of being) may become dissociated into new selves, especially upon death, each of which splinter selves or psychic-offshoots then takes its own separate course of karmic being—though it takes some time for such a self to accumulate much self-being even of the illusory sort (It may wander as a disembodied spirit for long ages). In such an interpretation of *The Three Faces of Eve*, had Eve died when the three selves within her were struggling for mastery, she might have split into three new sub selves who might not have recognized each other at their next encounter in their next lives. A quotation or two will give Mr Magness' account of this situation.


At death, due to lack of integration and purification at one firmly poised and oriented center, these four heaps of personality make a total split and go their ways² (see Diagram I).

When a man dies, the main stream of consciousness, or life-continuum process (*bhavanga sota*), though it continues to activate as a stream, has offshoots. That is, under the force of the grasping impulsions which accumulated from antecedent environmental contact (but constrained by the centripetal gravitational force in the organism) the main stream is split off into sub streams, each instinct with a separate life-continuum process of its own henceforth (not unlike the divided amoebae).

Thus what is perpetuated is not static identical singularity but, rather, amorphous plurality. Each separate life-continuum process is then propelled to its own kammic [karmic] destiny, sometimes taking rebirth immediately. Once separated thus, it would scarcely be to the point to say that one such life-continuum has an identification with another. The logical conclusion is that a man may meet one of his former life-continuum fragments incarnate and never so much as recognize the connection.³

Here then is a variant form of the *anattā* or four-stream conception of being. It emphatically asserts that there is no true self-identical person at any moment, nor any identity carrying on from life to life, that dependent-origination-identity is not true iden-

DIAGRAM I



tuty Yet it is different from the assertion that the five factors simply come apart upon death, in its statement that the pseudo-self comes apart into subordinate *selves*, or split-karmic streams—each of which becomes a new five-factor pseudo-self. For Mr. Magness this neatly explains or confirms two tangential Buddhist doctrines: (1) the seemingly infinite perpetuation of the number of selves to be reborn, though the "original" total number has been reduced by those attaining Nirvana, and (2) why it is that the memory of one's past lives—attainable by psychic discipline—peters out in the far past into an indistinct haze. The unperceivable beginning of a "self" represents its split-off point into sub-selfhood at some past time. Of course each splinter-self, though "but a recent product of environmental friction and contact," containing only a fraction of the parent stream's qualities, nevertheless as a proud pseudo-self "considers itself to be unique, god given and eternal"⁴.


Such is the negative side of psychic off-shoots, so to speak. Must one then consign himself to be thus forever split and re-split into an infinitude of sub-selves?—most distressing to self-respecting Westerners! Where in all this is the hope of Nirvana?—for Nirvana for all its seeming negativity is not a mere zero-end of self-fragmentation, but the maximization of one special sort of *self-becoming*. The whole point of Mr. Magness' work is the delineation of the positive prospect of achieving "true self-inte-

gration"—though this phrase is distinctly not Theravadin

Thus also it is said that insofar as the individual is concerned he can be said to endure from existence to existence *only to the extent that his paramis (perfect qualities of consciousness) are preserved intact* ⁵

The way to release, therefore, is a unification, integration, and purging of all rebirth factors, so as to eliminate any further reproduction of the amorphous plurality which perpetuates existence in the world spheres, without end ⁶

The way of release is then a genuine integration of those factors found in the ongoing stream of pseudo-selfhood, which is only a series of successive states, causally related to each other but otherwise discontinuous, into a new self of genuine integrity, a self capable of salvation in Nirvana. It should be noted that this is the maximization of the element of continuity, observable in the longitudinal-section view of life and which is best achieved by the saints' and Buddhas' will-to-perfection. It is the creation, along the way, of a non-splitting, true selfhood composed of an enduring entity of spiritual deeds (see Diagram II)



Before speaking a little further of the *religious* implications of this new and integral salvation-self, it is of interest to observe Mr. Magness' interpretation of the *psychological* process involved in the creation of this new self. Briefly, it is a process by which there is deliberately formed an integrated self-consciousness which is superior to, i.e., more deeply central and more tightly unified than, all of the separative self-fragments which compose ordinary and peripheral selves. It is a process in which all levels

of the self are united into an integral unity, from the ongoing subconscious life-stream (*bhavanga-sota*) which flows onward even during sleep and is the lowest common denominator of all life, up to and including the highest levels of explicit consciousness of saintly and Buddha awareness. In response to my question as to whether some of his descriptions of the action and interaction of consciousness and subconsciousness during the process of self-remaking were Freudian or reverse-Freudian, Mr Magness replied in part

The collective experience of the parami-self cannot be to the fore of consciousness in its completeness at any given moment. What is not to the fore is sunk and collected in a receptacle which is the *bhavanga*, its subconscious otherness. When it is said that the peripheral mind must be sunk down into the *bhavanga*, what is actually meant is to sink it down and then edge it up two finger-breadths above the *bhavanga*. If it is not edged up there will be no full *bhavanga* awareness, there will be only submergence into the ceaseless random flow of the subconscious stream. It is edged up thus so as to be near the *bhavanga* stream, so that it can dip into it at will, just as one dips into a stream and retrieves flowing objects therein. It is correct to say that by so doing the peripheral mind is deepened and made aware of experience unplumbed (brought over from other lives, as well as opening new horizons which may arise). It is also correct to say that it is the redemption of the subconscious by making it conscious?

Now some of the imagery here is esoterically Buddhist. The two-finger distance above the *bhavanga*-stream center, located near the navel, goes back to an ancient Hindu-Buddhist theory of psycho-physiology and its appropriate meditative techniques, nor is the picking up of the memories of past lives particularly Freudian—no matter how vast the subconscious realm is conceived to be! But the psychological bearings are clear. Conscious and subconscious levels of awareness are broken open to each other, and by their interrelation a new integral unity is created, containing elements of both. Not only is the superficial ordinary consciousness brought into vital contact with its own inward roots and hidden sources, but the turbid irrational currents of the subconscious life-force (or Id) are brought to clarity, redeemed by consciousness, and made part of a new self-consciousness which is

neither sub- nor super- but integral As Mr Magness goes on to say

Because his subconscious is pure the arahatta [i.e., the saint ready for Nirvana] has no delusive or morbid dreams⁸

But of course for the Buddhist the result is far more than the merely psychological renewal and integration of the person. It is a salvational process as well. This new self that results from the intermingling of the *bhavanga-sota* (subconscious continuum) and rational consciousness under proper auspices, is the parami-self. Its unification and purification of the ordinary fractionated pseudo self's impulses and drives constitutes a self capable of liberation from the impersonality of karmic being, and preserves it unto true Nibbanic selfhood with no further fractioning.

As a consistent Buddhist, however, Mr Magness is very emphatic that this new self is not the Hindu atman or primordial transcendent soul in disguise.

The nature of the transcendence of the new self that arises is not to be considered as inherent in individuality, for that would be tantamount to championing the doctrine of a permanent soul flowing on unchanged, from some primordial source. It is indeed created by self-action, but by no means is the self which created it originally transcendent. It is not a matter of original transcendence but transmutation.⁹

And every human self has at least a latent capacity to thus take the elements of its *anattā* (non- or pseudo-self) and transmute them into a *finally* transcendent self.

Now does this integration or transmutation of self, which results in Nirvana's attainment, signify the utter cessation of selfhood? Mr Magness quite emphatically denies such a conclusion. For, were annihilation the case,

it would be a contradiction in terms, for one does not integrate one self through a process of aeons merely to disintegrate again into some ocean of forgetfulness. Super selfhood [my phrase] is just the end-result of the aeonic process, and Buddhas at the moment in Nibbana [Nirvana] are certainly imbued with consciousness or they wouldn't be what they are. Their radiance fills the ocean of Nibbana.¹⁰

POSTSCRIPT

What is the significance of this doctrinal statement of Mr Magness? Writes he "I have proposed nothing new at all, but rather these doctrines have been imposed on me as the result of prolonged investigation. It is not book-learning which clarifies doctrines but the understanding which one brings thereto, revealing old doctrines in fresh light"¹¹ Nor is he concerned with whether "Buddhist orthodoxy" finds him "heretical" or not—since that "orthodoxy" is a body of inconsistent doctrinal variations, in his opinion.

To me as an outsider, Mr Magness' doctrine seems to have considerable Buddhist logic about it and to make more rational the doctrine of the karmic inheritance of personal characteristics. For I quite agree with him when he writes "It is always wrong in Buddhist circles to reduce everything to a naked karma-thrust"¹²

To me it also seems that Mr Magness has courageously made explicit what is largely implicit and subdued, and somewhat illogical, in Theravada orthodoxy because of its deep addiction to negative language, namely, the *dynamically positive quality of Buddhist salvation as a process of building a higher, more integrated self* (For "self" is always an evil term in Theravada no-soul orthodoxy) But actually "self-building" has a significant parallel in the widely received Theravada presumption that the infinite store of the Buddha's accumulated merits (his parami-self) remains as a *presently available and dynamic force for good and salvation among men*, though the Buddha himself, as an empirically perceptible self, has passed on into theoretically inaccessible Nirvana. And as I see it, the forging of an enduring *parami-self*, wrought of good deeds done in a meditational wisdom-context, is the *essence* of saint-making or salvation in Buddhism. It is therefore Mr Magness' great importance to attempt to rescue the anattā (no-self) doctrine from its sheer negativity, and the conception of karmic thrust from its nakedly characterless propulsion into new being¹³ And it is of great interest, and perhaps significance, that this no doubt represents a manifestation of the new *experiential* emphasis in Theravada Buddhism,

consequent upon the layman's very recent venture into the formerly exclusively monkish preserve of meditational discipline

NOTES

1 All quotations from letter of July 13, 1963

2 Letter, July 13, 1963

3 *Samma Ditthi*, p 69

4 *Ibid*, p 72

5 *Ibid*, p 69 (italics added)

6 *Ibid*, p 70

7 Letter, July 13, 1963, p 1

8 *Ibid*

9 *Ibid*, p 2

10 *Ibid*, p 1

11 Letter, September 15, 1963

12 Letter, July 13, 1963

13 Part of the "characterlessness" of the karmic thrust into new being may arise from my own misinterpretation of Buddhist karma. In any case I had not been so sharply aware, before reading Mr. Magness' writings, of other alternatives to the seeming bareness (i.e., devoidness of personal qualities) of the karmic thrust of a life into new individuality.

